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Introduction 
 
Gabriele De Anna and Riccardo Martinelli 
 
 
Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical phi-
losophers for some decades. Initially focused on problems related to se-
mantics, discussions about realism turned to problems in epistemology, 
in metaphysics, in theory of action and in ethics. In current debates we 
can observe a new return to realism, which seeks to overcome the anti-
realist implications of representational theories of the mind typical of 
modern philosophy. The realist trend has become one of the most origi-
nal contributions of analytical philosophy to contemporary thinking, a 
contribution which often also purports to offer a philosophical rehabili-
tation of more ancient ways of thinking (De Anna 2001). Starting from 
analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other con-
temporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in cur-
rent discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism” (De 
Caro and Ferraris 2012; Ferraris 2012; Possenti and Lavazza 2013). 
The implications of recent debates for political philosophy and politi-
cal practice have not yet been widely discussed. Generally, political theo-
rists still rely on a framework of practical rationality which pre-dates re-
cent discussions about realism and which postulates that the good is 
wholly subjective, i.e. relative to either individuals or societies (Rawls 
1971 and 1993; Habermas 1981). The hope is that, by assuming a sub-
jectivist view of rationality, clashes between the diverse positions upheld 
in complex contemporary societies may be prevented. Discussions about 
policy-making and public decisions in multicultural societies normally 
start from the assumption of this notion of rationality (Kymlicka 1996 
and 2007). This perspective, however, has proved to be deficient from 
the point of view of fostering convergence of identities into unitary and 
harmonic societies. It leads to fragmented societies, instead of construct-
ing communities where people may gradually converge on a shared view 
of what is worth achieving together. 
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The subjectivist view of practical rationality originated in early mod-
ern philosophy and was significant in European history – since it helped 
to recognize the legitimacy of different cultures within a wider anthropo-
logical, rather than metaphysical, intellectual outlook. Yet this ended by 
fostering idealistic (i.e. strongly anti-realistic) worldviews (Martinelli 
2004 and 2010). Nevertheless, it can be argued that cultural relativism 
does not necessarily imply idealism and that realism does not necessari-
ly deny the legitimacy of cultural diversity. 
The essays collected in this volume aim at discussing the framework 
of practical rationality for policy making which is usually assumed by 
current political theories, by considering the relevance for practical ra-
tionality in the political contexts of current debates on moral and epis-
temic realism, and on the ethical relevance of recent achievements of 
biological sciences. 
Debates about realism ensue from the work of contemporary philos-
ophers such as Hilary Putnam (1999), John McDowell (1998, 2004), 
Thomas Nagel (1986), etc. Unlike older, naïve versions of realism, the 
realism supported by recent analytical philosophers rejects the possibil-
ity of an absolute perspective on reality, while maintaining the notion 
that our cognitive efforts are at least partly constrained by objective reali-
ty. The moral upshot is that the good is not merely a subjective or social 
construction, but it is the result of typically human responses to the de-
mands of a reality that is structured in a certain way, and, due to its 
structure, has built-in possibilities of perfection. There is no absolute 
conception of the good, but still features of reality can be criteria for 
practical rationality and for the aptness of human subjective responses 
to problematic decisional situations (Putnam 2002 and 2004, Nagel 
1979, McDowell 1998). 
Discussions about the ethical relevance of recent findings in the bio-
logical sciences have contended – among other things – that the results 
of empirical investigations suggest that there are many homologies be-
tween human and animal behaviour, to the extent that it can hardly be 
denied that morality is deeply grounded on our animal nature, contra 
many subjectivist claims. This suggests that some moral notions are 
deeply rooted in our biological nature (Boniolo and De Anna 2006; De 
Waal 1998; Illies 2006; Hösle and Illies 2005). On the other hand, tran-
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scendental considerations suggest that human reasoning can justify the 
normativity of ethically guided action in humans. Again, this suggests a 
notion of ethics which is objective and anti-absolutistic at the same time 
(Illies 2003 and 2006; Nagel 1986 and 2012). 
The political upshots of these converging conclusions in epistemolo-
gy and in ethics are still object of discussion. Most importantly, the 
recognition that human practical rationality is ruled by what agents con-
ceive as objectively good has important implications for the notions of 
political authority and consent. On the one hand, against subjectivist 
views of the good, the new framework purports that arguments about 
what is good can have a justificatory and legitimating role in the practic-
es of political decision-making and in the formation of consent. On the 
other hand, against old-style realist views, the new framework denies 
that there is an absolute conception of the good, and is thereby sensitive 
to the subjective positions of those who have to consent to political au-
thority: this sets limits to political authority. Breaking those limits would 
constitute a violation of the humanity of those subject to authority, 
would progressively undermine their consent, and would hence destroy 
the very strength of authority and the coesion of the community (De 
Anna 2012a and 2012b; Besussi 2012 and 2013). 
How do recent conclusions about epistemic and moral realism 
change our ways of conceiving practical reason? And how does the ensu-
ing conception of practical reason change our ways of conceptualising 
politics, and affect our ways of practicing it? What are the normative im-
plications of this reconceptualisation? These essays intend to address 
these questions and subsequent issues. 
The first four papers of the collection focus on moral realism and 
jointly offer an account of realism which touch upon foundational issues 
(e.g, problems concerning the metaphysics of moral reality) and 
epistemological issues (e.g., problems concerning the character of 
practical rationality and the origins of normativity). 
Riccardo Martinelli’s essay, “Realism, Ontology, and the Concept of 
Reality,” focuses on metaphysical realism and the problem of defining 
reality from within an historical perspective. Quite often, realists adopt a 
merely negative definition of reality, which is considered “independent 
of” our mental thoughts, conceptual schemes, or linguistic practices, etc. 
Gabriele De Anna and Riccardo Martinelli 
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This approach possibly overcomes old-style idealism, yet raises several 
problems. As an alternative framework, Martinelli discusses the 
traditional definition of reality as “capacity to act,” or effectiveness, an 
argumentative strategy that enables us to solve some of the difficulties 
with ontological realism.  
Salvatore Lavecchia, in “Agathological Realism. Searching for the 
Good beyond Subjectivity and Objectivity or On the Importance of Being 
Platonic,” combines two aspects of Plato’s writings: the claims on the 
Demiurge made in the Timaeus and the analogy of the sun presented in 
the Republic. By explaining the analogy of the sun through the image of 
an intelligible sphere of light, Lavecchia suggests an interpretation of 
Plato according to which the idea of the Good is radically self-giving and 
self-transcendent, in a way that overcomes all dichotomies between 
subjectivity and objectivity, knowledge and morality, ethics and ontology. 
Building on Plato’s argument, he supports a form of moral realism 
which meets objections to which modern and contemporary varieties of 
moral realism are open. 
Alexander Fischer and Marko J. Fuchs are co-authors of the essay en-
titled “‘Solidarity at the Time of the Fall: ’ Adorno and Rorty on Moral Re
alism.” They deploy arguments by Theodor W. Adorno to suggest that 
Richard Rorty’s criticism of moral realism is not quite radical enough. In 
their view, Rorty’s very alternative to moral realism – according to which 
ethnic groups represent the ultimate measure of moral judgment with-
out any possibility of critique – would be excessively naïve. Adorno’s 
proposal, instead, rejects moral realism in the traditional sense, while 
still allowing a radical criticism of communities and cultures. Such a 
criticism is entirely possible, via his negative dialectics which reject met-
aphysics on the ground that it would reduce to identity the non-identity 
of individuals. Fischer and Fuchs do not spend time looking at some of 
the contentious facets of Adorno’s negative dialectics, which are very rel-
evant for current discussions on realism: e.g., the issue whether sense 
can be made of a radical non-identity, given the ways in which we deploy 
our concepts, which always seem to imply a certain degree of identifica-
tion of different individuals. The problem, then, is whether metaphysics 
can be avoided at all. Fischer and Fuchs, however, do stress an im-
portant implication of Adorno’s arguments for moral realism: he is 
-
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committed to a form of moral realism to the extent that he encourages 
us to take into account that moral thinking is oriented to action and 
hence must be about particulars. The reality of single individuals, hence, 
cannot be overlooked by any realist account of morality. In this way, the 
authors contribute to a full understanding of moral realism, by challeng-
ing any account that concentrates solely on the existence of universal 
values or moral laws. 
Mario De Caro and Massimo Marraffa, in their essay “Bacon against 
Descartes. Emotions, Rationality, Defenses,” review recent scientific 
literature suggesting that emotions are not a natural kind and that 
human reasoning is not a unitary, normatively regulated faculty. On that 
basis they claim that the old pyramidal conception of the mind, 
according to which reason rules the passions and other lower cognitive 
faculties, is no longer viable. By contrast they suggest that emotions and 
diverse rational capacities cooperate in constructing an image of reality 
which answers our pragmatic interests. The upshot of this, they claim, is 
that empirical reality, normative reality and social and political 
institutions are on the same level. 
A discussion concerning the relevance of moral realism for politics 
involves a consideration of how practical rationality functions in public 
contexts. This opens the problem of explaining how pragmatic 
considerations are relevant to an account of practical reason. The issue 
emerged particularly in the essay by De Caro and Marraffa. Hence, at 
this point, the following question presents itself: How does moral 
realism affect the pragmatic aspects of practical rationality? A second 
group of three essays addresses this question. 
Paolo Labinaz’ essay, “Reasoning, Argumentation and Rationality,” 
discusses recent “argumentative approaches” to the study of theoretical 
and practical reasoning. Philosophical reasons and empirical evidence 
suggest that reasoning is argumentative in nature, and recent argumen-
tative approaches to reasoning rightly take this into account. However, 
in Labinaz’ view, such approaches fail to draw all the implications from 
that evidence. After reviewing the main argumentative approaches to 
reasoning, the author argues that they have a partial view of the connec-
tion between reasoning and argumentation, since they focus exclusively 
on the capacity of reasoning to produce convincing arguments. In this 
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way they mainly stress the persuasive and therefore instrumental func-
tion of reasoning. By contrast, Labinaz supports an alternative argumen-
tative conception of rationality, outlined by Paul Grice and recently de-
veloped by Marina Sbisà, which underlines the reason-giving function of 
reasoning. Labinaz’ conclusion suggests that reasoning – including prac-
tical reasoning – is intrinsically tied to the relations a cognizer or an 
agent has with other cognizers or agents, and this suggests that practical 
reason is inherently connected to the communitarian, political or other-
wise, dimension of human existence. 
The connections between the pragmatic conditions of social and politi-
cal argumentation with moral realism are touched upon by Thomas Beck-
er, in his chapter titled “Is Truth Relevant? On the Relevance of Rele-
vance.” Becker argues that factual and evaluative statements are on a par 
with each other insofar as their relation to truth is concerned: in both cas-
es, truth is to be construed as depending on “practical relevance.” The au-
thor suggests that the demand that an assertion must be practically rele-
vant for the addressee is a precondition of the truth of the assertion and of 
the demand that the assertion must be based on knowledge held by the 
asserter. On the basis of this premise, Becker offers an account of the 
truth of normative statements, based on a realistic image of the world. 
Marina Sbisà, in her essay entitled “The Austinian Conception of Il-
locution and its Implications for Value and Social Ontology,” discusses 
the importance of illocutionary uptake in Austin’s theory of speech acts, 
and its theoretical implications, in particular for the distinction between 
facts and values, for moral realism, and for social ontology. In her view, 
illocutionary uptake is the basic source of deontic states and objects. One 
could expect that this might lead to a form of relativism, but Sbisà 
stresses that the distinction between the correctness and the incorrect-
ness of verdictives is not merely a matter of intersubjective agreement. 
Consequently, the assessment of speech is not carried out on one level 
only, but on two: indeed, in Austin’s terms, we can distinguish the felici-
ty/infelicity assessment from the (objective) correctness/incorrectness 
assessment. Defeasibility concerns cases of infelicity, while error and 
injustice concern incorrectness, thereby opening the possibility of moral 
realism. However, since judgments about correctness still depend on 
our repeated efforts to adjust and improve our relations to the world we 
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live in, – Sbisà contends – the ensuing moral realism eludes the tempta-
tion of assuming that there might an absolute point of view. 
The relevance of moral realism for practical rationality and the 
pragmatic consequences on the social and political level are the topic of 
the above essays. The next group of two essays turns to political 
philosophy and political practice, and discusses how the anthropological 
contentions so far outlined are relevant for our philosophical 
understanding of politics. 
The essay by Christian Illies, “The Relevance of Anthropology and the 
Evolutionary Sciences for Political Philosophy,” address the clash between 
two opposite approaches to human nature which, in the past decades, 
have led to contrasting understandings of politics: that according to which 
our social dimension is totally culturally construed, and that according to 
which our social dimension is an output of our biological nature. Illies 
shows that the contrast is somehow artificial, and asks, on the one hand, 
how we can understand the relation between cultural development and 
the biological nature of humans, and, on the other hand, how 
consideration of the interplay between culture and biology may be helpful 
for political thinking, e.g., in understanding and improving institutions 
and political decisions. This opens the way to a form of moderate political 
realism, in that data coming from the natural sciences is given weight in 
normative discourse, although in a non-reductive form. 
Gabriele De Anna, in “Realism, Human Action and Political Life. On 
the Political Dimension of Individual Choices,” draws on an account of 
human action according to which we are led by reasons, and on an 
understanding of reasons which is based on a partially realist model, to 
discuss current ways of seeing political communities and the role of 
institutions. At the foundations of his understanding of human action 
and reasons for action, he contends that reference to the good in political 
contexts is unavoidable. He further claims that reference to the good 
must be welcome, since an open discussion of different conceptions of 
the good present in society is the best way to achieve agreement and to 
attain a peaceful coexistence. 
The last group includes two essays which focus on the relevance of 
realism in the domain of politics for related fields of knowledge: 
jurisprudence and economics. 
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14 
The essay by Elvio Ancona, “Determining Ius according to Thomas 
Aquinas. A Realistic Model for Juridical Decisions,” focuses on the na-
ture of law, and on its relations to reality and human rationality, by con-
sidering the contribution of Thomas Aquinas, who – on the topic of law 
– offered a comprehensive account built on the longstanding tradition of 
Roman law and natural law. Ancona highlights that, according to Aqui-
nas, the determination of the ius (i.e., of what is right), which takes place 
in legal judgments, emerges from the comparison between the juridical 
positions of the parties and this gives it a realist connotation. The realist 
connotation has important methodological implications: dialectics can 
thereby be proposed as a particular method for legal decisions, i.e. a 
method which seeks the discovery of rules and principles that are com-
mon to different parties, in view of the identification of what is just in 
the claims of each of them. This method shows a practical way in which 
a realist understanding of normativity can be beneficial to societies 
where different conceptions of the good need to co-exist and cooperate. 
In “Reason, Morality and Skill,” John Stopford draws on Ancient 
Greek economic thought, including Aristotle’s views on the natural 
limitation of wealth, to discuss the problem of human flourishing in 
ecologically challenged societies. Some economists have recently argued 
that current societies must address ecological emergencies by working 
out ways to live in situations of diminishing economic growth. However, 
societies with very low levels of growth face issues of social instability 
due to recessions, unemployment and the decrease of social benefits. 
Stopford considers the solution to this problem proposed by economic 
capability theorists, influenced by the work of Sen and Nussbaum: 
prosperity should be redefined as capability development “within 
limits.” Stopford argues that the new definition of prosperity calls for a 
reexamination of the role of skill in the development of capabilities. The 
marginalization of skill has become a typical trait of modern industrial 
and consumer societies. However, Stopford shows, certain kinds of skill, 
exemplified in the work of the autonomously productive craftsman, are 
necessary to a full development of the capabilities that low growth 
political communities should promote. 
The essays collected here represent the result of a common work 
made by all the authors – together with other colleagues and with 
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students – during a workshop which took place at the University of 
Bamberg, in Germany, between the 19th and the 22nd of December 2013. 
The workshop was part of the project Moral Realism and Political 
Decisions: A new framework of practical rationality for contemporary 
multicultural Europe (MULTIRATIOPOL), which was funded by the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst - DAAD, in the context of the 
Hochschuldialog mit Südeuropa scheme. The project was presented by the 
University of Bamberg (Germany) and the University or Trieste (Italy), 
and it involved also the joint Master Program in Philosophy between the 
Universities of Trieste and Udine. Students and Faculty members from 
the three Universities – together with some invited speakers – took part 
in the event, which included plenary talks, discussions in groups and 
round tables. The relations between moral realism, practical rationality 
and political decisions were addressed in many of their facets. The 
papers here collected are not papers presented in the workshop, but 
original pieces which were written after the workshop by some of the 
participants, on the ground of the common work carried out during the 
workshop. (One exception is represented by the paper by Christian Illies 
which had already appeared in a slightly different form somewhere else, 
in German, but which well represents the contribution given by 
Professor Illies at the workshop). We are grateful to DAAD for their 
financial support for this initiative. 
While we were editing this volume, one of the contributors, 
Professor Thomas Becker, Chair of German Linguistics at the University 
of Bamberg, unexpectedly and tragically passed away. He had actively 
participated to the workshop, and showed an eagerness to discuss with 
philosophers which was uncommon. Philosophers profited much from 
his generous contribution. In his essay included in this collection, he 
had started new, interesting paths of investigation. He was looking 
forward to further develop these thoughts in collaboration with the 
research group which was formed during the workshop, and all the 
other participants to the project were counting on his valuable 
contribution. His tragic departure left an enormous emptiness among 
this group of researchers, as among his colleagues, his friends and in 
his family. We dedicate this collection to his memory. 
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Realism, Ontology, and the Concept of Reality 
 
Riccardo Martinelli 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, philosophers have been involved in an exten-
sive and animated discussion about realism. As is well known, the word 
‘realism’ appears in various philosophical contexts, e.g. in semantics, 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mathematics, philoso-
phy of art, political theory, etc.1 Remarkably, in each of these fields, the 
word ‘realism’ assumes different, heterogeneous meanings. Being a re-
alist in ethics, for instance, has little or no influence over one’s attitude 
towards realism in science, and so on. Accordingly, realism cannot be 
considered an all-embracing philosophical position.2 To a certain extent, 
some forms of realism might show a certain “family resemblance,” and 
the various realists possibly use certain specific sets of keywords more 
frequently than non-realists. Nevertheless, different realisms cannot be 
unified within a single doctrine. Most of those who are committed to re-
alism within a single sector of the philosophical debate would not con-
sider necessary, or even desirable, to embrace realism in a more general, 
comprehensive sense. Though this is true, some philosophers still epit-
omize their own theoretical position as ‘realism’ – sometimes as ‘new 
realism’ – without further specification.3 This might prima facie suggest 
that they do consider many (or some) forms of realism connected, but 
this inference would not be correct. Rather, what self-declared realists 
tout court usually mean is that they are realists in metaphysics or – more 
precisely – in ontology. To put it in a nutshell, ontological realists usual-
                                                 
1 See e.g. French, Uehling and Wettstein 1988. The volume provides a survey of many 
aspects of the debate concerning realism, including moral theory. See also the recently 
updated entry “Realism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Miller 2014).  
2 To my knowledge, at least, no one has claimed for a substantial linkage between the 
above mentioned independent semantic domains of the word ‘realism.’  
3 See e.g. Ferraris 2012. De Caro and Ferraris 2012. Gabriel 2014.  
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ly assume that things that belong to the world “out there” do not depend 
on our thoughts, mental schemes, categories, or linguistic practices, and 
so on. From this point of view, the way things occur in the world is fun-
damentally independent of whatever people may think (or not think) 
about it. Rather than a philosophical insight, this might seem a com-
monsensical or uncontroversial tenet.4 Yet realists insist that many phi-
losophers endorse the opposite view, and therefore that realism needs to 
be reaffirmed against sophisticated anti-realistic trends in philosophy. 
These trends are typically represented by idealist or nihilist thinkers.  
One of the favorite polemic targets of the new realist wave is Im-
manuel Kant. However, Kant vehemently and correctly protested against 
those who tendentiously interpreted his thought as an ingenuous, rather 
than critical (or transcendental), form of idealism.5 Although a discus-
sion of Kant’s philosophical stance is not part of this work, in § 4 I shall 
touch upon the fact that Kant never argued for anti-realism in ontology; 
rather, and more interestingly, he made claim to a philosophy free from 
ontological presuppositions. As far as nihilism is concerned, the analysis 
is no less interesting. Obviously, nihilists do not simply assume that 
nothing exists. More often, they try to challenge our (instinctive or culti-
vated) belief in the value of metaphysical notions such as truth, reality, 
goodness, and so on. Nietzsche’s verbal vehemence against the idoliza-
tion of facts – as in his famous sentence “there are no facts, only inter-
pretations” – must be considered within the context of the controversy 
against positivistic philosophy prevalent at that time.6 
                                                 
4 In her insightful book (D’Agostini 2013), Franca D’Agostini argues for the inseparability 
of the categories of reality and truth, so that (ontological) anti-realism becomes a self-
confuting theory. Despite D’Agostini’s ample and well-grounded discussion, I believe that 
reality and truth should be considered separately.  
5 See e.g. Sassen 1997; for a textual survey Sassen 2000. Kant’s early critics, Sassen 
demonstrates, were puzzled by a philosophy that, in Johann Feder’s words, “makes 
objects.” As is well known, Kant replies to them with his Prolegomena of 1783 and in the 
second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason (1787). 
6 Nietzsche 1980, 7.60: “Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehen bleibt 
“es giebt nur Thatsachen,” würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur 
Interpretationen” (emphasis added). Even the insistence of hermeneutics upon the 
inescapable circle of interpretation does not seriously challenge the world’s existence, 
unless one considers hermeneutics as a form of ontology – as Heidegger did, yet without 
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Still, realists are right in assuming that philosophers have often at-
tempted to put a limit on naïve ontological realism. Some very typical 
problems with the postulates of realism are of the following kind: what 
is the real meaning of the claim that the things “out there” are inde-
pendent of us? How are we supposed to know about them? How are we 
supposed to know about their independence from us? Moreover, what 
about ourselves? Are we merely part of this world of things “out there?” 
If we are indeed, what is the world of things independent from? If we 
are not, what about us as conscious or intentional entities is ontological-
ly different from material things?7  
In this essay I discuss some of the problems with ontological realism 
and the concept of reality. I come to the conclusion that, unless a positive 
and sound definition of reality is provided, ontological realism runs the 
risk of missing its own target. Claiming that reality “does not depend” on 
our thoughts, mental schemes, or linguistic practices is intrinsically con-
fusing. Quite paradoxically, this merely negative definition of reality would 
be acceptable only in a dualistic perspective, that is, whenever one consid-
ers thoughts, mental schemes, etc. to be essentially different from the 
things “out there.” A negative definition of reality can be useful in some 
cases, but it eventually leaves too many questions unanswered.  
In the following pages I will discuss some of the arguments in the 
debate concerning ontological realism (§2). I will then focus on the tradi-
tional definition of reality as effectiveness, or capability of acting (§3). 
Finally, I will attempt to determine to what extent this definition is help-
ful in the debate concerning ontological realism (§4).  
 
 
2. Arguments Concerning Ontological Realism 
 
Despite the realists’ own intentions, ontological realism in the above 
described form tacitly posits a dualistic view of the world, in which sub-
jectivity plays a central role. A definition of reality as that which does not 
                                                                                                       
denying the existence of the world.  
7 Kit Fine correctly observes that “we appear to avoid the absurdities of skepticism but only 
by buying in to the obscurities of metaphysics.” Fine 2001, 4. As a solution for this 
dilemma, Fine sets the concept of “ground,” which cannot be discussed here.  
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depend on human thoughts, mental states, etc., eventually makes this 
dualism inescapable. On this view, things and mental states are poles 
apart, independent from each other. Ontological realists must necessari-
ly allow for a particular kind of reality of some kind (call it “conscious-
ness,” intentionality or anything else), from which things are declared to 
be independent: otherwise, the negative definition of reality would be-
come inconsistent.  
To resist this conclusion, the realist may add some positive element 
to the classical negative definition. Most frequently, realists appeal to 
perception, claiming that reality emerges from what we perceive. Having 
nothing to do with conceptual schemes, perception gives us direct access 
to reality. In this sense, realism also tends to be a reassertion of the in-
dependence of sensory data from further mental elaborations of any 
kind. Perceptions given by the senses – realists say – may be sometimes 
confusing; yet they cannot be always false. Descartes’ well-known doubts 
concerning the senses in his first Meditation may be attractive for arm-
chair philosophizing, but should nevertheless be rejected, since they fi-
nally lead to skepticism about the external world (or, less attractively, to 
the Cartesian solution).8  
Be that as it may, the argument of perception has two important func-
tions. In the first place, it softens the negative definition of reality and 
turns it into a half-negative definition. Ontological realists still believe that 
reality is independent of our thoughts, conceptual schemes, etc.; yet, they 
concede, reality is related to another, non-intellectual part of our mental 
activity, i.e. perception. As a consequence, reality and perception are 
strongly linked together and, as such, they are independent of abstract 
thoughts, conceptual schemes, etc. In this form, however, ontological real-
ism potentially clashes with scientific realism. Whether reality is made up 
of standard-size objects as shown by ordinary perception, or of subatomic 
particles, is a dilemma that cannot be eschewed.9 Within the sphere of the 
                                                 
8 As Descartes points out, we might be dreaming in this very moment, so that all of our 
representations would be false and deceptive; moreover, even if we are awake, an almighty 
and malicious god could make us erroneously believe that the world exists. Against 
Descartes, however, realists can still argue that in most cases what we see, touch, and hear, 
is actually what is there. See Descartes 1968.  
9 For a survey of some debates concerning scientific realism see e.g. Leplin 1984. A 
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present discussion, the most striking difference between scientific and on-
tological realism is that the former positively defines reality, according to 
what scientific knowledge tells us about it, whereas the latter does not. 
Thus, unless scientific realism is explicitly embraced, the realistic position 
remains uncertain with respect to a positive definition of reality.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the perception-grounded 
argumentation works as a deterrent against any temptation to define re-
ality. Reality – realists assert – has to be perceived, not “defined,” as if it 
were a conceptual construct or a linguistic convention. In a sense, this is 
an essential part of ontological realism’s argumentation. The very act of 
requiring a definition of reality ultimately reveals an anti-realistic stance; 
by contrast, arguing against the possibility of a definition of this kind is 
a typical realist move. In other words, asking for even a preliminary 
agreement about a conceptual definition of reality is too strong a condi-
tion, that can be legitimately rejected by realists. Nevertheless, at some 
stage realists and anti-realists should find an agreement about the mean-
ing they attribute to this contextually crucial word.  
 
 
3. The Traditional Definition of Reality 
 
Although it is not likely to solve the hitherto discussed problems, and 
despite the realist’s skepticism about definitions, an investigation into the 
meaning we should assign to the term ‘reality’ is a reasonable task within 
the general discussion concerning realism. As many other related general 
terms – ‘truth,’ ‘substance’ (or ‘thing’), ‘causality,’ etc. – reality has been 
the subject of innumerable philosophical discussions, which cannot be 
resumed here. Nevertheless, a quick historical look at some classical defi-
nitions of reality turns out to be a helpful tool for our present concern.  
Within the modern tradition, ‘reality’ has been often defined as effec-
tiveness, or capability of acting.10 In German, the word ‘Wirklichkeit’ 
                                                                                                       
discussion of this topic lies beyond the scope of the present essay.  
10 See e.g. Trappe 1971 cols. 829-846. The double usage of the Latin word realitas gives 
rise, in modern German, to two different words: ‘Wirklichkeit’ (a term often related to 
modal logic, situated between contingency and necessity) and ‘Realität’ (829). Remarkably, 
the entry of the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie concerning the reality (Realität) of 
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(meaning reality) and the verb ‘wirken’, meaning acting, having an effect 
on something, share the same root. Germans also use the word ‘Realität’ 
for reality, sometimes with a slightly different meaning.11 For instance, 
whereas many nineteenth-century philosophers use ‘Realität’ for the 
subject of our discussion, Hermann Helmholtz talks about the Wirklich-
keit of the external world. For Helmholtz, things act (wirken) on our per-
ceptual system, triggering our various perceptions, according to the spe-
cific nature of the perceiving nervous apparatus.12 
Can the definition of reality as effectiveness solve some of the problems 
raised by ontological realism? Could an ontological realist adopt this defini-
tion, and with what effects? As we shall see, many ontological realists would 
probably resist the temptation to define reality in terms of effectiveness, 
since this definition diverts from a static ontology of things. Nevertheless, 
defining reality as effectiveness or capability of acting has considerable ad-
vantages. In the first place, it requires no involvement of intentional entities, 
so the above mentioned dualistic implications can be avoided. Reality is nei-
ther defined negatively as “what does not depend on” a certain intentional 
action, nor half-negatively as the counterpart of perception, but rather posi-
tively as effectiveness. Moreover, the capability of acting does not compel us 
to limit our attention to ordinary “material” things, that is, to regular-size 
objects suitable to bring about perceptions in a certain subject.  
In a sense, the negative definition of reality can be regarded as a special 
case within a general phenomenology of effectiveness. In fact, the negative 
definition identifies real things on the basis of their capability of acting on a 
certain subject. Things somehow provoke perceptions in the individual, and 
those perceptions cannot be changed or influenced by the individual’s 
thoughts, conceptual patterns, etc. By contrast, the definition of reality as 
effectiveness does not entail any limitation concerning the individual upon 
which the effect is exerted. This has remarkable consequences.  
In the first place, under this definition, there is no preliminary onto-
logical distinction between subjects and objects, or perceiver and the per-
ceived. Therefore, effectiveness could pertain to something, regardless of 
                                                                                                       
the external world (Grüneputt 1971) begins with Kant’s Refutation of Idealism.  
11 See Trappe 1971 col. 829. 
12 Helmholtz 1903 (1878).  
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its being endowed, or not, with intentionality. With this move, some of the 
difficulties previously discussed are overcome. Secondly, the clash be-
tween ontological commonsense realism and scientific realism is – at least 
– softened. The inevitable alternative (either standard-size objects or suba-
tomic entities) posed by these two theoretic options tends to fade and to 
give rise to a unified view. Whenever a certain effectiveness is captured, 
regardless of how it is captured (e.g., whether through ordinary perception 
or sophisticated scientific devices), we encounter reality.  
These remarks are surely far from offering a comprehensive theory. 
My intention is simply to draw attention to a relatively neglected aspect 
of the debate, suggesting that further conceptual clarifications are need-
ed concerning the very basic terms of the debate concerning realism.  
 
 
4. Conclusive Remarks 
 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned advantages, I suspect that 
many ontological realists are unlikely to embrace a definition of reality 
in terms of effectiveness. In many cases, in fact, what is at stake in the 
debate about ontological realism is not whether one is realist or not 
about the external world. Most people and most philosophers are indeed 
realists in this sense. Rather, the debate involves taking a position on on-
tology and its role within the body of the philosophical disciplines. 
Should we make preliminary decisions concerning ontology before we 
make any other philosophical move? From this perspective, the tendency 
towards a “new realism” actually corresponds to a revival of ontology as 
general metaphysics, that is, as a set of preliminary decisions about what 
exists, considered in its fundamental form.  
In my view, one can embrace realism without having to subscribe to 
fundamental ontology. Needless to say, ontology is an important part of 
philosophy. What should be avoided is the scholastic idea that ontology 
has some kind of priority over (any or most) other aspects of philosophy. 
Formal ontology and regional ontologies undoubtedly give many indis-
pensable contributions to phenomenology. By contrast, a general ontol-
ogy implying dogmatic realism is much less attractive, especially when it 
is imbued with foundationalist pretensions. With this, I do not mean to 
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advocate any form of commitment to anti-realism in ontology. Rather, 
one should subscribe to realism without compromising philosophical 
inquiries with a preliminary subdivision of the world into kinds or cate-
gories (the more so, if this subdivision runs tacitly), or with other fun-
damental ontological presumptions. My concluding historical remarks 
concern the Kantian origin of this philosophical stance. Kant famously 
argues for the replacement of ontology (general metaphysics) with the 
analytic of the intellect. He famously claimed that “the proud name of 
ontology” must “give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the 
pure understanding.”13 Interestingly, acceptance of this philosophical 
suggestion can be given independently of adherence to the other issues 
of Kant’s philosophical program. It can be true that philosophy should 
dismiss ontological presumption, without the second part of the sen-
tence (that a good substitute for ontology is the analytic of pure intellect) 
being also necessarily true.14 Recent philosophical debates provide many 
examples of an ontological modesty totally disjointed from Kantian criti-
cism. Some philosophers argue that the ontological presumption should 
be tempered by evidence coming from the field of psychology, or of neu-
roscience. Even those who don’t subscribe to this view may develop oth-
er strategies, nearer to traditional philosophical investigation. The con-
ceptual analysis of the main terms involved – reality, to begin with – is 
surely one of the main tools available to us for these strategies. 
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1. Integrating the Self with the World  
 
Any reflection concerning moral realism could be unsatisfactory if it 
concentrates solely on the notion either of objectivity or of 
transcendence. In the following discussion I will suggest the possibility 
of developing a moral realism which avoids such univocal connotation. 
This possibility will be indicated through focusing on one of the most 
essential notions in any moral discourse: on the notion of good. My 
thesis is based on two seminal passages from Plato’s works – Timaeus 
29e-30a and Respublica 506d6-509c. I will reflect on the possibility of 
configuring a notion of good which integrates in itself 
universality/objectivity as well as individuality/subjectivity, immanence 
as well as transcendence.1 In other words, the intended notion of good 
                                                 
* The term agathological does here not primarily refer to the domain of ethics or practical 
philosophy, but rather to a thinking which, transcending any separation of practical from 
theoretical domains, perceives a supreme Good (agathon) as both ultimate origin and rea-
son (logos) of its autonomous activity as well as of being in general. Realism, in turn, in-
tends here simply to indicate an ontological consistency independent from the relation 
with a perceiving or knowing person.  
1 My argument as it follows is not necessarily best understood as an attempt to give an ex-
position of Plato’s moral realism. For a valuable and stimulating exposition of this subject 
see Rist 2012. However, differently from Rist, I regard chronological concerns as not rele-
vant for my considerations. According to the crucial (and reliable) testimony of Dionys. 
Halicarn. de comp. verb. 25.32-33, Plato reconsidered and revised his works throughout his 
life, which makes impossible any trustworthy hypothesis concerning their chronology. 
Additionally, in contradistinction to Rist – who does not exploit the possibility of integrat-
ing Respublica 506d6-509c with Timaeus 29e-30a (Rist 2012, 142-146) – my primary concern 
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should refer not only to a telos originally perceived as external, as purely 
objective and transcendent in relation to the knowing and acting self – 
that is to individual, personal consciousness –, but also to a reality which 
can be immediately experienced by the self as belonging to its own 
authentic nature as well as to its acting as a knowing person. 
Concentrating on Plato and evidencing the importance of his 
suggestions, I will be expressing not merely archeological, but primarily 
heuristic concerns, attempting to indicate a perspective in which realism 
is capable of being genuinely realist not only with regard to the world or 
to the so-called moral facts experienced by the self, but also with 
reference to the self, that is, to the consciousness and self-consciousness 
experiencing itself and the world,2 as well as to the conscience making 
moral choices in the world. This form of realism is able to counter two 
possible criticisms made of realism. On the one hand, realism is accused 
of problematically affirming the objective reality of an outer world – that 
is of a transcendent being – founding moral facts. On the other hand, 
realism is accused of overlooking the profound evidence concerning the 
reality and uniqueness of a person’s inner life and self – ignoring, for 
instance, the epistemically unconfutable transparency of self-
consciousness.3 The variety of realism that I propose is able, I claim, to 
answer to both this critiques.  
Certainly, many responses to the aforementioned reproaches can be 
given. They could either be oriented towards naturalistic positions 
willing to eliminate the self by considering it an illusion emerging from 
biological processes or social contexts; or they could result in the 
assumption of spiritual perspectives absorbing the professed 
autonomous reality of the self in the dazzling light of an 
                                                                                                       
will consist in emphasizing the self-givingness of the Good rather then its connotation as 
telos, thus liberating Plato’s moral realism from the univocal objectivistic nuance character-
izing its current expositions.  
2 A valuable attempt at delineating a realist approach with regard to consciousness and 
subjectivity can be found in Nagel 2012, although Nagel perceives his attempt as imma-
nent to a naturalistic, while non-materialist, perspective, which differentiates his approach 
from that presented in the following discussion.  
3 This unconfutability is affirmed also in the context of eliminativistic positions. See the 
exemplary disquisition contained in Metzinger 2003 (with further bibliography). 
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undifferentiated Absolute or One. In both cases, however, realism would 
be inevitably compelled to postulate an insurmountable chasm, a 
dualism between being and consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity, self 
and world. I am not convinced that such form of realism would be able, 
ultimately, to authentically harmonize with the aspirations which orient 
the majority of persons living at the present time. This explains my 
interest for realistic positions which, in the field of both metaphysics 
and practical philosophy, do not assume the aforesaid gap as the 
ultimate destiny of mankind. Among these positions Plato’s perspective 
may be regarded as paradigmatic. It is in fact focused on a notion of 
good which, transcending any separation or dualism between ontology 
and ethics, could offer significant impulses towards a moral realism 
leading to the experience of reciprocal integration between being (world) 
and consciousness (self). 
 
 
2. Plato’s Notion of Good. Good as Unrestricted Self-Givingness and 
Self-Transcendence  
 
Plato delineates explicitly the nature of being good only in Timaeus 29e-
30a,4 a passage illustrating the cause of the Demiurge's impulse to produce 
the physical universe. According to this passage this cause consisted in the 
goodness of the Demiurge, where being good is intimately connected with 
being aphthonos (Timaeus 29e1-2):5 being good involves being absolutely free 
from envy and, therefore, inclination to the highest form of generosity, 
which disposes for an unrestricted self-givingness. Unrestricted self-
givingness is, more precisely, the motivation by which the Demiurge gave 
life and form to our cosmos: the Demiurge was willing to render everything 
as similar to himself as possible, that is, to render it good (Timaeus 29e2-3, 
                                                 
4 I attempted a more general account of the implications contained in Plato’s notion of 
good in Lavecchia 2010 and Lavecchia 2012, 12-31. The scantiness or absence of references 
to other interpreters of Plato in the following pages is due to the fact that the implications 
intended here have until now not been adequately evidenced and investigated.  
5 The intimate association between being good and being aphtonos is very well emphasized 
in Milobenski 1964, 27-58, although Milobenski does not investigate the important impli-
cations that can be derived from it with regard to Plato’s notion of good. 
Salvatore Lavecchia 
 
32 
30a2). In brief, on the basis of his goodness the Demiurge was willing to 
unrestrictedly endow another being with the most essential quality 
characterizing his own nature. In summary: he was willing to originate an 
image – an eikôn, that is something which is similar (eoike) to its own origin 
– of himself (see Timaeus 92c7). 
In the light of the above passage the good consists in an 
unconditional impulse to self-manifestation, through which the good 
being shapes a ground for the existence and manifestation of another 
good being, that is for an image of itself.6 The unconditionality 
characterizing this impulse is demonstrated through the fact that the 
activity of the Demiurge is absolutely free and autonomous, therefore not 
determined by any factor: neither by any need or necessity, nor by any 
opposition to something bad, nor by a striving for self-assertion, nor by 
any norm or law, nor by any imperative or commandment, nor by any 
past experience or expectation regarding the future. In other words, the 
impulse we are delineating involves the unrestricted openness for the 
autonomy of another being. Not surprisingly, according to Timaeus 
34b6-8, the activity of the Demiurge results in generating a cosmos 
characterized by complete autonomy – it needs, in fact, nothing external 
in order to maintain its own existence – and self-consciousness 
(gnôrimon ... auton hautô). This is indeed the logical consequence of the 
unlimited generosity characterizing a good being: if a good being would 
not be inclined to endow another being with its own freedom and 
autonomy, as a result its manifestation would be limited by some 
internal or external factor, that is it would be unable to be absolutely free 
from envy and hence unable to be unrestricted in its generosity.  
In this perspective the good implicates absolute gratuity, thus 
transcending any opposition between the self and the other. The good 
consists namely in its manifestative character, that is, in the most 
generous form of relationality, which involves unconditionally being 
open to and for the self-manifestation of another being. In sum, the 
good would not be the good if it did not implicate the most profound 
                                                 
6 For the positive connotations Plato associates with the notion of image (eikôn), with spe-
cial reference to his notion of good, see Lavecchia 2006, 199-202; Bontempi 2009, 210-224; 
Lavecchia 2010, 11-16.  
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form of self-transcendence:7 if it did not immediately transcend any 
opposition between identity and difference. 
 
 
3. The Analogy Between the Sun and the Supreme Good. The Supreme 
Good as Origin of Being and Consciousness 
 
Plato illustrates the eminently manifestative character of the good 
through the famous analogy between the sun and the origin of every 
being (Respublica 506d6-509c). This origin Plato identifies with the 
supreme Good.  
For the following reason the sun appears as an absolutely convincing 
analogon of the supreme Good: in the same way that the sun is 
unconceivable as separated from its manifestation through light, so the 
supreme Good is unconceivable as separated from its manifestation 
through being. Consequently, in Respublica 508d5 the light generated by 
the sun is presented as analogous of truth ( ) and being, thus 
evidencing the immediate unity of the Good with its manifestation, 
beyond any opposition between immanence and transcendence.8 In this 
context we should therefore take at face value the etymology of aletheia – 
a- privativum plus the same root of lanthanô and lêthê –, which points at 
the quality of being unhidden: truth – alêtheia – is the unhiddenness of 
the Good. As a result, in accordance with the literal meaning of idea – 
originally designating what can be seen (idein) with regard to a certain 
being –, in Plato’s analogy of the sun we should interpret the association 
of the term idea with the supreme manifestation of the Good (for 
example in Respublica 505a2, 508e2-3, 517b8-c1) as indicating that the 
Good makes itself unconditionally knowable, visible, manifest through 
its idea. That is to say, the idea tou agathou (the Form of the Good), that 
is the supreme form of being, has to be intended as the unrestricted 
visibility or as the unhiddenness (alêtheia) of the Good resulting from its 
                                                 
7 With regard to self-transcendence as intrinsic characteristic in Plato’s notion of good see 
Lavecchia 2013a. 
8 Concerning this characteristic of the supreme Good see Ferrari 2001, 14-15, 18, 22-24, 26-
27, 36-37; Lavecchia 2010, 43-55. 
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unconfined self-givingness.9 The unrestrictedness of this visibility 
involves, in turn, the highest autonomy of being from its origin, that is: 
the inherence of autonomous consciousness in the highest form of 
being. The analogy between the Good and the sun indicates, in fact, that 
at its supreme level of manifestation being does not presuppose any 
separation from consciousness. As Socrates explains, the relation 
connecting the sun with sight (with the eye) and the visible beings is 
namely analogous to the relation connecting the Good with the highest 
intellect (nous) and the intelligible/noetic beings (Respublica 508b12-c2). 
This implicates that the Good manifests itself in its supreme form – in 
the form of intelligible/noetic reality – as unity of (we could say) objective 
being and subjective consciousness (intellect), in the same way as the sun 
manifests itself as objective visibility as well as subjective activity of 
perception (seeing). This corresponds entirely to the notion of being 
good explicated basing on the Timaeus: the being good of the Demiurge 
consists in an unrestricted self-givingness generating a being which is 
not only an objective image of the Demiurge (92c7), but also an 
autonomous subjectivity, that is a self-consciousness (34b7-8) capable of 
perceiving and knowing the origin of its generation.  
 
 
4. Explicating the Unity of Being and Consciousness in the Supreme 
Good: the Infinite Sphere of Intelligible Light 
 
On this platonic perspective, as illustrated through the analogy 
between the Good and the sun, the supreme Good does not generate a 
merely objective being: the being supremely manifesting the Good is an 
autonomous self, an autonomous consciousness, that is an intellect 
(nous) able to immediately perceive and manifest the intelligible, 
objective light of the Good. Plato does not offer any conceptual 
explication for this unity of being and consciousness in the supreme 
manifestation of the Good. However, we can attempt an explication 
                                                 
9 On the appropriateness of differentiating the idea tou agathou (the supreme manifesta-
tion of the Good) from the Good beyond its manifestation (agathon epekeina tês ousias Respu-
blica 509b), already considered by Schelling, see Lavecchia 2005; Lavecchia 2006, 110-118; 
Lavecchia 2010, 43-55. 
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based on some clues which he gives in connection with the analogy 
between the Good and the sun. The first clue consists in the fact that 
Plato perceives the Good as generator not only of intelligible reality, but 
also of visible light as well as of the sun (Respublica 508b12-13, 517c3-4). 
This implicates that we have to consider the notion of intelligible/noetic 
light – which permeates the analogy between the Good and the sun 
(Respublica 508d4-6) – not as a mere metaphor based on the experience 
of visible light, but as indicating the true light, that is the spiritual 
(intelligible/noetic) light of the highest being emanating from the 
Good.10 Of this light visible light has therefore to be regarded as an 
authentic image. Consequently, the Good reveals itself – in accordance 
with its unconditional, infinite impulse to self-manifestation – as an 
original center emanating intelligible light, that is light transcending 
space and time.  
If we now closely consider the Good as an original center of 
intelligible light, we will be capable of finding an explanation for the 
unity of being and consciousness denoting the supreme manifestation 
of the Good. An original center of intelligible light implicates immediate 
identity with an infinite sphere of light, which that center generates 
instantly because it transcends time and space. An original center of 
intelligible light is therefore its own instant exteriorization in an infinite 
sphere, which implicates the fact that the center does not precede the 
sphere or vice versa. The just indicated exteriorization, in turn, does not 
result in an indefinite sphere. In fact, if we concentrate on the infinity 
characterizing its impulse to self-manifestation, at infinity the 
exteriorization of the original center manifests a limit consisting in its 
reversion, that is in an interiorization. In other words, the instant, 
spherical and infinite self-manifestation (exteriorization) of the original 
center (of the Good) results in an immediate interiorization, which 
constitutes the plurality of points building the circumference of the 
infinite, but definite sphere generated by the original center. This 
reversion can be explained through the fact that the exteriorization, the 
objectivation of the original center (of the Good) is unrestricted and 
                                                 
10 With regard to Plato’s notion of intelligible light see Beierwaltes 1957, 37-98 for an expo-
sition which is still unsurpassed. 
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unconditional. As a consequence, it is completely undetermined by its 
identity, by its being exteriorization and objectivation, hence manifesting 
itself immediately as unity with its opposite – with interiorization, 
subjectivity and consciousness. 
In this context the points building the circumference of the 
intelligible sphere have to be considered as autonomous centers of 
intelligible consciousness manifesting the Good as the original center of 
intelligible consciousness, that is, as supreme intellect. Considering the 
strict analogy between the activity of the sun regarding sight and the 
activity of the Good regarding intelligible consciousness (Respublica 
508b12-c2), the aforementioned centers of intelligible consciousness 
correspond to the centers of sight generated by the light of the sun, that 
is to the eyes. The faculty of sight and, accordingly, the essence of the 
eye, is characterized by Plato this way – and this is the second clue to the 
explanation we are attempting – as generated through the interiorization 
of the light exteriorized by the sun (Respublica 508a9-b11). Following the 
analogy with the Good, this process has to be perceived as mirroring the 
dynamic generated by the Good through its manifestation as original 
center of intelligible light: it is, in fact, the visible equivalent of the 
intelligible manifestation originated by the Good and consisting in the 
polarity of intelligible subject (intellect) and intelligible objects.11 This 
equivalence implicates the congruity of the explications here attempted 
with reference to the infinite sphere of intelligible light – 
notwithstanding the fact that Plato does not refer explicitly to that 
sphere12 –: just as the exteriorization of the sun reverses and interiorizes 
itself in the faculty of sight, generating a plurality of eyes, so the 
                                                 
11 See the strict analogy between nous kai ta noumena and opsis kai ta horômena in Respubli-
ca 508b12-c2. 
12 This absence of explicit reference could explain why nobody has until now attempted to 
integrate into the explication of the analogy of the sun an interpretation of the sphere of 
intelligible light. In any case, the integration proposed here is legitimized by the fact that 
Socrates declares his having omitted many things during the explication of the analogy 
(Resp. 509c9-10). One of these many things is exactly the explanation concerning the unity 
of being and consciousness to which the analogy clearly points. Without reference to the 
sphere of intelligible light this aspect of the analogy would remain simply incomprehensi-
ble. 
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exteriorization of the Good reverses and interiorizes itself instantly in a 
plurality of centers characterized by autonomous intelligible 
consciousness and perception. Further, in the same way that the sun can 
be perceived as generating a visible sphere of light whose circumference 
is constituted by the eyes, the Good can be perceived as instantly 
generating an infinite intelligible sphere of light whose circumference is 
built by autonomous centers of intelligible perception, that is, by 
autonomous centers of consciousness. 
 
 
5. The Life of the Intelligible Sphere as Supreme Paradigm of Morality 
 
Examining the sphere of intelligible light with special regard to the 
dynamic connecting its components to each other, we will discover some 
stimulating implications to which Plato’s notion of supreme Good could 
be pointing.  
Since intelligible light transcends space and time, the components of 
the sphere generated by the Good cannot be considered as separated 
from each other through the presence of something residing between 
them. Therefore, in the intelligible sphere every point building the 
circumference is not separated from the original center, so that every 
point belonging to the circumference is center and the whole sphere is 
constituted only by the points building its circumference: the center is 
everywhere and the circumference nowhere.13 However, the hereby 
presupposed unity of the original center with every other point of the 
sphere is not to be intended as a static, mathematical coincidence, which 
would imply a spatial connotation of it. On the contrary, this unity has to 
be perceived as a dynamic reciprocal transparency instantly and 
immediately connecting each other all components of the sphere.14 The 
                                                 
13 This formulation is attested in Liber XXIV Philosophorum II (Deus est sphaera infinita cui-
us centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam), which contains the first explicit reference to 
the aforementioned property characterizing the infinite sphere. Concerning the history of 
this image see Mahnke 1937; Hedwig 1980.  
14 The notion of reciprocal transparency is explicitly related to the intelligible beings in Plo-
tinus Enn. V 8 (31), 4, 6-7, where it is associated with the self-transparency of intelligible 
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resultant relation subsisting among those components can be imagined 
as rhythm and harmony deriving from an eternal (id est, non-spatial and 
non-temporal) pulsation, through which every component, by 
manifesting its self-consciousness, immediately manifests the self-
conscious transparency of every other component. 
Commensurate with these considerations, Plato’s notion of supreme 
Good points to the fact that the being immediately manifesting the Good 
cannot be considered as an abstractly universal, impersonal reality, but 
should be perceived as a dynamic, harmonious community: as a cosmos of 
intelligible beings, in which every individual being manifests instantly 
the whole community as well as every other individual by transparently 
manifesting its own autonomous individuality and consciousness. 
Certainly, the 'cosmos' as I understand it here is very far from the 
picture currently delineated by exegetes of Plato with regard to the 
intelligible world, according to which picture Plato’s Forms are purely 
abstract, universal entities not characterized by autonomous 
consciousness and morality.15 This current picture is indeed problematic 
in twofold respect: on the one hand it does not take seriously enough the 
relation intimately connecting the Forms with the Good, which – being 
the origin of the Forms as well as the supreme Form – has 
unquestionably to be perceived as endowing the Forms with its own 
qualities,  that is  with its own impulse to unconditional relationality; on 
the other hand it takes into little or no account the fact that in Respublica 
500c2-5 the intelligible world is in fact characterized as the supreme 
paradigm of justice and kosmos, that is as a perfectly harmonious and 
ordered complex of relations, which reveals it as the supreme expression 
of virtue (see also Phaedrus 247d5-6). In addition, interpreters assuming 
as valid the current picture are until now incapable of satisfactorily 
explaining away the identification of the Demiurge with the supreme 
noetic (intelligible) being attested in Timaeus 37a1-2. If taken seriously 
(and why should we not take it seriously?) this identification – that is, 
                                                                                                       
light. Although Plotinus does not mention explicitly the intelligible sphere of light, the 
aforementioned passage can be explained entirely through reference to it.  
15 On the necessity of attributing self-consciousness to the Forms see the brilliant exposi-
tion in Schwabe 2001 (with further bibliography).  
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the identification with the Form of the Good16 – would document clearly 
the inherence of consciousness and morality in the intelligible world, 
revealing the intelligible world as the highest manifestation of the 
identity between being, consciousness and morality implicit in Plato’s 
notion of supreme Good and manifested by the analogy of the sun.17  
On this basis the explication of the infinite sphere offered above (§ 
4.), combined with Plato’s perception of the supreme Good as well as of 
the intelligible world, could help to delineate a coherent picture. In the 
resultant picture the supreme Good appears – because of its 
unconditional relationality – on the one side as transcending any notion 
of unity and plurality,18 of universality and individuality, of objectivity 
and subjectivity, of identity and difference, on the other side as 
originating a reality characterized by the most intimate unity of being 
and consciousness. This reality, in turn, manifests itself immediately as 
a cosmos, that is as a complex of harmonious, transparent relations 
                                                 
16 The identification of the Demiurge with the Form of the Good – which in the perspec-
tive delineated here would imply the identification with the supreme intellect – is affirmed, 
for example, in Stumpf 1869, 232-243; Zeller 1889, 507-518; Wood 1968; Benitez 1995; 
Seifert 2001; Lavecchia 2005, 14-19; Lavecchia 2006, 216-222 (with further bibliography). 
The importance of this identification with reference to some seminal problems arising 
from Plato’s philosophy is rightly acknowledged in Rist 2012, 232-235 and 252, although 
according to Rist – who does not attribute adequate significance to Timaeus 37a1-2 – for 
Plato the identity of the Demiurge with both the supreme intellect and the Form of the 
Good remains only conjectural. 
17 The identity of Demiurge and highest intelligible being obviously involves the identity of 
the Demiurge with the model of his activity, that is, with the intelligible world – since the 
highest noetic being embraces in itself all other noetic beings (Timaeus 30c7-8). In turn, 
this implicates that the relationality peculiar of the intelligible world has to be intended as 
unrestricted also ad extra. This is not contradicted by the fact that Plato often emphasizes 
the transcendence of the intelligible world with regard to the visible universe, since he 
never characterizes this transcendence as hindering an impulse to self-givingness.  
18 In this perspective the two supreme principles of being attested in the so-called agrapha 
dogmata – the One and the Indefinite Dyad – could be interpreted as explicating the fact 
that the Good is supreme principle both of unity and plurality, whereas the Good trans-
cends every form of both unity – that is the One – and plurality – the Indefinite Dyad. If 
this interpretation is right, Plato could not be considered as progenitor of the neoplatonic 
henology, which, in turn, would in this case depend on an univocal interpretation of Plato’s 
protology. Regarding these subjects see Lavecchia 2010; Lavecchia 2012, 23-31; Lavecchia 
2013. 
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between autonomous centers of intelligible consciousness. This spiritual 
cosmos is, according to Plato, supreme paradigm and source of both 
individual and public morality (Respublica 500b7-501c3).  
In consonance with this background, morality results solidly 
anchored in the ultimate origin of being. In the supreme Good are, in 
fact, anchored on the same level, a configuration of being immediately 
manifesting morality as well as the consciousness and conscience 
capable of autonomously revealing that configuration. This anchorage 
can be vividly illustrated through the infinite sphere of intelligible light, 
of which the Good is the original center. The unity of being and 
consciousness characterizing this sphere can be perceived, in reality, as 
immediately manifesting morality, since that unity instantly reveals 
itself as a transparent complex of harmonious relations between 
autonomous centers of intelligible consciousness, whose life supremely 
manifests the self-givingness of the Good. In other words, an immediate 
and conscious relation with the Good can be perceived, in this 
perspective, as the substance of intelligible/noetic life. Being 
consciousness intrinsically manifesting intelligible life, intellect (nous), 
in its both divine and human instantiations, should therefore not be 
regarded as a faculty exclusively producing abstractions or formalisms. 
On the contrary, the authentic nature of its activity, that is, of thinking, 
resides, according to this perspective, in autonomously generating 
relations manifesting the Good through a direct insight into the Good 
self.19 As a consequence, in this activity every gap separating knowledge 
and morality is definitely transcended, since true knowledge consists for 
Plato in the acquaintance with and in the manifestation of the Good.  
True knowledge resides, from Plato’s point of view, beyond the polarity 
of theory/contemplation and practice/application,20 in the same way that the 
life of the intelligible sphere resides beyond the polarity of self and other. In 
other words, true knowledge is an activity imagining and generating new 
instantiations of the transparent, eternal rhythm and harmony constituting 
                                                 
19 Plato evidences the intrinsic relation with the Good as characterizing the nature of intel-
lect, for example, in Phaedo 97c5-6, 98a7-b3, 99a7-b2 and c1-6; Respublica 508b12-c2; Phile-
bus 67a10-12.  
20 For an exemplary take on this aspect of Plato’s philosophy see Festugière 1950, 373-447 
and Krämer 1959. 
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the life of the intelligible sphere,21 in which every center of consciousness 
generates itself through being unrestrictedly open to the transparency of 
and communion with every other center of consciousness. In the 
aforementioned, eminently moral activity consists the genuine nature of 
thinking, which, according to the dynamic which characterizes the 
intelligible sphere, originally manifests itself as production of the sphericity, 
that is of the unconditional relationality building that sphere. On Plato’s 
perspective human persons are capable of generating autonomously and 
intentionally that – both intellectual and moral – activity if they connect 
themselves consciously with the authentic essence of their being. The 
unshakeable confidence in this potentiality explains why Plato perceives 
authentic morality as presupposing a constant orientation towards the 
activity of intellect, through which that essence manifests itself in the 
supreme form. This orientation, in turn, does not implicate the abstract 
intellectualism often attributed to Plato’s or Socrates’ ethics. It points, 
conversely, to the self-givingness which led Socrates to sacrifice his life 
because of encouraging his fellow citizens to become persons 
autonomously, that is consciously manifesting the Good.22 
 
 
6. Manifesting the Good as Experience of Genuine Freedom. 
Harmonizing Individuality and Community 
 
In consonance with our previous considerations Plato’s notion of 
good cannot be intended as primarily referring to the concept of end or 
goal (telos), which solely implicates a reference to a being or a 
state/condition external to the person striving for attaining the good. In 
Plato’s perspective good indicates, rather, primarily the fundamental, 
constitutional attitude of a self capable of consciously actualizing the 
most generous relation with regard to another self or to a plurality of 
                                                 
21 Not surprisingly, in Leges 689d sophia is strictly connected with the concept of symphônia, 
indicating the harmonious integration of many voices. For a general exposition concerning 
Plato’s notion of sophia, with particular attention to its relation with the supreme Good, see 
Lavecchia 2009. 
22 Concerning Socrates’ self-givingness, that is Socrates’ absence of envy, see the signifi-
cant passages in Euthyphro 3d6-8 and Apologia 33a6-b3.  
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selves, enabling another self or a plurality of selves to manifest 
unconditionally and autonomously their genuine nature. Of course Plato 
intends the good also as telos, as some seminal passages in his dialogues 
clearly indicate.23 However, this telos does not consist in a merely passive 
state of contemplation related to some irrevocably transcendent object. 
On the contrary, the philosophical itinerary proposed by Plato 
culminates in a productive union with the supreme reality, which results 
in activity autonomously generating new instantiations of morality and 
knowledge (Symposiun 212a3-5 and Respublica 490b1-7).  
The radical transcendence of the supreme Good with regard to every 
form of being, evoked in Respublica 509b8-10 – the Good is epekeina tês 
ousias – does not contradict this perspective just delineated. Conversely, if 
the Good did not transcend every form of being, then it would follow that 
the self-givingness of the Good would be determined and limited by the 
coincidence with a form of being. This coincidence, in fact, would make it 
impossible for the Good to endow another being with real autonomy, 
which implicates real alterity, that is independent ontological substantiality 
on the side of the being originated by the Good. In sum, transcendence 
results in this context as prerequisite of freedom, both for the Good and 
for its manifestation. On this basis the manifestation of the Good cannot 
be intended as reflection or reproduction of some identity, but reveals itself 
as generation of new forms of autonomy, that is as creativity.24 And this 
pertains not only to the supreme manifestation of the Good self, but also 
to the activity of every self intending to manifest the Good. In order to 
realize its intention, that is, in order to directly experience and reveal the 
Good, that self has to transcend every form of being, becoming thus 
capable of manifesting a really new form of being, not deducible from 
other forms of being. The self willing to manifest the Good has, in other 
words, to re-generate in a new form the unrestricted freedom of the 
Good.25 Nevertheless, the thus attained freedom has nothing to do with 
                                                 
23 See, for instance, the explicit assertions in Gorgias 499e7-500a1 and Respublica 505d11-
e1. 
24 For an attempt at illuminating Plato’s notion of good in reference to the notion of crea-
tivity see Lavecchia 2012a. 
25 From this point of view it becomes comprehensible why Plato portrays the authentic 
philosopher as manifesting the highest form of freedom (Theaetetus 172d3-176a1).  
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arbitrariness, but consists in infinite openness to the most generous 
relation with regard to and for the autonomy of other beings or selves. 
This freedom implicates, in sum, primarily freedom from one’s own self. 
This freedom is the most radical form of self-transcendence. It cannot 
therefore be intended as unilateral subjectivity; on the contrary, this form 
of freedom is unconditionally receptive to the most transparent 
manifestation of alterity. In fact, it gives to another self, to other persons, 
and, in general, to other beings – as already mentioned – the possibility of 
entirely revealing their genuine nature.  
To the same source of freedom refers the passage of the Politicus 
(294a6-b6) evidencing the superiority over any norm or law with regard to 
the person who has achieved true knowledge. This superiority, in fact, 
does not implicate any sort of anomic attitude, but the capacity of actively 
generating harmonious relations with the world and with other persons, 
drawing the substance of those relations from the supreme source of any 
law and rule as well as of any being, that is from the supreme Good. The 
passage from the Politicus points, accordingly, to an eminently situational 
ethics, which, basing on a direct experience of the supreme Good, 
considers as prime concern the individuality of the context in which the 
good has to be manifested.26 However, this does not involve striving for 
anarchy, since Plato’s ethics lives in intimate relation with an ontology 
which, originated in the experience of the supreme Good, gives autonomy 
and individuality a preeminently relational, that is moral, connotation. In 
the light of this ontology autonomy and individuality actually manifest 
themselves authentically through showing the same self-givingness 
characterizing the Good, that is the reality which, on Plato’s account, 
ultimately originates their very being. On this basis Plato’s ethics can be 
perceived as per se harmonizing free individuality and community: if free 
individuality actualizes itself through manifestation of self-givingness, in 
consequence its nature reveals itself as intrinsically generating 
communion, that is as intrinsically creating harmony within a community. 
The point of view just characterized implicates that the good cannot be 
manifested exclusively based on the past, ie. through exclusive instantiation 
                                                 
26 In contrast, no norm or law is capable of mirroring that individuality, since it is always 
based on generalizations (see 294a10-c6), that is on abstractions. 
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of exterior or interior norms deduced from past experiences. This form of 
proceeding would bias the encounter with the individuality of persons as 
well as with the specificity of situations. Conversely, in this perspective the 
good can become most originally manifest starting from the future which 
can be initiated through unprejudiced and competent observation of the 
present: through creative formativity,27 not through the monarchy of 
formalized procedures. The contrary would implicate here both 
annihilating any form of true knowledge and making life unlivable, as the 
brilliant depiction of degenerate normativity in Politicus 294d4-297b4, 
297e8-299e effectively emphasizes. Authentic manifestation of the good, 
that is, genuine morality and virtue, involves, in other words, the 
willingness to bring a new birth into the world (Symposium 212a2-5), in the 
same way that, as indicated by Socrates’ acting as midwife, a new birth is 
presupposed in order to attain true knowledge (Theaetetus 149a-151d3).28 
In this context Socrates’ midwifery reveals itself as exemplary with regard 
to the achievement not only of epistemic truth, but also of moral truth. 
This is not surprising, since every act of true knowledge consists, from 
Plato’s viewpoint, in a direct or indirect relation with the supreme Good – 
with the origin of every truth (Respublica 508e1-4) –, thus manifesting 
itself as eminently moral act. 
In consonance with this perspective, both epistemic and moral acts 
have ultimately to be based on unrestricted confidence in the individuality 
of the acting person(s) as well as of their context.29 This is the same 
unconditional confidence required by the event of a birth, where, 
notwithstanding her expertise, the midwife is never able to deduce from 
past experience the singularity and uniqueness either of the newborn, of 
the mother, and of the actual situation concomitant with the birth. In 
accordance with Plato’s notion of supreme Good, this confidence 
appears as the ultimate ground of genuinely good choices. In other 
words, the supreme Good can never be authentically manifested on the 
                                                 
27 On the possibility of connecting Luigi Pareyson’s concept of formatività (Pareyson 1988) 
to Plato’s notion of the good, see Lavecchia 2012a. 
28 For a valuable introduction to the context presenting the characterization of Socrates’ 
midwifery see Sedley 2004. 
29 Stimulating considerations on Plato’s notion of confidence can be found in Bontempi 
2013. 
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basis of fear with respect to personal autonomy and responsibility, 
delegating freedom and responsibility to formal or bureaucratic 
procedures. Manifesting the supreme Good presupposes, on the 
contrary, the courage of imagining genuinely unrestricted, creative 
freedom: the courage of realizing that very unconditional generosity 
through which the Good originally gave birth to beings intrinsically 
endowed with autonomous consciousness and personal responsibility.  
 
 
7. Agathological Realism 
 
The implications contained in Plato’s notion of supreme Good could 
enable a configuration of realism capable of transcending any sterile 
opposition not only between subjectivity and objectivity, but also 
between ontology and ethics. In accordance with these implications, 
moral and ontological reality cannot, in fact, be separated, since in the 
light of the Good the original nature of being manifests itself as 
autonomous consciousness characterized by acting through unrestricted 
self-givingness, that is, by acting in an eminently moral form. As a 
consequence, ontology does not prevail over ethics or vice versa: both are 
anchored on the same level in the unconditional relationality of the 
Good. In sum, the here emphasized unity of ontology and ethics, of 
being and morality, neither involves a predetermination of being 
through an univocally prescriptive morality nor implies an original 
delimitation of morality through an univocally objective being. In the 
light of the Good both being and morality are intrinsic manifestations of 
a consciousness which, because of its unrestricted self-givingness, 
generates the highest form of freedom and creativity, concomitantly 
generating the most harmonious form of relation and communion. On 
this perspective thinking is originally the activity which, on the one side 
manifests, and on the other side perceives the generativeness just 
indicated as well as the relations and the harmonious order produced by 
it. In other words, thinking transcends the Kantian distinction between 
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practical and pure (theoretical) reason.30 Being anchored in the Good, 
conceptual activity reveals itself therefore as both productive imagination 
and active contemplation of good relations: it concretely perceives the 
reality as well as the ultimate origin of those relations, at the same time 
being immediately capable of generating new instantiations of that 
reality.31  
In accordance with these considerations, conceptual and moral 
realism32 could persuasively attain a common foundation based on the 
important suggestions derivable from Plato’s notion of supreme Good. 
This common foundation of conceptual and moral reality could give a 
solution to the many aporias resulting from the separation between 
theoretical and practical philosophy as well as between ontology and 
ethics. Plato’s notion of supreme Good, in fact, transcends that 
separation, since it grounds both knowledge/perception and morality in 
                                                 
30 Obviously, distinction does not mean opposition or dualism, as Kant’s constant attempt 
to achieve a synthesis between these two dimensions of reason demonstrates. In the light 
of the foregoing discussion concerning the unity of being and consciousness in the Good, 
an unprejudiced investigation of Kant’s so-called Opus Postumum could be extraordinarily 
stimulating and illuminating. Dieter Henrich’s masterly considerations regarding Kant’s 
concept of ethical autonomy (Henrich 2001, 6-42) properly affirms the impossibility of re-
turning, after Kant, to an interpretation of morality univocally based on the concept of telos-
entelecheia. This interpretation would namely incorrectly bypass Kant’s intense considera-
tion of the fact that only a real presence of the good in the morally acting consciousness/self 
(bonitas solae voluntatis) on the one hand, and only the possibility of founding the relation 
with the good in that consciousness/self on the other hand, is capable of authentically 
grounding ethical autonomy (Henrich 2001, 40-41). According to Henrich, this connects 
Kant with perspectives peculiar of Plato’s philosophy (Henrich 2001, 41-42). This is in 
general true, if we only except the fact that Kant always – including his latest elaborations – 
formulates his concept of authentic moral action by ultimately recurring to the notion of 
law (Gesetz). In Plato’s agathological perspective, on the contrary, the primary concern of 
supremely moral action does not reside in the possibility of its being universalized, but in 
its impulse to creatively configuring relations which are able to manifest the singularity of 
every situation.  
31 Consequently, this perspective has to be differentiated from Kenneth Gergen’s social 
constructivism as well as from the resulting concept of relational being. According to 
Gergen the self is, in fact, a whole that is equal to the sum of the relations in which it is 
embedded (Gergen 2009, 55), not a creator of authentically new relations. 
32 A recent valuable attempt at grounding a conceptual realism can be found in Mulder 
2014. 
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the very same gesture of self-givingness. To this assertion could be 
certainly objected through many more or less stringent arguments. 
Nevertheless, no objection is capable of obliterating the phenomenal 
experience we can observe in association with our activity of perceiving 
and knowing: on the one hand we would perceive and know no really 
other being if we would not generate an unlimited space of 
manifestation for its reality, that is if we would not be unconditionally 
open for its birth in our perception and knowledge; on the other hand no 
perception or knowledge would be possible if being would not be in a 
certain way unconditionally open for the birth of our perception and 
knowledge. This points to a real reciprocal self-givingness connecting 
ourselves with the world or with other selves. Without that self-
givingness I would remain confined in my interiority, and the world in 
its exteriority:33 were myself as well as every other being incapable of 
manifesting a certain level of self-givingness, no form of real perception 
or knowledge would be possible. On this perspective, that is, on a 
platonic perspective, authentic morality reveals itself as the most 
conscious and active form of perception and knowledge, of which every 
other form of perception and knowledge can be considered a more or 
less authentic image. This does not imply a subordination of morality to 
knowledge, since in this same perspective true perception and 
knowledge, in turn, can be actualized solely because of the moral 
constitution peculiar of being. Summing up: in this agathological 
perspective morality and knowledge reciprocally generate their reality, 
thus instantiating that creative unity of interiority and exteriority, of 
being and consciousness, of individuality and community, of freedom 
and responsibility, which is immediately implied in the ultimate origin 
of every reality, that is in the supreme Good. Accordingly, neither 
morality nor knowledge could be authentically founded on the basis of a 
realism univocally concentrating either on moral or on conceptual 
realities. This would indicate the necessity of an agathological realism, 
willing to consider the reality of the good as the primary concern of 
philosophy, on which the possibility of a both moral and conceptual 
                                                 
33 For an introduction to the concept of perception and knowledge as transcending the op-
position of exteriority and interiority see Scheurle 2013. 
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realism does depend. As the foregoing discussion hopefully indicated, 
this willingness, in turn, would imply the courage of thinking and 
experiencing the good as originally transcending many reapresentations 
we currently associate with it. Plato’s notion of supreme Good may give 
us valuable help on the way of attaining that courage: the courage 
leading Socrates to sacrifice his life for helping others to generate 
authentic knowledge and morality. 
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“Solidarity at the Time of the Fall:” 
Adorno and Rorty on Moral Realism 
 
Alexander Fischer and Marko J. Fuchs 
 
 
 
Einer fragte Herrn K., ob es einen Gott gäbe.  
Herr K. sagte: “Ich rate dir, nachzudenken, ob dein Verhalten  
je nach der Antwort auf diese Frage sich ändern würde.  
Würde es sich nicht ändern, dann können wir die Frage fallenlassen.” 
(Bertolt Brecht. Geschichten von Herrn Keuner) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Current discourse in practical philosophy has seen so-called moral 
realism re-emerge as a controversial topic. Moral realism is here defined 
as positing the existence of eternal and universal moral values, inde-
pendent of the discretion of a moral agent. This has not always been a 
controversial topic. In particular, Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy 
aimed to put an end to the thesis of the existence of timeless values in 
favor of the increased life of the individual, and to establish a relativistic 
vitalism instead of a moral realism. Today, however, we see attempts to 
defend moral realism against this Nietzschean attack, but these attempts 
are not without their own fierce criticism.  
One of the most prominent representatives of today’s criticism of re-
alist positions within Ethics is Richard Rorty, who in many ways draws 
on Nietzsche’s philosophy. One of his much-discussed, and also criti-
cized, general theses is the following: instead of eternal and universal 
values it is solidarity with members of one’s own ethnic group that 
should serve as guide for what is to be understood as good behavior. 
Thus conventions supersede universal moral values, and respectively 
concrete conventions in one’s lived life are, through Rorty’s approach, to 
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be saved from the hubris of a metaphysical grounding of morality, 
which shifts the scale of moral action into an afterlife. 
This paper will not make another attempt to defend moral realism 
against Rorty’s critique. It rather confronts Rorty’s position with argu-
ments by Theodor W. Adorno, noting that Adorno also follows the Nie-
tzschean critical attitude towards the assertion of eternal and universal 
values. In this regard, Rorty and Adorno are connected via similar start-
ing points. By turning these two philosophers against one another, how-
ever, it not only becomes clear how diverse relativistic moral critiques 
can be; we also gain interesting insights into Rorty’s critical design, 
which, in turn, also enables a new understanding of Adorno’s critique. 
Adorno also refers to the actual present life world as a reference point 
for moral action. However, for him this reality is not unquestionable and 
also not our ultimate reference for choosing an action, such as it seems 
to be for Rorty. Adorno rather scrutinizes this reality and its norms of 
actions. 
The purpose of this paper now is to demonstrate that Adorno fun-
damentally confronts Rorty’s position. Rorty’s criticism of moral realism 
does not reach far enough and itself ends up at a rather naive moral real-
ism, in which the ethnic group functions as the ultimate measure of 
moral judgment, thus without any possibility to criticize this premise 
itself. By contrast Adorno offers a figure of thought by which even with-
out the assumption of a moral realism in the traditional sense, such a 
criticism is entirely possible. At the end this paper will finally suggest 
that Adorno’s philosophy could be described as a kind of enlightened 
moral realism. 
In order to achieve these goals the paper first depicts Rorty’s posi-
tion. This is followed by the reconstruction of Adorno’s philosophy and a 
comparison of the two positions, which will show how Rorty’s stand-
point cannot withstand Adorno’s critique.  
 
 
2. Rorty: Solidarity rather than Objectivity  
 
The idea of moral realism arises from the context of a philosophy 
that must be understood as a fundamental science, the science of the 
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general, unchangeable and necessary, by means of abstraction. Rorty set 
himself the goal to bid farewell to this idea of philosophy, in order to 
lead the discipline out of its – as stated by Nietzsche – “loss of reality.” 
Instead, a “postmetaphysical culture” (Rorty 1989, xvi) became an objec-
tive in working against the separation of philosophy from life’s reality, 
which bids farewell to the assumption of “permanent truths of reason 
and temporary truths of fact” (Rorty 1991 I, 176). The fundamental accu-
sation of a “life-distance” can also be applied to the requirements of a 
metaphysico-objective morality, which is demanded within the argu-
mentative frame of moral realism and suggests an attitude of escape 
from the contingencies of life. Showing that this is impossible became 
one of the main focuses of Rorty’s philosophy, who, following philoso-
phers like the already mentioned Nietzsche, William James, and John 
Dewey, tried to introduce a pragmatic turn to philosophy, with which 
philosophy and life praxis could close ranks. Thus Rorty argues for the 
disavowal of the “belief that there are, out there in the world, real es-
sences which it is our duty to discover and which are disposed to assist 
in their own discovery” (Rorty 1989, 75). With this in mind, it is point-
less to seek for the essence of anything, including morality, if only be-
cause our reality constantly alters, and because of this an essence (if 
such a thing even existed) would be subject to constant change, too. Pla-
to’s distinct different spheres are no longer available with Rorty, nor is 
the idea of a morality as the morality.  
But in order to approach the phenomenon that we call “morality” 
(escaping our vocabulary is only conditionally possible) we have to – in a 
pragmatic sense – focus on social practices, because “there is nothing 
deep down inside us except what we have to put there ourselves, no cri-
terion that we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no 
standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigor-
ous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions” (Rorty 
1982, xlii).  
Thus it is necessary to lift the veil of our commonly used terms and 
to become aware of social practice as a constitutive variable. The same 
applies to morality. Morality can be understood as a result of social prac-
tice, which implies a constant and always contextually embedded 
change:  
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If we are inclined to philosophize, we shall want the vocabulary offered 
by Dewey, Heidegger, Davidson, and Derrida, with its built-in cautions 
against metaphysics, rather than that offered by Descartes, Hume, and 
Kant. For if we use the former vocabulary, we shall be able to see moral 
progress as a history of making rather than finding, of poetic achieve-
ment by “radically situated” individuals and communities, rather than 
as the gradual unveiling, through the use of “reason,” of “principles” or 
“rights” or “value” (Rorty 1991 I, 188-189). 
 
Although Rorty obviously polemicizes against metaphysical princi-
ples of philosophy, he also adheres to a principle, which can be associat-
ed directly in the sphere of morality: solidarity. This term can serve as an 
example of how Rorty’s understanding of a moral principle in a specific 
context of life is supposed to work. Rorty’s view of solidarity is an alter-
native to an understanding of solidarity that is dependent on objectivity 
(which traditionally depends on the belief of the Humane), as the so-
called realists construct it. Rorty claims that such realists necessarily 
demand implausible additional assumptions, as they  
 
have to construe truth as correspondence to reality. So they must 
construct a metaphysics which has room for a special relation be-
tween beliefs and objects which will differentiate true from false be-
liefs. They also must argue that there are procedures of justification 
of belief which are natural and not merely local. So they must con-
struct an epistemology which has room for a kind of justification 
which is not merely social but natural, springing from human nature 
itself, and made possible by a link between that part of nature and the 
rest of nature (Rorty 1991 II, 22). 
 
According to Rorty these necessary assumptions cannot be designed 
convincingly. He therefore considers it preferable to focus on the con-
crete life context to illustrate solidarity. This depends on identification-
categories with which we calculate the proximity of a person to us, in or-
der to develop a sense of solidarity. Even though this is a psychological 
(and intuitive) and not a systematic argument, Rorty applies it against 
the notion of universal moral principles. Specifically, he applies his ar-
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gumentation against humanism: identification with the humane is not 
enough to motivate solidarity, claiming that “‘because she is a human 
being’ is a weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action” (Rorty 
1989, 191). A thus-constructed ethical universalism therefore ignores the 
fact that we feel closer to people, with whom “imaginative identification 
is easier” (Rorty 1989, 191). 
Of course, Rorty is aware of the fact that such thinking does not 
come without presuppositions, but rather depends on an age-old ethical 
discourse that recognizes human solidarity as a value. It hence becomes 
clear that Rorty cannot get away from a specific vocabulary, which is the 
product of an indubitable ethnocentrism (Rorty 1991 II, 23, 29). Rorty 
here agrees with Putnam (a well-known colleague in the criticism of 
moral realism), that we can only obtain a better view of morality whilst 
speaking of a tradition (with its echoes of the Bible, philosophy, demo-
cratic revolutions and so on), instead of proclaiming a supposedly ahis-
torical position, as moral realists do. This leaves us with a simple formu-
la for the definitions of our moral values: those beliefs are “true […] 
which he or she finds good to believe” (Rorty 1991 II, 24) – and this cost-
benefit calculation is always embedded in different contexts of history, 
life circumstances etc. A realist will tend to interpret this type of view as 
another positive theory about the nature of truth, that is, as a theory ac-
cording to which the truth is only a respective opinion of an individual 
or a group. “But the pragmatist,” Rorty says, “does not have a theory of 
truth, much less a relativistic one. As a partisan of solidarity, his account 
of the value of cooperative human inquiry has only an ethical base, not 
an epistemological or metaphysical one. Not having any epistemology, a 
forteriori he does not have a relativistic one” (Rorty 1991 II, 24). 
The accusation of being a relativist can thus be read as a projection of 
the realists, “for the realist thinks that the whole point of philosophical 
thought is to detach oneself from any particular community and look 
down at it from a more universal standpoint” (Rorty 1991 II, 30), but 
those who think they can see axioms are just victims of a “Cartesian fal-
lacy of seeing axioms where there are only shared habits, of viewing 
statements which summarize such practices as if they reported con-
straints enforcing such practices” (Rorty 1991 II, 26). 
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Ultimately Rorty’s critique of metaphysics culminates in an argu-
ment promulgated by Nietzsche, who demands we renounce the meta-
physical ghost constructions and dive into the “real:” 
 
[the] traditional Western metaphysico-epistemological way of firming 
up our habits simply isn’t working anymore. It isn’t doing its job. It 
has become as transparent a device as the postulation of deities who 
turn out, by a happy coincidence, to have chosen us as their people. 
So the pragmatist suggestion that we substitute a ‘merely’ ethical 
foundation for our sense of community – or, better, that we think of 
our sense of community as having no foundation except shared hope 
and the trust created by such sharing – is put forward on practical 
grounds (Rorty 1991 II, 33). 
 
 
3. “Solidarity at the Time of the Fall:”1 Metaphysics and Ethics in Adorno 
 
Rorty’s accomplished anti-metaphysical and pragmatist turn in favor 
of an emphasis on solidarity can, on the one hand, be seen as a demand 
to free actually lived morality from the claims of moral realism, which 
urges people to follow the supposedly morally higher sphere of timeless 
values instead, a sphere separated from actual life. On the other hand, 
the difficulties of such a conception are particularly evident when one’s 
own ethnocentric standpoint becomes a subject of critical assessment, 
because Rorty cannot provide any sort of standard against which his the-
ory can be proven. However, as noted earlier in the introduction, this 
section of the paper is not supposed to go further into the development 
of a transcendental argumentation, but instead wants to ask: Does Ror-
ty’s supposedly enlightened critical attitude, with which he rejects moral 
realism in favor of the fullness of lived morality, go far enough to de-
serve the name of profound criticism? Or is Rorty’s pragmatism to be 
characterized as mere opportunism, compared to a standard of criticism 
that will be introduced in the following? 
                                                 
1 Adorno 1992, 408: “There is solidarity between such [i.e. negative dialectical] thinking 
and metaphysics at the time of its fall.” 
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The figure of thought that will be consulted for this exam is Adorno’s 
critique of society. Like Rorty within his concept of pragmatism, Adorno 
refuses to use metaphysical arguments for the discussion of the ques-
tion of the successful life. If moral realism is to be understood as a con-
cept that postulates or tries to prove the existence of timeless values that, 
in the end, tell us what we should do, and prove the quality of moral 
goodness or define moral obligations, then Adorno is no more a realist 
than Rorty is. However, the motive that leads Adorno to such a decline is 
slightly different to Rorty’s – in general, it can be named “Auschwitz.” 
For Adorno, Auschwitz is the bankruptcy of any metaphysics that ei-
ther tries to transcend the finite world altogether or claims to deduce 
some meaning of finite being from a transcendental world. “After 
Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as 
sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind 
of sense, however bleached, out of the victim’s fate” (Adorno 1992, 361). 
This metaphysical thesis of the significance of finite being implicitly 
sanctions the horrors of the concentrations camps, instead of making it 
explicit and thus become an ally to fascism. However, the absurdness 
that Auschwitz has brought to light is the radical nullity of individuals 
that suffer a mechanized and industrialized death in the gas chambers:  
 
The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had 
never yet to fear in just this fashion. There is no chance any more for 
death to come into the individual’s empirical life as somehow con-
formable with the course of that life. The last, the poorest possession 
left to the individual is expropriated. That in the concentration camps 
it was no longer an individual who dies, but a specimen—this is a 
fact bound to affect the dying of those who escaped the administra-
tive measure. Genocide is absolute integration. It is on its way wher-
ever men are leveled off—“polished off,” as the German military 
called it—until one exterminates them literally, as deviations from 
the concept of their total nullity. Auschwitz confirmed the philoso-
pheme of pure identity as death (Adorno 1992, 362). 
 
If we take a close look at this quote, several aspects become clearer 
which show us why metaphysics is no longer an option in the face of the 
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Holocaust. First of all, every thought refuses to grant the mass murder a 
metaphysical sense. Secondly, the industrialized killing and dying de-
stroys one of the fundaments of traditional metaphysics, the retrospec-
tive dependence of metaphysical speculation on the experience of the 
single person that was established by the personal fear of one’s own 
death. Death now faces the individual in a mechanized form and proves 
the nullity of the individual: the nullity of its existence at all, the nullity 
of its own individuality. This becomes clear when the individual, as a 
mere copy of a type or race, i.e. a general disposition, suffers the same 
automated death with several other individuals. Thirdly, there is, in 
Adorno’s opinion, an even deeper structure that causes the failure or 
“fall” of metaphysics. This is, again, due to the fact that Auschwitz is not 
only a failure of a particular form of metaphysically impregnated philos-
ophizing, but also a failure of culture, to which this metaphysical philos-
ophy belongs as a part and an expression of itself. Therefore “[a]ll post-
Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage” (Adorno 
1992, 367). This diagnosis by Adorno, namely that metaphysics should 
not just be regarded as a superfluous counter model to, but rather as the 
very expression of a failed culture itself, profoundly subverts Rorty’s op-
position of metaphysical speculation (at least for morality), on the one 
hand, and seemingly the healthy, life-world rooted reality of actions on 
the other. “That this could happen in the midst of traditions of philoso-
phy, of art, and of the enlightening sciences says more than that these 
traditions and their spirit lacked the power to take hold of men and work 
a change in them. There is untruth in those fields themselves, in the au-
tarky that is emphatically claimed for them” (Adorno 1992, 366-7). That 
means that the dreadful kind of thought that finds its manifestation in 
the concentration camps is also at work in philosophy and science in a 
clandestine way. This thought even functions as a basis for the highest 
forms of culture – such as philosophy, art, and science – and it essential-
ly neglects the special and singular features of the particular being in fa-
vor of the identical aspects this being has in common with other things. 
It is this tendency to neglect and to level what is special and non-
identical which is essential to theoretical and metaphysical thought and 
which becomes reality in the fascist genocide. Thus it becomes clear, 
that for Adorno, metaphysics (which is deeply based on the deluded 
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principle of identification and the conceited preponderance of the uni-
versal), cannot present a remedy for a horrid reality that is constituted by 
the same principles and of which it is a part. 
Now, one might be inclined to turn Adorno’s considerations in a way 
that might lead one to admit that the Holocaust was just one break-
through of barbarism with roots specifically in Western European cul-
ture and its cultural forms. One then could call for a different way of 
thinking that takes the non-identical more strongly into account and for 
a philosophy that also gives us the consolation that thought will develop 
in such a way that we will never let Auschwitz happen again. By this 
Auschwitz would somehow get a meaning, namely just that we would 
have now been placed in a position, once and for all, to learn from our 
mistakes and to change our thinking and living. Furthermore, one could 
think that it is exactly Rorty’s undogmatic approach that answers to the 
non-pragmatic but metaphysical based Western European thought that 
lead to Auschwitz.  
That this is no option for Adorno has been made clear before. But 
why this is so becomes clearer whilst understanding how far reaching 
Adorno’s diagnosis is. First of all, Adorno would disagree with the thesis 
that the barbaric logic of identification, that is the very texture of Ausch-
witz, is just a past Western European phenomenon that could be elimi-
nated by decision. The reason for this gives a second point, which is that 
none of the forms of high culture (philosophy, art, science) are autono-
mous regions, which only accidentally come into contact with society. 
On the contrary: All three of them are essentially connected with society, 
which enforces its fixed constants and structures of thought upon them. 
Thirdly: The very essence of this kind of thought, which is substantiated 
as society and the forms of life imposed by it, consist in identifying and 
making the unequal equal. In Adorno’s eyes, this is true not only for 
Western European culture but also for North American capitalism – in 
which Adorno sees as nothing else but the totalitarian completion of 
Western European culture. Thus, Adorno’s diagnosis which concerns 
European culture also concerns North American capitalism; both are 
deeply rooted within the logics of identification. 
Auschwitz, thus, is not a break-in of barbarism into the enlightened 
capitalist society, but the realization of its very structure. This is the rea-
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son why the end of the concentration camps is not the end of the spell of 
identification. It rather subsists within capitalist societies and takes over 
all spheres of life. That is why “there is nothing innocuous left” (Adorno 
2005, 25). The seemingly innocent affable small talk is doomed by the 
spell of identification and implicitly sanctifies the existing order. “Even 
the blossoming tree lies the moment its bloom is seen without the shad-
ow of terror” (Adorno 2005, 25). Every human and interpersonal relation 
is determined by this leveling, identifying, that is thought and form of 
existence and life at the same time. This has severe consequences for 
Rorty’s position. The selfsame living environment that according to Ror-
ty serves as a corrective against metaphysical ideas, which are out of 
touch with the real world, is, according to Adorno, nothing else but a 
monstrous structure of repression itself. 
Things get even worse for Rorty’s concept. The spell of identification, 
that haunts society, tends to conceal itself. It is a universal context of de-
ception and a ban that does not release its subjects but deludes them by 
making them think of themselves as free persons whilst they are ruled 
and compelled. This context of deception affects all regions of culture and 
thus also philosophy. For example: a philosophy that promotes the liberal-
istic conception of a human society promotes a society constituted by au-
tonomous selves, who use instrumental rationality to pursue their own 
interests and to maximize utility. In Adorno’s eyes, such a philosophy in-
deed is a mere reproduction of the solipsist way of existence which is im-
posed upon people by a repressive society in order to make them subjects 
of control using the delusion of freedom of choice (an argument that, 
again, Nietzsche already developed). Thus, this philosophy sanctions, as a 
theory, the selfsame structures of power that make the people submissive 
to the mechanisms of capitalist society. From this perspective, Rorty’s the-
ory does not appear to be an enlightened position which restores the im-
mediate ethical substance of everyday life but an unconscious affirmation 
of the machinery of power. 
Although thinking and philosophy are enmeshed within the spell of 
identification and power, and unable to get out of it, Adorno does not vote 
for a retreat from culture, thought, and philosophy for a return to rural 
life. This retreat again would simply sanction the power of society and its 
immanent logics that would finally creep up again upon the retreater. Ra-
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ther, we must think in a way that keeps the basic structure of identifica-
tion – that rules every thought – conscious, in order to overcome its own 
barbaric tendency to level the non-identical and, in particular, in this self-
reflexive manner. In other words: It is selfsame thinking that is cause and 
cure of the problems at the same time by thinking “against itself” and its 
brutal tendency of identification. The utopian aim of such thinking is to 
unlock the non-identical and release it from its forced deformations, to let 
it show itself and to give it a language of expression without imposing lev-
eling and identifying categories upon it. Such thinking would then not 
come to postulate some positive contents as examples of “the non-
identical,” but would consist in a constant negative dialectical criticism, 
which, in its process, would try to retrieve the non-identical out of the con-
text of deception. This is the reason why such a negative dialectics is able 
to offer a certain potential consolation without being urged to name and 
strictly determine the consoling utopia; even less it is forced to evoke a be-
lief in transcendental eternal values in order to find some “metaphysical 
comfort” against which Rorty so eloquently polemicizes. At the end stands 
a comfort that is only negative; it consists “in the gaze falling on horror, 
withstanding it, and in unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding 
fast to the possibility of what is better.” (Adorno 2005, 25) In this figure of 
negative dialectical thought Adorno is able to find his own idea of solidari-
ty, which is, as quoted above, solidarity with metaphysics “at the time of its 
fall.” 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We can conclude that Adorno’s approach goes far beyond the bound-
aries of Rorty’s criticism without restoring a simple naive moral realism 
of a metaphysical kind. However, does this mean that we finally have to 
dismiss moral realism altogether? This does not seem necessary. At sec-
ond sight one could indeed see a certain kind of “moral realism” in 
Adorno’s philosophy. This, however, is not the moral realism Rorty at-
tacks. It rather is a moral realism that recurs on something “real,” i.e. 
the non-identical that serves as the measure of a thinking, that tries to 
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break the ban of identification without being so naive to think that the 
mere intention is the deed.  
This realism would be a moral one insofar as the negative dialectical 
movement of thought follows the intention to let the non-identical to be 
free in its otherness and dissolve it from its forced transformations. This 
is not realism because it claims the existence of eternal values; it is real-
ism because it aims at a change of reality; it is realism because the non-
identical is “real” as much as it can be freed from the spell of identifica-
tion by negative dialectical thinking. 
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Bacon against Descartes. 
Emotions, Rationality, Defences 
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Introduction 
 
According to the “pyramidal” conception – which is historically asso-
ciated with the hierarchical conception of cerebral functions dating back 
to the 19th Century – the architecture of the mind consists in a gradual 
ascent from “lower” psychological levels (instinctive drives, tensions, an-
imal automatisms and, more recently, “reptilian” anatomical structures) 
through increasingly “higher” psychological levels, up to a vertex that is 
able to impart order to this hierarchy of functions, and above all that is 
able coherently direct the “noblest” functions that define rational self-
consciousness (cf. Oatley 1978). This “Victorian”1 picture of the neu-
rocognitive architecture is still very popular – for instance, it underlies 
the “dual-system view,” which has guided much research on human 
emotion over the past decades (cf. De Oliveira-Souza, Moll, and Graf-
man 2011).  
 It will be argued here, however, that this picture should be rejected. 
The main problem with the pyramidal conception of the mind is that 
it misleads us in positing the existence of increasingly “higher” psycho-
logical levels that reach a hypothetical vertex on which everything de-
pends. Today, we have sufficient evidence that this vertex does not exist. 
A large amount of neurocognitive data offer robust evidence against the 
hypothesis that, in some area of the mind-brain, there is a place where 
“it all comes together” – some sort of central executive system coordinat-
ing all the cognitive operations (Dennett and Kinsbourne 1992). Actual-
ly, a “modularist” conception of the mind-brain has loomed large in psy-
chology and neuroscience since the 1980s. In contrast with the pyrami-
dal view, which sees the mind as a homogeneous and hierarchically-
                                                 
1 ‘Victorian Brain’ is a phrase coined by Reynolds (1981). 
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ordered field ruled by consciousness and rationality, Chomsky and Marr 
famously envisioned a much less unitary, homogeneous, and hierar-
chical mind with a largely modular architecture, comprising a swarm of 
neurocomputational subsystems that perform highly specific functions 
independently of each other (cf. Carruthers 2006). Along the same lines, 
the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (see, e.g., Dehaene and 
Changeux 2004) sees the neurocognitive architecture underlying the 
unity of consciousness as a distributed computational system with no 
central controller. 
Furthermore, a Cartesian epistemology is part and parcel of the py-
ramidal conception of the mind. According to Descartes, rational con-
sciousness can fail only because of the influence of emotional and affec-
tive motions that originate from the opacity of the bodily machine. 
However, today some research programs in cognitive sciences adopt a 
“Baconian” logic instead. In the Novum Organum Bacon sees the errors 
of judgment and conduct as naturally produced by the conscious and ra-
tional mind. The famous idola, constant factors of deception, are, in this 
philosopher, human knowledge’s habitual way of operating: “Human 
understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, 
distorts and discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature 
with it,” Bacon famously writes (1620, Bk I, 41). In current terms, he 
sees the mind’s errors, illusions, and self-deceptions as inherent to the 
very mechanisms of “high” cognition. 
We think that Bacon’s criticism of rational consciousness should be a 
fixed point for the sciences of mind and brain. In the following pages we 
examine some of its ramifications in three research areas – the study of 
emotions, psychology of thought and the literature on the interpersonal 
and social dynamics – to finally draw a moral for the psychodynamics of 
defences. 
 
 
1. The Heterogeneity of the Emotions 
 
If we give up Descartes’ theory of error, and thus cease to divide the 
mind into lower and upper floors, the folk concept of emotion breaks 
apart, being replaced by a diversified, articulated, disparate and even 
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heterogeneous field, which, contrary to the traditional ideology, is part 
and parcel of the wider universe of all psychological events. In other 
words, the folk concept of emotion turns out to be not a natural kind, i.e., 
a real category in nature tied together by a causal homeostatic mecha-
nism that underlies projectibility and inductive reasoning (cf. Boyd 
1991). 
The claim that emotions do not form a natural kind has been made 
by Griffiths (1997, 2004, 2013), based on a large amount of evidence 
from ethology, psychology, neuroscience and anthropology. According to 
Griffiths, the folk concept of emotion is a cluster of at least three differ-
ent classes of psychological phenomena: basic emotions, complex emo-
tions, and disclaimed action emotions. Let us examine them in turn. 
Paul Ekman’s psychoevolutionary theory of emotions aims to offer a 
unitary account of a number of “basic” emotions by positing an underly-
ing causal mechanism. That is, these emotions are characterized by spe-
cific physiological, neurobiological, expressive, behavioural, cognitive, 
and phenomenological responses to events in the environment; and 
these responses are assumed to be automatically elicited and coordinat-
ed by a computational mechanism called the “affect program” (Ekman 
and Cordaro 2011, 365). According to Griffiths (1990), the computational 
psychology of these affect programs is modular in a sense very close to 
that popularized by Fodor. Basic emotions are fast and mandatory re-
sponses, which are controlled by subsystems that draw on a limited da-
tabase, are triggered by information coming from an extremely limited 
range of perceptual inputs, and work independently of more conceptual 
processes, such those underlying action planning. In Fodor’s words, 
they are “informationally encapsulated” and have “limited central ac-
cess.” In emergency conditions, facing serious danger, the modular fea-
tures permit the affect program to work as a fail-safe system, which seiz-
es behaviour when, having little time, it is crucial for the agent immedi-
ately to do the right thing, even at the price of trusting quick and dirty 
knowledge. 
It is important to make clear that, in a research program that aspires 
to be scientific, basic emotions should not be designated by such folk 
terms as ‘anger,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘happiness,’ and ‘sadness.’ These folk 
categories do not designate basic emotions in the sense of the psychoev-
Mario De Caro and Massimo Marraffa 
 
66 
olutionary theory: indeed, some of these categories lack those physiolog-
ical, neurobiological, expressive, behavioural, cognitive, and phenome-
nological features that Ekman regards as the markers of a basic emotion. 
And yet some members of the ‘anger,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘happiness,’ and 
‘sadness’ categories do meet Ekman’s criteria – one example is the kind 
of fear produced by sudden loss of support (cf. Öhman and Mineka 
2001). Consequently, as an alternative to the use of folk terms, we could 
coin neologisms (e.g., ‘threat-coping system’), or use modified versions 
of the folk categories, making it clear that what is referred to is not the 
whole folk category, but only a part of it (e.g., fearb or fearbasic) (cf. 
Scarantino and Griffiths 2011, 449). 
Their mandatory, fast and passive character makes affect programs 
candidates for reference of some folk emotion concepts. However, folk 
psychology also recognizes other types of emotion which are much more 
cognitively complex than basic emotions. These are the complex emo-
tion episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental 
life, episodes involving guilt, resentment, envy, shame, jealousy, loyalty, 
embarrassment, etc. There are good reasons to hold that, contrary to 
what some evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides 1990; 
Pinker 1997) have claimed, such complex emotions rest on psychological 
mechanisms that are different from the affect programs. For the latter 
have a number of salient features that the complex emotions lack, and 
vice versa. On the input side, complex emotions are sensitive to a much 
wider range of information than the encapsulated affect programs. Thus 
they cannot be triggered as one would predict by assimilating them to 
affect programs.2 Moreover, on the output side, complex emotions are 
responses that fail to display stereotypical physiological effects, persist 
longer, and are much more integrated with cognitive activity such as 
long-term planning.3 
                                                 
2 “If Othello’s sexual jealousy had been an affect program or a downstream cognitive effect 
of such a program, he would have had to catch Desdemona in bed with Cassio, or at least 
have seen the handkerchief, before his jealousy was initiated.” (Griffiths 1997, 117). 
3 This is a central aspect in Frank’s (1988) sociobiological theory of moral emotions: here 
complex emotions are short-term irrational responses designed to keep the agent rational 
in the long term. E.g., loyalty would often be conducive to long-term cooperation rather 
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However, the general category of emotion subsumes a third kind of 
psychological state: disclaimed actions modelled on emotion. James R. 
Averill’s defines an emotion as “a transitory social role (a socially consti-
tuted syndrome) that includes an individual’s appraisal of the situation, 
and is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action.” (1980, 312) A 
social role is a characteristic pattern of behaviour found in a particular 
social context. One example is the social role that a person plays after 
being elected to Parliament: members of Parliament enter a network of 
social practices in which they play a particular role. The role that they 
play is relatively enduring and overt, in the sense that everyone agrees 
that being a member of Parliament means being treated in a certain 
way. But in the case of the socially constructed emotional states the so-
cial roles become transitory and covert. These roles are transitory because 
people play them exclusively in short-lived and stressful situations. They 
allow a behaviour that would be unacceptable in other circumstances – 
i.e., in these cases the passive character that is ordinarily ascribed to 
strong emotions and to sudden passions (love or aggressive) is exploited 
to avoid responsibility for the action. The individual “disclaims” his or 
her action and the emotional state – being experienced as an objective 
rather than a subjective event, i.e. something that is not produced by the 
mind but that simply “happens” – is imputed to casual bodily accidents 
or is perceived as an effect of being “possessed” by some force or entity 
that comes from the outside. Moreover, such roles are covert in the sense 
that they take shape only insofar as society does not recognize either 
their function or the social practices including these roles. A paradigm 
example of a socially constructed state is a state like amok, a violent fren-
zy found in southeast Asian cultures. 
Thus, disclaimed action emotions differ from basic and complex 
emotions not only because they are culturally local, but also by virtue of 
their psychological mechanisms. They are unconscious attempts to take 
advantage of the special status usually accorded to emotions because of 
their passivity. This means that their etiology involves the mechanisms 
that subserve social cognition rather than the perceptual mechanisms 
                                                                                                       
than short-term defection in social interactions that have the structure of an iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma. 
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underlying basic emotions or the conceptual mechanisms that subserve 
complex emotions.  
To sum up, the folk concept of emotion is a cluster concept, which 
does not pick out a natural kind that can be used to ground inductions 
or projections across the range of emotions. The collection of features 
we think characterize emotions are explained by various causal mecha-
nisms in different cases. Basic emotions are psychological states involv-
ing isolated modules; complex emotions are special adaptations of high-
er-level cognition. Building a theoretical category based on the similari-
ties between these two classes of mental phenomena would not be justi-
fied by any promising explanatory project. As to the disclaimed action 
emotions, they are manifestations of a higher cognitive activity, viz. the 
understanding and manipulation of social relations. Consequently, they 
cannot be placed in a single category with the other emotions because 
they are essentially pretenses: “[i]t would be like putting ghost possession 
in the category of parasitic diseases.” (Griffiths 1997, 245) What follows 
is the conclusion anticipated at the beginning of this section: our con-
cept of emotion gathers quite diverse phenomena under a single con-
ventional label. Further, it is to be noticed that all these phenomena can 
no longer be relegated, as the ideology of passions suggested, to a “low-
er” and “primitive” psychic sphere, which threatens the nobility of “the 
thinking thing;” quite legitimately, they belong to the wider universe of 
all mental events. 
 
 
2. Rationality and Reasoning 
 
To consider the issue from the other side, cognitive sciences have 
brought to light the heterogeneity not only of emotions but of what is 
traditionally meant by ‘reason’ as well. That is, the human mind, even in 
its most rational aspects, is a heterogeneous repertoire of analytical and 
operative tools that, in some circumstances, spontaneously produce er-
rors. A quick reference to some key positions in psychology of thought 
will allow us to give substance to this Baconian picture of human ration-
ality. 
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Let us begin from the very well-known heuristics and biases program 
(see the classic Kahneman et al. 1982). Human inferential performances 
are seen here as driven not so much by the normative principles of ra-
tionality established by deductive logic, mathematical statistics and ex-
pected utility theory, but rather by heuristics, viz. cheap and effective but 
not systematic problem-solving strategies. That a heuristic is not sys-
tematic means that its application can lead to the solution of a problem, 
but does not ensure the constant attainment of such a result; for some-
times the same heuristic can give rise to performances that deviate from 
those attainable by means of the application of normative principles. 
Thus the biases originating in the activation of one or more heuristics 
are the measure of the gap between the real performance and the nor-
matively correct one. This has led a number of researchers to pessi-
mism: the human mind is not equipped with “the correct programs for 
many important judgmental tasks;” human beings have not had “the 
opportunity to evolve an intellect capable of dealing conceptually with 
uncertainty.” (Slovic et al. 1976, 174) The cognitive tools available to 
someone who has not been trained in formal disciplines are only norma-
tively problematic heuristics – an interpretation of the errors made in 
reasoning experiments called the “Bleak Implications hypothesis” by 
Samuels et al. (1999). 
This pessimistic interpretation has been challenged by Gerd 
Gigerenzer, who points out that heuristics cannot be evaluated accord-
ing to the standards of normative rationality. In this perspective, the 
heuristics and biases program incorporates both a strong and a weak el-
ement (cf., e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 2011). The strength consists in incor-
porating Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality perspective, according to 
which the real agent, due to the limits of its computational capacity, is 
not an optimizer but rather a satisficer. By contrast, the weak element of 
the program is its unilateral focus on the negative aspects of heuristics. 
Conversely, Gigerenzer highlights their virtues: our ancestors left us “an 
adaptive toolbox,” which includes a collection of fast and frugal heuris-
tics well adapted to some (physical and social) environments but not to 
others. In virtue of this adaptation, these heuristics need minimum time 
and little knowledge to make inferences and decisions according to an 
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ecological rationality that allows us to reject the Bleak Implications hy-
pothesis. 
Gigerenzer’s theory of smart heuristics, however, has been criticized 
by advocates of the already cited “dual-system” or “dual-processing” ac-
counts of reasoning (cf. Evans and Frankish 2009). According to this 
family of theories, the human cognitive system is composed of at least 
two subsystems. System 1 (“intuitive”) is fast, parallel, unconscious, isn’t 
easily altered, is universal, impervious to verbal instruction, (partly) heu-
ristic-based, and (mostly) shared with other animals. By contrast, System 
2 (“reflective”) is slow, serial, conscious, malleable, variable (by culture 
and individual), responsive to verbal instruction, influenced by norma-
tive belief, and can involve application of valid rules. On this perspective, 
the main shortcoming of the fast and frugal heuristics theory lies in the 
unilateral focus on the automatic and unconscious processes of System 
1, which leads to neglect the higher processes associated with System 2. 
A comprehensive account of the human mind’s workings and rationali-
ty, dual-system theorists argue, needs an in-depth analysis of both sys-
tems, as well as of their forms of interaction in terms of both competi-
tion and cooperation. 
In light of what we have just said, one might form the impression 
that dual-system theories have ended up restoring the division between 
low and high levels of the psyche established by the Cartesian model of 
the relationship between reason and passions. But this would be a mis-
take.  
First of all, it is difficult to see the evolutionary plausibility of two 
cognitive systems implemented in distinct neural subsystems: Why on 
earth would evolution start anew with System 2 rather than modifying, 
expanding or integrating the architecture of the pre-existing System 1? 
This sort of objection led Frankish (2009) to put forward the hypothesis 
that System 2 is realized within System 1, i.e., there are not two separate 
systems, but two levels or layers of cognitive processes, one dependent 
on the other. On this perspective, it is not necessary to suppose that evo-
lution generated System 2 by massively upgrading the architecture of 
System 1; it may suffice to imagine that the subsystems underlying Sys-
tem 1 have been orchestrated and used in new ways. 
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Moreover, we can definitely admit the reality of the distinction be-
tween intuitive and reflective processes of reasoning; and we can accept 
also Frankish’s hypothesis that reflective reasoning is largely realized in 
cycles of operation of unconscious intuitive processes (including the 
subsystems that are typically associated with System 1). This is not, 
however, a vindication of the System 1/System 2 distinction, since the 
latter does not map onto the distinction between intuitive and reflective 
reasoning. Let us consider reflective reasoning: it is easy to show that in 
some contexts reflection does not improve but rather impairs perfor-
mance; that there are some tasks where reliance on intuitive reasoning 
is best; and that reflective reasoning can also employ heuristics. As to 
intuitive systems, some can be slow, some can be controlled, and some 
can approach the highest normative standards. In brief, as Carruthers 
(forthcoming) argued, the System 1/System 2 distinction is not a natural 
border and should be abandoned.4 
In conclusion, the psychological investigation of rationality and rea-
soning tells us that in the case of rationality, as in that of emotions, there 
is no unitary cognitive sphere; there is instead a repertoire (a toolbox) of 
imperfect analytic and operative tools, which is heterogeneous and scat-
tered, and thus lacking the hierarchical structure, culminating in self-
conscious rationality, that was assumed by the Cartesian model. 
 
 
3. Psychological Defences 
 
We have thus seen that the cognitive science research work on emo-
tion and thought provides us with the tools to deconstruct the ideology 
of the conflict between reason and the passions. The phenomena that 
folk psychology labels as “emotional” can no longer be relegated, as the 
ideology of the passions suggested, to a “low” and “primitive” psychic 
sphere, which threatens the nobility of “the thinking thing;” rather, quite 
                                                 
4 “If one of the goals of science is to discover what natural kinds there are in the world – in 
the sense of homeostatic property clusters with unifying causal etiologies […] – then cogni-
tive scientists would be well-advised to abandon the System 1 / System 2 conceptual 
framework. The human mind is messier and more fine-grained than that.” (Carruthers, 
forthcoming, 21 of the web version: <http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/>). 
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legitimately, all those phenomena belong to the wider universe of all 
mental events. The factors of error are inherent in rationality, or rather 
immanent in that hodge-podge of procedures and abilities into which 
our bounded rationality can be decomposed. 
This leads us to a radically new interpretation of the psychoanalytic 
idea that self-consciousness is a construction packed with self-
deceptions and bad faith. In the Baconian perspective, Jervis (1993) no-
tices, the aspects of ambiguity, self-deception, and suffering of human 
life can no longer be conceived in the way that much of the philosophi-
cal tradition has viewed them, namely, as the crisis of a fundamentally 
rational agent, temporarily overwhelmed by the perturbing influence of 
affects and sentiments. These aspects can now be conceived as globally 
constitutive dimensions of the mind and conduct. This reinforces an 
overturning of the psychoanalytic questioning about defences: what we 
now have to ask ourselves is not how and why some defensive mecha-
nisms exist, but rather if it is not the case that all the structures of 
knowledge and action around which everyday life is structured serve de-
fensive functions.5 
Here, then, we grasp something that is already in Freud but which 
the Cartesian framework of instinctual drives prevented him from artic-
ulating fully: the defensive processes are much more than bulwarks 
against anxieties and insecurities that perturb the order of our inner life; 
they are the primary instruments for establishing order in the mind; 
they are the very structure of the mind – the Freudian ego itself is a de-
fence. 
In this theoretical framework, dynamic psychology joins forces with 
interpersonal and social psychology. The defence of self-image (closely 
linked to the self-defensive use of causal attribution), the social attitudes 
in general and the stereotypes and prejudices in particular, and the ra-
                                                 
5 Jervis argues that just as nowadays we start  by asking how consciousness, rather than the 
unconscious, is possible, or we ask not how behaviors that contradict our intention can 
exist but, on the contrary, if ever deliberate and voluntary behavior exists, so, in the same 
way, “in examining the construction of the everyday life we need to explain not how and 
why some ‘defensive’ mechanisms exist, but rather how all the structures of knowledge 
and action are by themselves, integrally, a matter of defenses.” (1993, 301, transl. in Mar-
raffa 2011). 
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tionalizing handling of cognitive dissonance are the building blocks of 
an interpersonal and social reality packed with systematic errors or, as 
Freud would have put it, interested self-deceptions. And all these struc-
tures of self-deception are defensive constructions that spring from 
mental operations in which the cognitive aspect cannot be separated 
from the affective. To illustrate, we will briefly focus on the construct of 
prejudice. 
“Knowing” – as well as “making sense” – is primarily a pragmatic 
matter, a “knowing how to do things.” In the context of everyday life an 
object makes sense for me, and it is known by me, because I place it in a 
pragmatic context, insofar as I consider it within a repertoire of compe-
tences: I have done something with this object in the past and I can do 
something with it in the future. Nevertheless there is inherent in the 
very idea of “knowing how to do” an organization of the world according 
to differentiations and hierarchies. All of us, in forming more or less 
complex behavioural patterns, act according to gradients of involvement 
and interest. Basically, we assign different “values” to single objects and 
to different aspects of our behaviour itself.6 The panorama of reality 
takes shape then in accordance with our interests for objects, viz. accord-
ing to the value that we assign to the surroundings:  
 
Clusters, hierarchies of values arise; the various areas of reality are on 
different grades of importance. The “nearer” scenarios are those that 
we are more interested in, and are easily the object of our “positive” 
planning; the more “distant” scenarios are those we are less interest-
ed in; they are less differentiated in their internal details, and can 
more easily appear to be extraneous or even hostile. These variables 
                                                 
6 “Values” are to be understood here as simple differences of importance, i.e. of priority, in 
the context of the general theme of adaptation. There is an objectivity in the gradients of 
value in specific contexts. In the cycle of everyday activities animals organize their behavior 
as a function of a limited series of general interests (“evolutionary values”) such as preda-
tor defense, foraging, defense of rank in group hierarchy, reproduction: each of these gen-
eral needs dominates over specific behavioral patterns which from time to time are a high-
er priority than others, i.e. literally “they come before” insofar as they “have more value,” 
alternating with each other at the top of the agenda of “the things to do.” In ethology be-
havioral priorities can be quantified by means of game theory – cf. Maynard-Smith (1982).  
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come to be organized in the first place according to the phenomeno-
logical category of “domesticity,” or “familiarity.” All of us tend to 
make a spontaneous separation between, on the one hand, what is 
“internal” to a limited, “domestic” social world, and hence “good” 
and “reassuring,” and where we find, as it were, a proximal panora-
ma of guaranteed values; and, on the other end, what is “external,” 
“alien,” which we are less interested in, whose guaranteed value is 
lower, and where objects and events can take on negative tones. (Jer-
vis 1993, 331). 
 
This way of organizing reality, and of situating ourselves at its centre, 
is a primary way of “establishing order,” which has clear affinities with 
some basic structuring categories such as “before-after,” “high-low,” and 
above all, in our case, “inner-outer” and “near-distant.” The phenomeno-
logical category of domesticity refers to the experience of the world-
environment as structured according to criteria of distance and control-
lability. This is a primarily cognitive operation, but one which is never-
theless linked to the attribution of emotional-evaluative connotations in 
conformity with the so-called “primary affects,” i.e. according to a basic 
alternative of our dispositional orientation toward reality that sharply 
distinguishes pleasantness and unpleasantness, friend and foe, and 
thereby coming closer and going away, accepting and rejecting, encom-
passing and expelling (see the circumplex model of affect in Russell 
1980, 1983). 
In animals the world tends to get organized in accordance with the 
category of territoriality; we find, in ways that are different depending on 
the species, the den as the most protected shelter, and more outwardly a 
“possession zone,” an “exploratory zone,” and so on. In children the 
“domestic space” is linked to the presence of the primary attachment 
figure: the possibility of exploring, leaving the “protection zone,” appears 
to be proportional to the level of reassurance provided by the caregiver 
(cf. Ainsworth et al. 1978). In adults the difficulty of leaving the “domes-
tic zone” has been called “territorial anguish” by De Martino (1951-52), 
and viewed by the philosopher-ethnologist as one of the two main pa-
rameters of the feeling of being in crisis: the spatial or geographic pa-
rameter as opposed to the temporal one. 
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This brings us to prejudice, because its psychological dynamic be-
longs precisely to that way of organizing reality and placing ourselves at 
its centre that we have just been sketching. That is, the dynamics of 
prejudice are part and parcel of the ways in which we spontaneously sys-
tematize material or social reality according to categories of relevance 
and gradients of approval and disapproval. The peculiarity of prejudice 
consists in the fact that, whereas in most of our basic attitudes (of liking, 
curiosity, identification, wish, disposition to the affective bond, etc.) 
there is a (“positive”) tendency to approach the object, in prejudice we 
find the opposite tendency to reject the object, which results in a refusal 
to know it. Now, according to the social identity theory, the dynamics of 
feeling as though one is a member of the ingroup is closely linked to 
stigmatizing the outgroup members as treacherous and different (see, 
e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1986). As a result, the sentence expressing the 
prejudice (i.e. the stereotype) at the moment at which it brings discredit 
on “the others,” accomplishes the defensive (self-apologetic) function of 
enhancing our self-image, providing us with a collective identity (a sense 
of community), which is also a certificate of nobility that “the others” do 
not possess. Feeling comfortably part of a “valid” community causes us 
to believe in our inner validity. 
Thus the biasing aspect of prejudice can be ascribed to the very ways 
in which ordinary knowledge constitutes itself. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the last section it was argued that Freud’s view of defence mecha-
nisms must today be subjected to a radical revision. Freud’s investiga-
tion was still wholly within a Cartesian logic, where rational conscious-
ness fails only because of the influence of emotional and affective mo-
tions originating from the opacity of the bodily machine. However, if we 
give up Descartes’ idea of a non-rational psychological domain, crowded 
by passions, instincts, emotions, which can be clearly demarcated from 
the operations of rational consciousness, the folk concept of emotion 
melts away. Far from being a natural kind, ‘emotion’ turns out to be a 
conventional label that captures quite diverse phenomena; and such 
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phenomena can no longer be relegated, as the ideology of passions sug-
gested, to a “lower” and “primitive” psychic sphere, which threatens the 
nobility of “the thinking thing.” They belong to the unlevelled universe 
to which all psychological events belong. 
In addition, we have also seen how cognitive sciences have brought 
to light the heterogeneity not only of emotions, but also of what is tradi-
tionally meant by ‘reason.’ The experimental investigation of rationality 
and reasoning shows that in the case of rationality, as in the case of 
emotions, there is no unitary cognitive sphere. There is instead a toolbox 
of imperfect analytic and operative tools that is heterogeneous and scat-
tered, and consequently lacks the hierarchical structure that, according 
to the Cartesian model, culminates in self-conscious rationality. 
Thus, a paradigm shift is underway. It has been shown how some re-
search areas in cognitive sciences adopt a Baconian logic, in which er-
rors and self-deceptions are seen as intrinsic to the ordinary cognitive-
affective processes. Therefore, whereas in Freud the naive subject nor-
mally deceives herself because she is unable to accept the presence, deep 
down, of “inadmissible” sexual and aggressive drives, in a dynamic psy-
chology informed by the renewal of the traditional psychological catego-
ries outlined above, intrinsically defensive cognitive-affective mecha-
nisms become the principles that rule over the construction of everyday 
reality. Reason does not dominate emotions, nor vice versa. Rather, they 
work synergistically, to make us the complicated animals we are.7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 We therefore agree with Oliveira-Souza, Moll and Grafman when they write: “Two para-
digms have guided emotion research over the past decades. The dual-system view embrac-
es the long-held Western belief, espoused most prominently by decision-making and social 
cognition researchers, that emotion and reason are often at odds. The integrative view, 
which asserts that emotion and cognition work synergistically, has been less explored experi-
mentally. However, the integrative view (a) may help explain several findings that are not 
easily accounted for by the dual-system approach, and (b) is better supported by a growing 
body of evidence from human neuroanatomy that has often been overlooked by experi-
mental neuroscience.” (2011, 310; italics added). 
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Reasoning, Argumentation and Rationality 
 
Paolo Labinaz 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Reasons matter in many situations of one’s life, be they private or 
public. Anyone engaged in a dialogical situation is likely to want to pro-
vide reasons in support of her opinions and claims and to evaluate oth-
ers’ reasons for their opinions and claims. In giving and evaluating rea-
sons we engage in a reasoning process: we make connections between 
premises and conclusions and judge whether a certain set of premises 
provides good reasons to accept a certain conclusion. By contrast with 
such a dialogic process we see that in today’s public debates, such as tel-
evision political debates, opponents are engaged rather in exchanging 
“arguments” whose aim is to persuade one’s target audience, irrespec-
tive of whether such arguments are well-grounded. Since antiquity phi-
losophers have been strongly interested in distinguishing between good 
and bad arguments; think, for example, of Aristotle’s work on syllogistic 
reasoning in his Prior Analytics and Sophistical Refutations. As a matter of 
fact, the study of reasoning and argumentation has been central to phi-
losophy and its branches ever since. In the last century, however, reason-
ing and argumentation have been studied independently by cognitive 
psychologists and argumentation theorists respectively. While their lines 
of research have been running in parallel, without addressing each oth-
ers’ studies, for thirty years, they have recently been brought together 
thanks to the development of argumentative approaches to reasoning in 
various fields of research, particularly cognitive psychology and analytic 
philosophy. Such approaches provide good theoretical grounds for the 
idea that reasoning is argumentative in nature and a large body of evi-
dence supporting it. This may be taken to suggest that human rationality 
itself has an essential connection to argumentation. My aim here is to 
examine to what extent the idea that reasoning is argumentative in na-
ture, and its implications, have been developed by the main argumenta-
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tive approaches to reasoning and whether and how more could be done 
to elaborate upon it. 
The paper unfolds as follows: In Section 2, I briefly describe the state 
of the art in psychological studies on reasoning and in argumentation 
theory, and then turn to today’s most influential argumentative ap-
proaches to reasoning. In Section 3, I examine how rationality appears to 
be conceived in these approaches and conclude that by attributing a per-
suasive function to reasoning they assume an instrumental conception 
of rationality. In Section 4, I argue that the reduction of the argumenta-
tive function of reasoning to that of producing convincing arguments 
does not fit the project of viewing reasoning as basically argumentative 
in nature. I conclude by presenting a conception of rationality, outlined 
by Paul Grice (1991; 2001) and recently discussed by Marina Sbisà (2006; 
2007), that, in my view, may account for the argumentative nature of 
reasoning by highlighting its reason-giving function. 
 
 
2. Argumentative Approaches to Reasoning 
 
Reasoning and argumentation have been studied by different re-
search traditions over time.  
On the one side, in the last few decades reasoning has been the sub-
ject of intensive psychological and philosophical investigation. In this 
interdisciplinary field of research, a great deal of interest has been di-
rected towards the results of experimental studies on how people actual-
ly reason. These studies show that people systematically depart from the 
standard models of rationality, i.e. deductive logic, standard probability 
theory and expected utility theory, failing to solve even very simple rea-
soning tasks, such as assessing the logical validity of an argument, de-
ciding what evidence one needs to test a conditional rule, estimating the 
posterior probability of a hypothesis on the basis of the evidence provid-
ed, and so on (see, e.g., Gilcovich, Griffin and Kahneman 2002). Some 
psychologists initially held that, on the basis of the evidence collected, 
people may be regarded as basically irrational. However, in the current 
debate, leading theories, especially evolutionary, ecological and dual-
system theories, maintain that reasoning which seems to be irrational 
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can be judged as being perfectly rational, on the condition that it is eval-
uated according to the appropriate normative standards, such as evolu-
tionary or ecological ones (see respectively Cosmides and Tooby 1992; 
Gigerenzer 2000; Evans and Over 1996; Stanovich 1999). 
On the other side, argumentation has been widely studied by logi-
cians and linguists. In current studies on argumentation, two main 
strands of research can be identified, which focus on argument-as-
product and argumentation-as-process respectively. The first strand of 
research, which carries on the works of Chaim Perelman and those of 
Stephen Toulmin (see respectively Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958; 
Toulmin 1958), aims to identify and evaluate the structures of argu-
ments occurring in ordinary conversation on the basis of (depending on 
the theory at hand) their persuasiveness, appropriateness, relevance and 
so on. This strand of research includes, among others, approaches to ar-
gumentation such as informal logic (for an overview see Johnson and 
Blair 2000) and critical thinking (see, e.g., Ennis 1962; Siegel 1988). 
Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory 
and Douglas Walton’s New Dialectic are the leading theories of the sec-
ond line of research (see respectively van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
2004; Walton 1998). Both these theories study argumentation as a dis-
course activity. While the pragma-dialectical theory considers argumen-
tation as a “complex speech act aimed at convincing a reasonable critic” 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, 2), New Dialectic maintains that 
arguments should be assessed according to different standards depend-
ing on the types of dialogue in which they occur. 
There have been only few attempts to study reasoning and argumen-
tation jointly, particularly in the psychological domain: while argumenta-
tion theorists usually acknowledge that reasoning is related in some 
ways to argumentation, psychological studies on reasoning as tradition-
ally conceived consider reasoning to be an inner mental activity aimed at 
forming true beliefs (epistemic rationality) and maximizing one’s per-
sonal utility (practical rationality). Recently, however, some scholars, in 
fields such as cognitive psychology and analytic philosophy, have argued 
that reasoning and argumentation are so strictly related that the former 
cannot be studied detached from its place of occurrence, that is, dialogi-
cal, argumentative situations, regardless of whether reasoning is consid-
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ered to be cognitive or social (see Haidt 2001; Hahn and Oaskford 2006; 
2007; Mercier and Sperber 2011a; Dutilh Novaes 2013). Particularly, if 
reasoning is so conceived, some of the so-called biases found in psycho-
logical experiments concerning reasoning can be reassessed as effective 
argumentative moves or be shown to be due to factors other than peo-
ple’s supposed poor reasoning competencies, such as the particular con-
ditions in which they are asked to reason, their lack of acquaintance with 
particular dialogical and argumentative practices, their initial conviction 
in the claim corresponding to the conclusion of the argument (e.g., in 
the case of belief bias effect) and so on. In what follows, I will present the 
four theories that have contributed to the development of this new field 
of research in the last years. 
 
 
2.1 The Argumentative Theory of Reasoning 
 
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have recently proposed a psychologi-
cal theory of reasoning, which connects reasoning with argumentation, 
labeled the “argumentative theory of reasoning.” According to them, 
“the emergence of reasoning is best understood within the framework of 
the evolution of human communication” (Mercier and Sperber 2011a, 
60). In their view, reasoning has evolved not to help people getting better 
at thinking on their own, but to provide arguments supporting their 
claims and to evaluate those provided by their interlocutors in dialogical 
contexts. In Mercier and Sperber’s words, “reasoning has evolved and 
persisted mainly because it makes human communication more effec-
tive and advantageous” (Mercier and Sperber 2011a, 60): its main func-
tion is to successfully change our interlocutors’ minds and to acquire 
reliable information from them, limiting the risk of being misled. 
As to the workings of reasoning, Mercier and Sperber maintain that 
in our minds two different kinds of inferential activity take place, which 
they call respectively intuitive and reflective inferences, and that only the 
latter amounts to full-fledged reasoning. While intuitive inferences are 
the result of the inferential processes carried out by the domain-specific 
cognitive modules composing the human mind, reflective inferences are 
the indirect output of one of these modules, the so-called “argumentative 
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module.” Intuitive inferences are so ubiquitous that they are considered 
to be unconscious and uncontrollable, taking place silently at a sub-
personal level. When we are conscious of having reached a certain con-
clusion, but not of the inferential process that has led to it, we say that 
an intuitive inference has taken place since we are not aware of the rea-
sons supporting its conclusion. However, we rarely question whether 
intuitive conclusions are well-grounded or not, since we consider what 
comes from the workings of our minds as perfectly reliable, and so we 
accept such conclusions as they appear in our consciousness. When ac-
tivated, the argumentative module, as any other mental module, gener-
ates intuitive inferences, which are, however, of a special kind, because 
they amount to intuitive representations about whether a certain conclu-
sion is well supported by the reasons provided to accept it (that is, its 
premises and their connection with that conclusion). Since the argu-
mentative module provides representations about the connection be-
tween premises and conclusions, which are themselves representations, 
Mercier and Sperber take it to be a metarepresentational mechanism. 
Starting from the outputs of the argumentative module, reflective infer-
ences, which, as said before, amount to full-fledged reasoning, take place 
when we “accept a conclusion because of an argument in its favor that is 
intuitively strong enough [...],” “construct a complex argument by link-
ing argumentative steps, each of which we see as having sufficient intui-
tive strength verbally produce the argument so that others will 
see its intuitive force and will accept its conclusion [...]” (Mercier and 
Sperber 2011a, 59): in so doing, we can be said to be conscious (at least, 
to a certain extent) of the reasons for drawing a certain conclusion and of 
their relationship. Characterized in this way, reasoning is taken to have 
enabled humans to argue with each other, thus serving a fundamental 
social, but also cognitive, function. 
According to Mercier and Sperber’s evolutionary hypothesis, reason-
ing has evolved and persisted until today just because its function has 
been that of facilitating humans to argue for their claims and to evaluate 
each others’ arguments. Particularly, it facilitates our ways of giving and 
evaluating reasons in dialogical situations where people, while disagree-
ing, are disposed to change their opinions when good arguments are 
presented. On the contrary, when one is thinking on one’s own (and 
”[...], and “
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does not take into account other perspectives), or takes part in non-
deliberating groups, that is, groups in which people are not interested in 
comparing their opinions with those of their interlocutors, reasoning 
will be not helpful. As suggested by Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 63-66), 
in such cases people exhibit the so-called “confirmation bias,” that is, the 
tendency to favour evidence that supports their own opinions, leading to 
a strong reinforcement of their attitudes. When this happens, we can 
observe well-known phenomena such as individual and group polariza-
tion. By contrast, argumentative moves inspired by the confirmation bi-
as can be taken to be effective when they occur in deliberating groups 
because they offer people with evidence in support of their claims, in 
view of attacks or criticisms on the part of an opponent. More generally, 
according to Mercier and Sperber most of the failures in reasoning tasks 
are not caused by people’s poor reasoning competencies but depend on 
the abnormal conditions in which they are asked to reason, if compared 
with the function according to which reasoning has evolved to serve. Ex-
perimental subjects are indeed asked to reason in isolation without the 
possibility of genuinely debating with others. 
 
 
2.2 The Dialogical Nature of Deductive Reasoning 
 
While Mercier and Sperber study reasoning in general, arguing for 
its evolutionary origins in argumentative contexts, Catarina Dutilh No-
vaes (2013) focuses on our ability to reason deductively and its relation-
ship to argumentation, claiming that deductive reasoning should be 
seen as a cultural product, not as an heritage of human evolution. Ac-
cording to Dutilh Novaes there are good historically and psychologically 
grounded reasons to take deductive reasoning to be a particular form of 
argumentative practice, and so she argues that we should not see people 
as innately equipped with deductive skills, but rather that they acquire 
them thanks to specific training, particularly in the context of formal 
schooling. Dutilh Novaes (2013, 461) asserts that, while deductive logic 
has emerged as a specific way of arguing and debating since ancient 
Greece, in the last three centuries, particularly after the spread of Kant’s 
critical philosophy, there has been a wide agreement that its rules play a 
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normative role in our mental activity, internalizing them into the human 
mind. In her view there are two basic components on which deductive 
reasoning is grounded, which may be said to be argumentative in na-
ture: “(1) the willingness to reason from premises regardless of one’s 
doxastic attitude towards them; (2) the formulation of indefeasible ar-
guments, where the premises necessitate the truth of the conclusion” 
(Dutilh Novaes 2013, 461). Seen in this way, deductive reasoning repre-
sents a particular form of adversarial dialogue in which a proponent puts 
forward an argument so as to prompt her opponent to accept its conclu-
sion if she accepts its premises. In this dialogical situation, although 
proponent and opponent start by agreeing on some statements, ac-
knowledging them as the premises of the argument, the former aims to 
show that the claim she supports follows from these premises necessari-
ly, while the latter tries to find counterexamples to this claim, that is, 
cases in which the premises hold but the conclusion does not, thus un-
dermining the conclusion. Obviously, by formulating an indefeasible 
argument the proponent is almost certain to beat her opponent because, 
provided that the latter accepts the premises of the argument, she must 
accept the conclusion that follow from them necessarily: as a matter of 
fact, in a valid deductive argument the truth of the premises makes the 
truth of the conclusion necessary. 
In support of her socio-cultural account of the origins of deductive 
reasoning, Dutilh Novaes provides evidence about its historical emer-
gence and the ways in which one can get acquainted with its two basic 
components.  
From a historical point of view, studies on the origins of deductive 
logic suggest that a crucial role in its development has been played by 
debating practices which emerged in the early Academy and were devel-
oped and formalized in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (see Dutilh Novaes 
2013, 461-62). As suggested by Dutilh Novaes, both components of de-
ductive logic can be found in such dialectical practices. While (1) 
amounts to the traditional move of granting the opponent’s premises 
“for the sake of the argument,” (2) is concerned with drawing a conclu-
sion from a set of mutually accepted premises in light of the property of 
truth-preservation which characterizes deductive arguments. 
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From a developmental perspective, Dutilh Novaes holds that the 
emergence of deductive skills depends upon people’s engagement with 
specific dialogical and argumentative practices, which they learn to mas-
ter in the context of formal schooling. As to the component (1) of deduc-
tive logic, she makes reference to the work of Sylvia Scribner (1977), ac-
cording to whom one way (among many) that schooled people differ 
from unschooled people is that the former are more prone to draw con-
clusions from premises that are not in line with their beliefs and experi-
ences, since in class situations they learn to accept teachers’ statements 
as true in order to reason with them. By contrast, as suggested by Luria’s 
pioneering studies on Uzbekistan peasants’ deductive skills (see Luria 
1974), unschooled people are normally not disposed to reason leaving 
aside their own beliefs and experience and so refuse to draw conclusions 
from unfamiliar premises. While component (i) depends on the acquisi-
tion of what Sylvia Scribner characterizes as an analytic orientation in 
one’s mode of thinking, the ability to formulate indefeasible arguments 
requires stronger training, e.g. by learning to make mathematical 
demonstrations. Interestingly, Dutilh Novaes (2013, 477) maintains that 
formulating an indefeasible argument can “[…] be seen as a specific 
‘language game’ that must be learned to be played correctly:” only when 
engaged in such a language game, we are interested in whether our in-
terlocutors have presented a deductively valid argument, that is, an ar-
gument in which, if all of its premises are true, then its conclusion must 
be true also, since when engaged in a discussion we normally only ex-
pect to deal with plausible arguments. However, Dutilh Novaes (2013, 
476-79) underscores that there are also other social practices such as pre-
tence play, storytelling and betting, which, while being not connected 
with school teaching, may help to improve schooled, as well as un-
schooled, people’s acquaintance with the two basic components of de-
ductive logic: particularly, by engaging in pretence play and storytelling 
one may learn to assume premises regardless of her doxastic attitude 
towards them, while by engaging in betting one is exposed to adversarial 
communication, which is a key ingredient for formulating indefeasible 
arguments. 
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2.3 Jonathan Haidt on Moral Reasoning 
 
Nearly fifteen years ago, Jonathan Haidt developed what he calls the 
“social intuitionist model of moral judgment,” which has become in few 
years one of the most prominent and debated approaches to moral 
judgments in the field of moral psychology. Although his theory is not 
concerned primarily with reasoning, his way of conceiving moral reason-
ing has been very influential in the development of the argumentative 
approaches to reasoning. In contrast with the traditional model, accord-
ing to which moral judgments are the result of one’s conscious reason-
ing activity, Haidt holds that moral judgments, with few exceptions, are 
caused by “quick moral intuitions” (Haidt 2001, 817). In his view, our 
minds possess intuitive heuristics which give rise to specific affective 
reactions (i.e., good/bad or like/dislike judgments) when we are asked to 
judge moral issues or cases. Such judgments, which are evaluative with 
regards people’s actions or characters “[...] are made with respect to a set 
of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture” (Haidt 2001, 
817). For example, following one of Haidt’s examples, an act of incest 
evokes a sense of revulsion in people because they intuitively find some 
wrong with it (see Haidt 2001, 814). However, they do not know how 
they have arrived at such a judgment because it appears suddenly and 
effortlessly in their consciousness. 
Consider now moral reasoning. According to Haidt, we engage in 
reasoning only when a justification is required to give public support to 
our moral judgments. In such cases, using Haidt’s own metaphor, we 
become lawyers trying to build a case rather than judges searching for 
the truth (Haidt 2001, 814). In particular, moral reasoning is taken to be 
an effortful and conscious process which is performed after a moral 
judgment is made, to give a post hoc justification in support of it (see 
Haidt 2001, 822-823). Since such post hoc justifications are directed at 
one’s interlocutors, moral reasoning can be also performed to influence 
their moral intuitions (and hence their moral judgments). However, 
what influences others’ intuitions is not the validity or goodness of the 
arguments put forward to support our own moral judgments, but rather 
their capacity to activate “[…] new affectively valenced intuitions in the 
listener” (Haidt 2001, 819). 
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Interestingly, according to Haidt there do exist (a few) cases in which 
moral judgments are caused by reasoning: that happens, for example, 
when intuitions are in conflict or when a deeper examination of the 
moral case or issue in question is required by the social context in which 
we are involved (see Haidt 2001, 820). Furthermore, in some occasions 
we may reason privately but, as he observes, solitary moral reasoning is 
not very effective in overriding our initial intuitive judgments, since we 
rarely reason in order to question our attitudes or beliefs. When the 
overriding takes place, it is because “[…] the initial intuition is weak and 
processing capacity is high” (Haidt 2001, 819). By contrast, most of the 
time we falsely believe that we have changed our minds thanks to con-
scious reasoning, while what we assume to be a reasoned change in view 
is caused by other social or affective factors (see Haidt 2001, 823). 
In summary, according to Haidt, intuition is the default mode of 
thinking in the moral domain, giving rise to moral judgments which are 
rapid, effortless and easy. Moral reasoning occurs in two different ways: 
while its standard use is to give justificatory support to pre-existing mor-
al judgments, in other cases we rely on moral reasoning, or believe our-
selves to have relied on it, in order to derive moral judgments. However, 
accepting uncritically our own moral intuitions is not always the best 
way of approaching moral cases or issues. As suggested by Jonathan 
Baron (1998), there is strong evidence that when people trust their own 
intuitions their resulting decisions, particularly in public policy’s issues, 
can lead to disastrous consequences (see Haidt 2001, 815). So, Haidt’s 
theory is concerned with how moral judgments are made, but not with 
whether they are well-grounded. In this sense, it is neutral about wheth-
er moral judgments caused by moral intuitions are better than those de-
rived by reasoning. 
 
 
2.4 The Bayesian Approach to Argument Strength 
 
While the previous argumentative approaches to reasoning are all de-
scriptive, not taking a position on whether a specific instance of argu-
ment can be said to be well-grounded or not, Ulrike Hahn and Mike 
Oaksford (2006; 2007) develop a Bayesian framework for assessing ar-
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gument strength, which is clearly normative.1 This framework is sup-
posed to account for and predict the capacity of reasons to weaken or 
strength the audience’s degree of conviction in the claims which are tak-
en to be supported by them.  
Since in ordinary life arguments are presented to convince the audi-
ence of a certain standpoint, in order to evaluate them as good or bad we 
should determine the audience’s ultimate degree of conviction in the 
proposition expressed in the standpoint, that is, their degree of convic-
tion after the argument put forward to support the standpoint has been 
presented. It is clear, however, that the same argument may be convinc-
ing for one interlocutor but not for another, in light of their prior convic-
tion in its conclusion. Therefore, according to Hahn and Oaksford (2007, 
706-707) what matters in such situations is the degree of change caused 
by the argument in the audience, which they call the force or strength of 
the argument. Force or strength is distinguished from convincingness, 
which is characterized as the ultimate degree of conviction in the claim 
supported by such an argument. Interestingly, Hahn and Oaksford hold 
that both degree of conviction and degree of force can be quantified 
within a Bayesian framework. Within such a framework, an argument is 
taken to be composed by a claim, amounting to the hypothesis to be 
tested, and some reasons supporting it, which are the relevant pieces of 
evidence available. If we think of claim and reasons as associated to 
probabilities, interpreted as one’s subjective degrees of belief that the 
claim is true, thanks to Bayes’ Theorem we can quantify the audience’s 
degree of confidence in the claim after the reasons which are put for-
ward to support it have been presented. This hence determines the audi-
ence’s ultimate degree of conviction (its convincingness), which 
amounts to the posterior probability of the claim being true.2 As when 
new relevant evidence is presented the degree of belief in an hypothesis 
may be strengthened or weakened, the same happens when reasons are 
                                                 
1 Hahn e Oaksford’s account is strictly connected with the Bayesian approach to human 
reasoning and rationality that Oaksford itself, with the collaboration of Nick Chater (see, 
e.g., Oaksford and Chater 2007), has developed over the last twenty years on the basis of 
John R. Anderson’s work on rational analysis (see Anderson 1990). 
2 Stated in terms of hypothesis testing, Bayes’ Theorem specifies how a hypothesis should 
be revised in the light of new relevant evidence. 
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presented in support of a claim. Since the degree of confirmation pro-
vided by new relevant evidence is characterized as the difference be-
tween the posterior and prior probability of a hypothesis, the force or 
strength of an argument can be described as the discrepancy between 
the prior conviction in the claim (the audience’s initial conviction in the 
claim) and the ultimate degree of conviction in it (the audience’s convic-
tion in the claim after the argument has been presented). 
As Hahn and Oaksford underline, the same argument can have dif-
ferent strength in light of the audience to which it is directed. To deter-
mine how convincing the argument is, indeed, we must take into ac-
count the audience’s initial conviction in the claim at issue (its prior sub-
jective probability), the qualities of the reasons put forward to support it 
(e.g. the trustworthiness of their sources) and the relationship between 
the claim and such reasons, as Bayes’ Theorem clearly suggests when 
applied to hypothesis-testing cases. According to Bayes’ Theorem, in-
deed, the higher the degree of belief in an hypothesis, the higher is the 
likelihood that the evidence we have in its favour is the case when the 
hypothesis is true as opposed to false. Hahn and Oaksford claim that 
thanks to their Bayesian framework phenomena, such as the acceptance 
of fallacies and the persuasiveness of some types of messages, can be 
accounted for. According to their analysis, an argument is said to be fal-
lacious not because of its structure, as traditional work on fallacies has 
assumed, but because it occupies “[…] the extreme weak end of the ar-
gument strength spectrum given the probabilistic quantities involved” 
(Hahn and Oaksford 2007, 725). 
In support of their Bayesian framework, Hahn and Oaskford have 
provided a body of experimental evidence suggesting that people’s nor-
mative intuitions about argument strength, particularly fallacious argu-
ments, appears to be consistent with those derived from their analysis 
(see Hahn and Oaksford 2006; 2007). As a consequence, this theory can 
be said to be normative not only in the sense that it provides a normative 
framework for assessing argument strength but also because it can pre-
dict people’s judgments about how convincing an argument is. Obvious-
ly this does not mean that people are “Bayesian evaluators:” rather, it is 
the Bayesian framework aims to reflect their evaluations of the strength 
of arguments. 
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3. What Kind of Rationality is Assumed by the Argumentative Ap-
proaches to Reasoning? 
 
While differing substantially from one another, all the above-
described theories agree that the function of reasoning should be re-
thought, converging on the idea that reasoning is argumentative in na-
ture. In so doing, they assume, at least implicitly, that a distinction 
should be made between immediate, automatic inferences, which take 
place at a sub-personal level, and full-fledged reasoning, which instead 
involves the ability to consciously provide reasons in support of one’s 
claims. Although this distinction may seem to be merely a matter of 
terminology, it has a strong impact on the way that reasoning is studied 
empirically. Traditionally cognitive psychologists consider subjects’ re-
sponses in experimental tasks, which are supposed to require reasoning 
activity to be solved, as determined by some inferential processes. They 
then debate how these alleged inferential processes can be appropriately 
described. In the long run, this way of studying reasoning has led cogni-
tive psychologists to consider any cognitive process that is supposed to 
be inferential, particularly well-known heuristics processes, as an in-
stance of reasoning. As a consequence, human reasoning has been tak-
en to be a self-centered cognitive activity which is performed privately 
within one’s mind. Over the last decades or so, however, things have 
been gradually shifting away from focusing exclusively on subjects’ re-
sponses to focusing also on their ways of justifying such responses has 
been made. As highlighted by Jos Hornikx and Ulrike Hahn (2012, 229) 
 
there is ample evidence […] that attempts to understand our “rea-
soning” ability—that is, our ability to evaluate individual prem-
ise–conclusion connections—must take into account that, in our 
everyday lives, such reasoning is typically embedded in broader 
argumentative contexts […]. 
 
If reasoning is typically done interpersonally, taking place in “broader 
argumentative contexts,” its function should be found within its place of 
occurrence. As experimental data reported by Mercier and Sperber 
(2011a) suggest, many reasoning tasks, in which people tend to give 
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wrong answers if approached in isolation, are more frequently solved 
correctly when they are presented to groups and the participants are 
asked to discuss their solutions collectively. Therefore reasoning may be 
deemed to have its natural environment in argumentation. Consider in 
particular the two following experimental findings. As reported by Mer-
cier and Sperber (2011a, 61), when taken in isolation subjects are not 
usually able to apply nor recognize the well-known modus tollens (if p 
then q, not-q, so not-p), despite the fact that it is the simplest argument 
form after the modus ponens. However, if asked to engage in argumenta-
tive dialogues participants have been shown to recognize and easily ap-
ply modus tollens in order to question the claims made by their oppo-
nents. Similarly, although only about 10% of subjects solve the standard 
version of the selection task correctly, if asked to discuss its solution 
with others about the 70% of the subjects give the correct response 
(Moshman and Geil 1998). These and other similar experimental results 
(for a review see Mercier and Sperber 2011a, 61-66) suggest that reason-
ing works better when performed in argumentative contexts because it is 
set to serve argumentative ends. But what does it mean “to serve argu-
mentative ends?” Mercier and Sperber’s approach, as well as the other 
argumentative approaches we have examined above, fail to give a clear 
answer to this question. Saying that reasoning has an argumentative 
function may be interpreted in (at least) two different ways: it may 
amount to the attribution of a persuasive function or of a reason-giving 
one. According to Mercier and Sperber (2011b, 96), reasoning produces 
convincing arguments to change other people’s minds, enabling us to 
achieve desirable effects in them. We can therefore assume that accord-
ing to their theory, reasoning, in argumentative contexts, plays a persua-
sive function. We cannot say anything about whether Dutilh Novaes at-
tributes a persuasive or a reason-giving function to our ability to reason 
“in general,” because she is interested exclusively in deductive reasoning 
conceived as a dialectical practice. We do know, however, that according 
to her, we can put opponents on our side thanks to this practice, insofar 
as we can show that the claim supported by us follows necessarily from 
some mutually shared premises. As a consequence, we can assume that 
she acknowledges a persuasive function to deductive reasoning as a dia-
lectical practice. Haidt’s approach to moral reasoning has an ambiguous 
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position as to the function of reasoning. According to Haidt, reasoning 
helps us to justify our intuitive judgments to others by providing post-
hoc rationalizations of these judgments. At first sight, his theory can be 
taken to attribute a reason-giving function to reasoning, since it focuses 
on people’s efforts in justifying their already-made judgments. However, 
Haidt also holds that in justifying an already-made judgment we usually 
aim at convincing our audience that this judgment is well-grounded, ir-
respective of whether it may be or not, by activating “new affectively va-
lenced intuitions” in them (Haidt 2001, 819). In other words, according 
to him reasoning plays a fundamental role in our attempts to influence 
others’ moral intuitions, which amounts to recognizing it as having a 
persuasive function. Putting together the two characterizations provided 
by Haidt, we can say that the persuasive function prevails over the rea-
son-giving function because he strongly stresses the role of reasoning in 
“convincing” and “influencing” one’s audience. Lastly, in Hahn and 
Oaskford’s Bayesian framework, it is taken for granted that we reason to 
convince others of our standpoints and so their theory is also based on 
the idea that reasoning has a persuasive function. In sum, according to 
all these approaches, reasoning, be it a cognitive or a social activity, is 
taken to be a strategic instrument that makes us competitive when con-
fronted with other arguers. It can be said to be strategic, because 
through it we can achieve valuable goals, such as convincing others of 
our standpoints or defending ourselves from their similar attempts, that 
might otherwise be too difficult or even impossible to achieve with other 
cognitive or social instruments. 
Not only are the supporters of these approaches not too clear about 
the function of reasoning, but they also set aside the question of how the 
connection between reasoning and argumentation should be brought to 
bear on the characterisation of rationality. On the basis of what we have 
seen so far, however, we can assume that these approaches take for 
granted that rationality focuses on means-end relations: we are rational 
because we are equipped with reasoning, which can be inherited genet-
ically or acquired through experience or education, and thanks to which 
we produce convincing arguments for changing the others’ minds. It is, 
in other words, an instrumental conception of rationality. Indeed, inso-
far as reasoning is taken to be a good instrument, be it cognitive or so-
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cial, to convince others to change their minds, the above-described ar-
gumentative approaches attribute an instrumental value to it. The value 
of reasoning is derivative on the value which people attribute to chang-
ing other people’s minds. If people had never been interested in chang-
ing other people’s minds, or if providing them with arguments would 
not have proven to be a good means to this end, reasoning would not 
have become a permanent component of our cognitive or social reper-
toire. Similarly, if people had found an alternative, easier and more ef-
fective way of changing other people’s minds, reasoning would have 
been left aside and replaced by this alternative method. In sum, accord-
ing to this instrumental conception the effectiveness of reasoning 
amounts to its capacity to lead our audience to believe our opinions and 
claims: by relying on it we, both as proponents and opponents, aim at 
achieving the best results in competitive, dialogical situations. It should 
be noted that while this position can be attributed to Mercier and Sper-
ber and to Hahn and Oaksford in a strong sense, it belongs to Dutilh 
Novaes and to Haidt only in a weaker one. As stated previously, in focus-
ing on deductive reasoning, Dutilh Novaes can be taken to ascribe an 
instrumental function to it, but she does not take any stance as to the 
origins of our “general” ability to reason or on why reasoning has 
evolved. As to Haidt’s approach to moral reasoning, we can assume that 
it is grounded on an instrumental conception of rationality only insofar 
as, in it, the persuasive function prevails over the reason-giving one. 
However, a tendency to conceive rationality in instrumental terms is 
shared by all the four approaches. 
 
 
4. Argumentative Rationality 
 
By focusing upon the persuasive function of reasoning, the above-
described argumentative approaches do not fully develop the implica-
tions of the connection between reasoning and argumentation. While 
there can be two different ways of conceiving the function of reasoning, 
as either a persuasive or a reason-giving function, they stick to the for-
mer and, in so doing, appear to presuppose an instrumental conception 
of rationality. According to this conception, giving justificatory support 
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to one’s moves is not valuable per se but only insofar as it succeeds in 
convincing other people of one’s opinions and claims. The question is 
then whether this way of conceiving rationality fits the project of viewing 
reasoning as basically argumentative in nature. Insofar as the argumen-
tative function of reasoning is equated to its capacity to produce convinc-
ing arguments that influence or change other people’s minds, reasoning 
works as a persuasive device whose aim is to achieve goals which people 
find valuable. But in doing so, the argumentative approaches lose the 
opportunity given by the connection between reasoning and argumenta-
tion to detach the former from the individualistic function which has 
been traditionally attributed to it by philosophers and psychologists. This 
can be clearly seen in Mercier and Sperber’s position. On the one hand, 
they criticize the traditional, individualistic conception of reasoning, 
holding that reasoning is not merely strategic in the sense of helping us, 
as individual reasoners, to enhance our knowledge and to maximize our 
personal utilities, but because it helps us to produce convincing argu-
ments when challenged in dialogical contexts. On the other hand, by 
holding that, thanks to their ability to reason, people “[...] argue for 
whatever it is advantageous to them to have their audience believe” 
(Mercier and Sperber 2011b, 96), Mercier and Sperber assume that our 
ways of reasoning depend on what is advantageous to us, that is, pursue 
our own goals and interests. Reasoning therefore appears to be under-
stood by them to be an instrument serving the achievement of our per-
sonal utilities after all. Thus the supporters of argumentative approaches 
trace the argumentative nature of reasoning back to the purely individu-
alistic component of dialogical situations, that is, the goal of achieving 
personal advantages from them. 
In contrast to this instrumental conception, there is another route 
one may want to take in elaborating the idea that reasoning is argumen-
tative in nature. If one takes the reason-giving function of reasoning to 
be more fundamental than its persuasive function, one can avoid assum-
ing an instrumental conception of rationality and look for a thoroughly 
argumentative alternative. Indeed, an argumentative conception of ra-
tionality inspired by Paul Grice’s later works (see Grice 1991; 2001) ap-
pears to be a good fit to account for the argumentative nature of reason-
ing. 
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A preliminary distinction that must be established here is that be-
tween one’s ability to reason, that is, the ability to make premises-
conclusions connections, and that of producing convincing arguments, 
which amounts to the ability to change people’s minds about anything. 
These abilities are clearly independent of each other: on the one hand, 
one may be very good at making premises-conclusions connections, but 
not necessarily interested in using this ability to produce arguments to 
convince other people and, on the other, one can succeed in convincing 
other people with what one says without relying on one’s ability to make 
premises-conclusions connections. Although argumentative approaches, 
most explicitly Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reason-
ing, conflate these two abilities into a more general ability to argue, they 
might have developed for very different reasons, not necessarily linked 
to one another. Moreover, our ability to argue is much more complicated 
than the supporters of argumentative approaches assume. Not only we 
acquire deductive skills thanks to specific training, as suggested by Du-
tilh Novaes, but also our ability to argue, which does not coincide with 
our ability to reason, depends on our acquaintance with specific social 
practices, which involve, among other things, rules and expectations that 
guide our behavior when engaged in these practices. As suggested by 
argumentation theorists (cf. Grootendorst, van Eemeren 2004; Walton 
1998), these rules and expectations involve, among other things, attribu-
tions of entitlement, undertakings of commitments, turn-taking, ways of 
questioning each others’ claims, adoption of standards of precision, and 
so on. When people do not respect the rules characterizing such practic-
es and are not guided by expectations as to how to proceed when en-
gaged in them, they are engaged in a practice, which may be similar, but 
not identical, to that of arguing. Obviously, it is a necessary, but not suf-
ficient, condition to be engaged in argumentative practices that one 
should be able to make premises-conclusions connections. In reasoning, 
indeed, we make connections between premises and conclusions and 
judge whether a certain set of premises constitutes good reasons to ac-
cept a certain conclusion. This is what can be called the reason-giving 
function of reasoning. While it is true that if one is willing to be engaged 
in an argumentative practice, one needs to rely on the ability to reason, it 
is also true that someone may be interested in giving reasons in support 
Reasoning, Argumentation and Rationality 
 
99 
of a certain claim or decision anytime it seems relevant to do so, without 
any particular further goal (such as that of convincing others of some-
thing). However, since we can be interested in justifying our moves in a 
variety situations, be they public (speaking with others) or private (such 
as engaging in an inner dialogue with ourselves), the reason-giving func-
tion of reasoning may be considered as primarily communicative. Obvi-
ously, this function of reasoning can be exploited to convince others of a 
certain claim or opinion, and thus become part of a more complex social 
situation, which may be adversarial or cooperative. 
At this point, it is useful to recall Paul Grice’s characterization of 
human rationality as: “a concern that one’s moves are justified and a ca-
pacity (to some degree) to give effect to that concern” (Sbisà 2006, 241-
242; see Grice 1991, 82-83), which has been taken by Marina Sbisà 
(2006; 2007) to express an argumentative conception of rationality (as 
opposed to the received instrumental conception). On this view, the val-
ue of reasoning does not lie in its persuasive efficacy, but in its reason-
giving function. However, a further distinction is to be made between 
people’s concern for justifying their moves and their ability to give effect 
to this concern, that is, their ability to actually reason. Indeed, while 
without an ability to reason we cannot give effect to our concern for jus-
tifying our moves, without motivations our ability to reason is not useful 
nor relevant for us. 
If we ask why we engage in reasoning, the first response, as suggest-
ed by the definition, is that one must care about having reasons for one’s 
moves. A capacity for concern regarding the justification of our own 
moves develops in us when we begin to realize that we find it valuable to 
provide reasons in support of what we say and do. One may imagine that 
it is in order to give effect to this concern that we equip ourselves with a 
capacity to make premises-conclusions connection, or, at least, that we 
start finding our ability to make premises-conclusions connection rele-
vant to our aims, both cognitive and social, and worth developing. Our 
ability to reason, on this view, would then be a response to our concern 
to provide reasons in support of what we say and do to our interlocutors.  
As the experimental works of Keith Stanovich and his collaborators 
suggest, people’s reasoning performances cannot take place if people’s 
reasoning is not activated and supported by their attitudes and disposi-
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tions (see West et al. 2008; Stanovich 2010). We reason for a variety of 
motivations: giving sense to our speech or actions, making explicit the 
premises of what we say or do, collaborating with others, convincing 
others, or improving our self-image. To achieve these and similar aims, 
one needs to be supported by one’s ability to reason. This does not 
mean, however, that we possess this ability because it helps to achieve 
these aims as well as many others: they are not the reasons why we rea-
son as we do. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The great merit of the argumentative approaches to reasoning we 
have discussed in this paper is that they highlight the limitations of con-
ceiving of reasoning as an inner mental activity that makes people get 
better at thinking on their own, as most psychological theories have 
done in the last thirty years or so. In doing so, they have also provided 
good theoretical grounds and a large body of evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that reasoning has its natural environment in argumentative 
contexts. But these approaches do not take into consideration the impli-
cations that the choice to underline the connection between reasoning 
and argumentation may have for the characterization of rationality. Fo-
cusing on how rationality appears to be conceived by these theories, I 
have argued that, insofar as they take reasoning to be a strategic instru-
ment thanks to which we can achieve valuable goals, such as convincing 
others of a certain claim and defending ourselves from their similar at-
tempts, they assume an instrumental conception of rationality. This 
means that in these perspectives giving justificatory support to one’s 
moves is not valuable per se but only insofar as it succeeds in convincing 
other people of something. However, as these argumentative approaches 
reduce the argumentative function of reasoning to its capacity to per-
suade, their way of conceiving rationality does not fit the project of view-
ing reasoning as basically argumentative in nature.  
If, as I have tried to show, the reason-giving function of reasoning is 
considered to be more fundamental than that of producing convincing 
arguments, another route can be taken in elaborating the idea that rea-
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soning is argumentative in nature. I have indeed presented an argumen-
tative conception of rationality, inspired by Paul Grice’s later works (see 
Grice 1991; 2001), which, by focusing upon the reason-giving function 
of reasoning, seems to be able to develop the implications of the connec-
tion between reasoning and argumentation more deeply than the argu-
mentative approaches have made from an instrumental point of view. In 
the perspective inspired by this argumentative conception of rationality, 
the function of reasoning that can be taken to be primary is not that of 
producing convincing arguments, but that of justifying one’s claims, 
opinions and other moves, which is sustained by our concern that our 
moves be justified. In this light, while recognizing that the reason-giving 
function of reasoning can be exploited to achieve many valuable goals, 
including that of producing convincing arguments, the suggestion that it 
may have emerged from our deep concern for providing reasons for our 
moves appears to be worth consideration.  
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Is Truth Relevant? On the Relevance of Relevance 
 
Thomas Becker 
 
 
1. Assertion1 
 
Assertion can be defined in at least two ways: It can be defined as a 
speech act and thus be distinguished from other speech acts such as ques-
tions, commands, etc. This is what linguists do, and most of them are sat-
isfied with it. However, another way of dealing with assertions – a way that 
has been popular with philosophers for some time – is more ambitious: 
Finding out the norms of assertion, or defining what is a “good assertion.” 
Regarding an answer to this question, we are far from any consensus. 
 
 
1.1. What is an Assertion? 
 
Let us tackle the first question first. The most mature speech act the-
ory currently available is that of Daniel Vanderveken (1990). 
Vanderveken assembles a number of speech acts (or more precisely, a 
number of English verbs) under the heading of “assertives” (1990, 169-
181). Assertives are distinguished from other speech acts by their asser-
tive “illocutionary point” (roughly: the basic purpose of the act) which is 
defined as “representing as actual a state of affairs” (1990, 105). An as-
sertive can be true or false, sincere or a lie, relevant or irrelevant. An as-
sertive is also distinguished from a quote, i.e. the pronouncing of a sen-
tence without representing it as actual, e.g., in order to demonstrate its 
syntax on a blackboard. Neither sincerity, nor truth, nor belief, nor rele-
vance, nor justification is constitutive of assertion, yet notions of “asser-
tion” and “good assertion” are often confused. 
                                                 
1 I am very grateful for the most valuable comments made by the participants of the work-
shop Moral realism and political decisions (Bamberg, Dec. 19 – 22, 2013), by Robert Hümmer, 
Jan Henning Schulze and Sebastian Krebs. The remaining blunders are all mine. 
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The assertion itself is the “primitive assertive” in Vanderveken’s theory 
(1990, 169); the other assertives such as answers, reassertions or denials re-
quire additional contextual qualifications. Testimonies and conjectures are 
also assertives, but they are distinguished from plain assertions by the de-
gree of strength in their “mode of achievement.” Testimonies are stronger 
than regular assertions, conjectures are weaker. In Vanderveken’s theory the 
degree of strength is a parameter that is independent of the assertive illocu-
tionary point; this independence will be important in what follows.  
However, the definition of assertives as speech acts “representing as 
actual a state of affairs” contains a well-sealed Pandora’s Box of prob-
lems, namely the question of how an actual state of affairs is distin-
guished from a state of affairs that is not actual – the problem of truth. 
The pre-theoretical notion of “actual” is sufficient for most linguistic 
purposes; therefore the box need not be opened unless the question is 
raised as to what makes an assertion a good assertion. 
 
 
1.2. What is a “Good Assertion?” 
 
Searle (1969) also broaches this question. He gives preparatory rules 
that state the contextual prerequisites needed for a speech act to be suc-
cessful or “happy” (1969, 60). There are two preparatory rules for asser-
tion (1969, 66; S = speaker, H = hearer, p a proposition): 
 
1. S has evidence (reasons etc.) for the truth of p. 
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows (does not need to 
be reminded of, etc.) p. 
 
The first rule states that an assertion should not be careless; the sec-
ond rule states that it should not be irrelevant. Both careless and irrele-
vant assertions are still assertions, yet they are hapless or “bad.” 
Searle’s sincerity rule states (ibid.): 
 
S believes p. 
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Needless to say (obvious to both S and H), that an insincere assertion 
is still an assertion, though often a bad one. In the case of assertion (not 
with other speech act types) the sincerity rule might seem to be covered 
by the preparatory rule 1 above. If one has reasons to believe that p, 
should one believe that p – or not? Not necessarily. In many cases there 
are arguments both for and against a proposition. Therefore a speaker 
might very well be able to “justify” a proposition and at the same time 
believe it to be false and utter it in order to lead the hearer astray. A justi-
fication does not necessarily make an assertion a good assertion. 
There are also cases in which belief is entirely unjustified, if it is 
based on misleading intuitions, for example. However, intuitions need 
not be misleading. The reliability of chicken-sexers who cannot explain 
their criteria is one example, another example (Gladwell 2005), is the in-
cident of a group of experts who intuited that a statue offered to a muse-
um was forged and who were entirely unable to give reasons for this 
opinion. A later inquiry proved their intuitions to be correct. Those inci-
dents are not rare: It is not the worst physician who intuits a diagnosis 
on the basis of his experience – and he is definitely entitled to assert it. If 
intuitions have proved to be reliable by induction, then they do not need 
further justification by arguments. In everyday life – as opposed to scien-
tific discourse – justification is often neither sufficient nor necessary for 
a good assertion, as the assertion norms for everyday life are different 
from those concerning scientific knowledge. 
 
 
1.3. Scientific and Everyday-Life Knowledge 
 
Knowledge, just like truth, is one of the most debated concepts and 
there is no hope of ever achieving a consensus. Assertion in everyday life 
obviously does not require corroborated expert knowledge but rather eve-
ryday commonsense understanding.2 How does this type of knowledge 
relate to belief? To attempt to answer this, it may be instructive to look at 
the use of the words ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ in natural languages.  
                                                 
2 The work published in epistemology appears to aim at a third type in between these, the 
function of which has not yet been made clear to me. 
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The fundamental difference between the verbs to know (that) and to 
believe is their factivity: The verb to know is factive, i.e. it presupposes the 
truth of its complement clause, whereas to believe is non-factive. If A 
says: ‘B knows that p’ she says that B believes that p, and she indicates 
through the said presupposition that she herself believes p as well; be-
liefs are called truths or knowledge by those who believe them. “Factivi-
ty” of the verb to know means that the speaker of the utterance ‘B knows 
that p’ regards p as a fact – nothing else. In particular, it does not mean 
that p is (in fact) a fact – whatever ‘being a fact’ is supposed to mean. Not 
even the “facts” of Euclidean geometry were safe from revisions; even 
more vulnerable is what we assert every day or what we believe to be our 
knowledge. When I hear somebody saying that the earth is not flat, I 
claim the right to assert ‘he knows that the earth is not flat’ and do not 
feel obliged to examine whether or not his belief is just accidentally true. 
I would argue, in fact, that most of our everyday beliefs are only acci-
dentally true and lack any sound justification. 
On the other hand, if A says ‘B believes that p’ (instead of ‘knows’) she 
does not indicate that she herself believes p as well, nor does she exclude 
it. In this case, however, the choice of the verb to believe votes out the al-
ternative to know, together with its presupposition. In most contexts the 
choice of to believe triggers an inference (a clausal conversational implica-
ture, Gazdar 1979, 59), a weak indication, that A does not assent to p. Oth-
erwise she could and should have used the verb to know. 
When transferred to the first-person the meanings of the verbs more or 
less coincide. ‘I believe that p’ and ‘I know that p’ can refer to the same atti-
tude towards p: belief can be very firm. Nevertheless, the weakening effect of 
the implicature in play in the first-person, compared to assertions made in 
the second-person or third-person, affects the meaning of to know by adding 
a connotation of certainty, so that the use of to know is preferred in the up-
per range of gradual firmness of belief. Therefore one can say ‘I believe that 
p but I could be mistaken’ without contradiction, as opposed to ‘I know that 
p but I could be mistaken.’ However, the contradiction of ‘I know that p but 
I could be mistaken’ is merely a pragmatic one: we conventionally use the 
phrase ‘I know that’ to affirm our subjective certainty. Strictly speaking, we 
should add ‘but I could be mistaken’ to any assertion – if that addition were 
not entirely irrelevant. 
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One might assume that the verb to know “expresses” certainty whereas 
to believe does not; however, the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘to know’ can as 
well be used to underscore uncertainty or subjectivity, as in the common 
phrases ‘to my knowledge’ and ‘as far as I know,’ which are phrases used 
to hedge one’s bets, used to explicitly indicate less reliable knowledge. 
This is true not only for English but for most Western languages: 
 
French: à ma connaissance/autant que je sache 
Italian: per quanto io ne sappia 
Spanish: según mi saber/por lo que sé 
German: meines Wissens/so viel ich weiß 
Latin: quantum scio 
Greek: ὅσον γ' ἐμὲ εἰδέναι 
 
Moreover, the history of science teaches us that even scientific 
knowledge is nothing but temporarily received belief that has to be put to 
the test by further regulated experience. Many of our convictions (perhaps 
all of them) are default assumptions. We rely on them as long as there is no 
substantial evidence to the contrary. Of course scientific knowledge requires 
a certain level of justification, which is provided by scientific methods which 
themselves require justification by philosophy of science. By contrast, the 
everyday-life concept – the one pertinent to assertion – requires only belief 
and subjective certainty. The assertions observed in everyday life range from 
those based on scientific knowledge to completely careless ones; however, 
one would lose touch with reality by demanding more than subjective cer-
tainty from common people making assertions. The general linguistic norm 
of “good” assertions requires subjective certainty (that is, sincerity). Justified 
or otherwise corroborated assertions are required by different norms per-
taining to particular situations such as academic discourse or judicial hear-
ings, which I will not deal with in this paper. The knowledge required for 
good everyday-life assertions is mere belief combined with subjective cer-
tainty. It is sufficient to have a revocable default assumption, whose justifi-
cation may be not fully reliable as long as its contrary is less reliable. The 
burden of proof here lies with the skeptic. 
The knowledge requirement appears to boil down to Searle’s sincerity 
rule. However, this is not quite so: A speaker can have a belief and yet be 
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reluctant to assert it. Putting aside norms of politeness, etc., let us consider a 
speaker who has a belief but nevertheless doubts its reliability. In some situ-
ations an explicit guess is more appropriate than an unqualified assertion. 
 
 
1.4. The Epistemic Standards of Assertion 
 
Consider the following dialogue between A, standing in the hall and 
ready to leave, and B sitting on her sofa: 
 
A: Where is your car key? 
B: In the drawer. 
A: No, it isn’t. 
B: In my coat. 
A: No. 
B: Sorry, here you are. 
 
Apparently that conversation is quite natural and B’s behavior is appro-
priate if not exactly optimal. Before answering the first question B could 
have made an inquiry in order to obtain reliable information about the loca-
tion of the key. What she actually did was to enlist A in that inquiry because 
she rightly believed she would get the result faster this way. This is both ra-
tional and appropriate even if it turns out that her first guesses were mistak-
en and she could have found the key easily on her own. Her first answer 
was a guess and it was helpful in finding the key. Was her answer an asser-
tion? Yes, it was both a guess and an assertion.3 There is no linguistic dif-
ference between a guess and an assertion because they share the illocution-
ary point and the difference lies in the context.4 The stakes in that situation 
were very low; the risk taken with a false assertion was next to zero. In a dif-
ferent case, if B had not had a chance to examine the drawer, if the conver-
sation could not have been continued after the first reply and if the conse-
                                                 
3 I use the term ‘assertion’ for all assertives because the difference between answers, oaths 
etc. and assertions in the narrow sense is merely contextual. 
4 For a contextualist notion of knowledge/assertion cf. DeRose 1995: 30 or Sosa 2000: 2, 
e.g. Stanley (2004) critically discusses various versions of contextualism, none of which 
relate knowledge to relevance or practice. 
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quences of not finding the key had been serious, that is, if the stakes had 
been high, B’s answer based on insecure knowledge would have been en-
tirely inappropriate. In such a situation she should have downgraded her 
assertion to an explicit guess or have acted very differently. This means, the 
strength of assertion is to be taken as a parameter independent of the asser-
tive point (as shown by Vanderveken 1990, see above) – it ranges from frivo-
lous guess to oath – and the speaker is obliged by the assertion rule to adjust 
its strength to the epistemic standards of the situation. In some cases that 
strength has to be made explicit, while in others it is unnecessary or irrele-
vant. The obligation to explicitly indicate the strength of assertion correlates 
with the epistemic standards of the speech situation and the asserted propo-
sition’s presumed reliability. Even a frivolous assertion, a joke, is appropri-
ate when the stakes are low and the consequences of “error” are insignifi-
cant. By the way, a good joke can be made a better one by adding a well fab-
ricated “justification” to the frivolous assertion. 
The epistemic standards have to be distinguished from the epistemic 
position of a person in a given situation. The epistemic standards are de-
pendent on the social activity the assertion is embedded in, whereas the ep-
istemic position a person holds is merely the degree of reliability of 
knowledge independent of future action. The neglect of action is a frequent 
but serious omission in the analysis of assertion. The norms of good asser-
tion require a consideration of the role of assertion in social practice. 
 
 
1.5. The Embedding of Assertion in Social Practice: Relevance 
 
An assertion is hardly ever just supposed to represent a fact in the 
world. The perlocutionary effect intended by an assertion is hardly ever 
restricted to merely convincing the addressee of the proposition assert-
ed; a relevant assertion aims at further, indirect responses, that is, it 
aims at guiding the future activities of the addressee. Nobody would ever 
make a promise, for example, if it had no other effect than limiting the 
range of the speaker’s future activities by the obligation thereby in-
curred, as a promise is an investment aimed at the future cooperative 
behavior of the addressee. Assertion is embedded in social activity, and 
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the appropriateness of assertion is not only dependent on the epistemic 
position of the asserter but essentially related to that activity. 
A very instructive example is discussed in Lackey (2011, 253-255): an 
oncologist in a teaching hospital “knows” from a very competent student 
that one of her patients has cancer. This knowledge is “isolated 
secondhand knowledge” based on the diagnosis of the student who has 
reviewed the relevant data, which the oncologist has not had a chance to 
see. The student is entitled to assert to her professor that the patient has 
cancer; the professor is also entitled to assert this to her husband at dinner 
(272), but neither the student nor the professor are entitled to assert it to 
the patient because of the severe consequences of such an assertion for 
him. It is the severity of the consequences that makes first hand expert 
knowledge necessary. The doctor’s epistemic position is the same when 
talking to her husband as when talking to the patient, yet the stakes and 
the epistemic standards differ.5 When talking to her husband, the asser-
tion is part of the language game “dinner conversation;” when talking to 
her patient, it is part of a therapy where isolated secondhand knowledge is 
out of place. The epistemic position of the speaker is insufficient for decid-
ing if an assertion complies with the norms of assertion or not; the em-
bedding in action has to be considered (Stanley 2005, 88, 92). 
Another example is discussed in Becker 2012, 266:  
 
Imagine your partner in a conversation somewhere in Europe needs to buy 
a pencil and you tell him that he can buy one in the Arya Stationery Mart in 
New Delhi, Nai Sarak, near the Vaish Co-Operative Bank. That is true and 
you can easily justify it using the yellow pages on the Internet. Nevertheless 
it is a brazen violation of our rules of conversation: it is not relevant. 
 
 
2. Relevance 
 
The “truth norm of assertion” thesis, which enjoys some popularity, is, 
I argue, absurdly weak. Any speaker in any speech situation is epistemical-
                                                 
5 I agree that when the patient accidentally overhears the conversation not addressed to him, 
he has no right to complain to the asserter (Moran 2005: 22; Goldberg 2011: 192 disagrees). 
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ly entitled by his knowledge to assert an infinite number of true and 
known propositions – about the number of his toes and fingers, mathe-
matical equations, capitals of states, almost all negative sentences and so 
on. This can be demonstrated by the absurdity of the Library of Baghdad, 
which is similar to Jorge Luis Borges’s Library of Babel (Borges 1999, Bor-
ges 2007). Borges’ Total Library is a fascinating fabrication: it holds an in-
finite set of books, each of them finite, containing all combinations of let-
ters (22 letters plus space, period, and comma). It contains every text pos-
sible in every language that can be transliterated by the set of those 22 let-
ters (other letters can be defined as combinations; the library contains an 
infinite number of such definitions, too). Hence, the library contains a de-
tailed and true history of our future, an infinite number of false ones, the 
“Persae” of Aeschylus (and his “Egyptians”), the exact number of times 
that the waters of Ganges have reflected the flight of a falcon, and so forth. 
All of these books are untraceably hidden in an infinite muddle of books 
containing meaningless combinations of letters. 
The Library of Baghdad is different: its books contain only true sen-
tences (not a single false one) in impeccable English, without a single 
misprint. It contains, just like the Library of Babel, an infinite set of true 
sentences derived logically or by other recursive definitions from a basis of 
true and known sentences compiled by a large committee of scholars. All 
the sentences differ from each other, not a single sentence is recorded 
twice, and all sentences are of finite length. Nevertheless, it is as useless as 
the Library of Babel, because you have virtually no chance to find a single 
interesting sentence among the infinite number of true and irrelevant 
ones. Natural languages like English are recursive, that is, you can make 
any number of additions to a sentence without affecting its grammaticality 
or truth. For instance, the sentence ‘The library of Babel is very large’ can 
be extended to the form ‘The library of Babel is very, very large.’ You can 
add ‘very’ any number of times; there is no natural number of additions 
that renders the sentence ungrammatical or false. This means for any 
natural number there is a sentence in the Library. The books containing 
this family of sentences alone would fill the entire cosmos. And there are 
other sources of infinity, to name but two of them: ‘1 is less than 2,’ ‘1 is 
less than 3’ etc. Or: ‘Human beings have 11 fingers and human beings 
have 12 fingers, or (!) Paris is the capital of France.’ Adding ‘or Paris is the 
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capital of France’ to any of an infinite set of true or false sentences will 
yield a true sentence. Let us assume that the set of sentences is not or-
dered according to its recursive enumeration. The library would even be 
less useful if it contained the true sentences whose truth has not been es-
tablished by experts so far (e.g. the distance between the first and the sec-
ond occurrence of the letter ‘e’ in this paper), as almost all of these truths 
contained in the library of Baghdad do not matter at all; what matters are 
the very few sentences that happen to be relevant. Therefore, the point of 
assertion is to pick out the most relevant proposition of an infinite number of 
true, known and justifiable ones.6 Relevance is both as relevant and as easy 
to overlook as the air we breathe because our cognition rejects almost all 
of the irrelevant information in our environment. 
Science is a selection of what is worth knowing to us for practical pur-
poses (of what is relevant) chosen out of an infinite number of truths 
(Bolzano 1837, 3; Putnam and Putnam 1990, 206). This does not imply 
that scientific findings are of immediate use. In many cases the practical 
use of a finding has been discovered later. Nevertheless, basic research is 
justified by the hope for application in the future. Good science must be 
relevant in the most general speech situation of all: the life of mankind. 
 
 
2.1. Relevance and the Theory of Conversational Implicature 
 
“Be relevant!” is one of the Maxims of Conversation postulated by H. 
P. Grice (1975), whose inferential theory of meaning is one of the cor-
nerstones of thinking in linguistics and philosophy of language. Further 
linguistic research (above all: Sperber and Wilson 1986) has attributed a 
much more dominant role to relevance than Grice ever imagined. 
According to Grice and his followers the hearer does not understand 
an utterance by decoding its semantics; instead, he takes the utterance 
together with the context as a hint to the speaker’s communicative inten-
tion. The hearer infers the speaker’s meaning; the most important of 
                                                 
6 Cf. Jary 2010: 164: “There is an indefinite amount of true information, but most of it is of 
no use or interest to most individuals. Accounts of assertion merely in terms of commit-
ment to truth thus miss out on the point of assertion.” Cf. also Jary 2011, 2010: 155. 
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those inferences is called “conversational implicature” or briefly “impli-
cature.” What is a (conversational) implicature?7 Consider the following 
dialogue: 
 
A: “Do your daughters speak foreign languages?” 
B: “Paula speaks French.” 
 
A might interpret B’s answer as follows: 
 
a) Paula does not speak other foreign languages. 
b) The other daughters do not speak any foreign language. 
c) Paula is a daughter of B. 
d) French is a foreign language to Paula. 
 
The information given in a-d) is neither “said,” nor logically implied by 
the sentence uttered by B, but “implicated” through conversational impli-
catures. Given that in normal speech situations parents boast with the 
achievements of their children, A would infer a-b), as B would withhold 
relevant information if Paula and his other daughters would in fact speak 
several foreign languages. If Paula was not B’s daughter but a French 
neighbor, his utterance would not be false. A infers c) and d) on the basis 
of the additional premise that B’s utterance is an answer to his question. If 
any of the inferences a-d) were false, B would not have been cooperative. 
Normally a speaker like A would infer a-d) on the assumption that B is co-
operative – which is certainly rational as humans normally cooperate with 
each other. Cooperation is the default assumption that can only be over-
ridden by substantial evidence to the contrary. 
Another example shows that implicatures are not only important in 
everyday life but also to philosophical matters like logic. When I say: ‘I 
am going to Italy or France,’ a normal hearer would most likely under-
stand that I go to one of these countries but not to both (exclusive ‘or’), 
whereas in a logic seminar you would learn that the meaning of ‘or’ 
                                                 
7 In the following account of the Gricean theory I do not intend to do justice to Grice’s 
texts. Grice focusses on the intention of speakers, whereas I am more interested in a ra-
tional and, if possible, deductive reconstruction of implicatures. 
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would include the case of ‘both’ (inclusive ‘or’). According to Grice the 
exclusion of ‘both’ is a conversational implicature. A cooperative speaker 
would have used ‘and’ instead of ‘or’ if he intended to go to both coun-
tries. The ‘or’ sentence would be true but too weak. We assume that our 
partners in conversation make their statements as strong as necessary, 
that is, if they can make a stronger statement without additional effort 
they would normally choose the stronger one.8 
For all these inferences the hearer used an additional premise: The 
speaker is cooperative. Only by this premise A can infer that Paula is a 
daughter of B. If this were not the case B would not have answered A’s 
question and therefore B would not be cooperative. The relation of con-
versational implicature and entailment can be described as follows: 
 
 
 
The sentence X uttered by the speaker does not entail Y; the utter-
ance is a conversational implicature iff the hearer assumes that the 
speaker is cooperative (premise 2) and the situation is such that the 
speaker would not be cooperative if Y was false (premise 3). Premise 3, if 
spelled out, contains the individual analysis of the given speech situa-
tion. The three premises taken together entail Y. 
The core of Grice’s theory is that the assumption of cooperativity is 
essential in understanding utterances. This is the assumption that 
speakers comply with the Cooperative Principle (1975, 1989, 26): 
 
 
                                                 
8 Horn 1972, 1989 showed that this analysis applies to some (), possibly () and other oper-
ators of rising strength in Aristotle’s square of oppositions (“Horn scales”). 
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COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged. 
 
Then he specifies what it means to be cooperative by four maxims of 
conversation: 
 
MAXIM OF QUANTITY 
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
MAXIM OF QUALITY  
Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
 
MAXIM OF RELATION 
Be relevant. 
 
MAXIM OF MANNER 
Avoid obscurity of expression. 
Avoid ambiguity. 
Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
Be orderly. 
 
I infer from B’s answer that his other daughters do not speak foreign 
languages, assuming that he complies with the Maxim of Quantity; I infer 
that Paula is his daughter, assuming that he complies with the Maxim of 
Relevance, that is, he answers my question and does not change the topic in 
an unpredictable way. These conversational implicatures play a pivotal role 
in communication; human communication would break down entirely if 
the hearers were restricted to the pure semantics of the sentences uttered. 
Grice was well aware that the four maxims are only a first draft in need 
of specification. One important development of his theory was the reduc-
tion of the four maxims. The most drastic cut was imposed by Sperber 
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and Wilson 1986. Their “Relevance Theory” aims to reduce the four max-
ims to one: relevance. The Maxim of Quantity is easy to reduce: if you do 
not make your contribution as informative as is required you withhold rel-
evant information; if you make your contribution more informative than 
required, you say something irrelevant. The Maxim of Quality (truth) is 
much harder to deal with, as I will point out later. The Maxim of Relation 
need not be reduced. The Maxim of Manner has been reduced by Rele-
vance Theory in the following way: if your speech is obscure, ambiguous, 
prolix or not well-ordered, it is hard to understand; if you have two infor-
mation sources, one short and clear and the other obscure, obviously the 
first would be more relevant to you: “other things being equal, the greater 
the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the 
individual at that time” (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 609). 
Unfortunately, Wilson and Sperber threw the baby out with the bath-
water and abandoned both the cooperative principle and the relation of 
cooperation and practice. Furthermore, they revised the everyday meaning 
of the term relevance and transformed it into a technical term. I regard 
these departures from Grice unnecessary if not detrimental, therefore I 
will not elaborate on Relevance Theory, although what follows is signifi-
cantly influenced by the work published in that framework. 
What is relevance? Let me suggest the following draft: 
 
RELEVANCE 
A proposition is relevant 
 with respect to an activity and 
 with respect to an observer of that activity 
iff 
its recognition furthers or impedes the achievement of the activi-
ty’s goals as assumed by the observer to the degree the observer 
(subjectively) rates its furthering or impeding effect. 
 
Of course, an object like a hammer, a non-verbal action, or an ob-
served fact, can be relevant as well; however, all of these non-
propositional entities can be projected onto propositions: ‘that the 
hammer is there,’ ‘that the action is realized,’ ‘that the fact obtains.’ The 
observer can, but need not, be an agent involved in that activity. Rele-
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vance is subjective but it can appear to be non-subjective when a com-
munity forms a consensus about it; our judgments are often mistaken, 
so are our judgments about relevance. Relevance can be negative if the 
entity impedes the achievement of the goals.9 A proposition can be both 
relevant with respect to one activity and irrelevant or impeding with re-
spect to another activity. For instance, a lie can be positively relevant in 
the eyes of the hearer with respect to his activity, and negatively relevant 
in the eyes of the speaker with respect to the hearer’s activity and as-
sumed goals, and positively relevant in the eyes of the speaker with re-
spect to his own activity and goals. Moreover, it can be negatively rele-
vant to a higher degree with respect to the liar’s activities and goals in 
the liar’s later and revised judgment. Relevance is a gradual concept. The 
number of activities an entity pertains to is indefinite; it ranges from 
“taking the next step” to “living a good life in a well-organized society.” 
A notion of “practical relevance” would approximate to what pragma-
tists call “truth” (James 1922, 72–73):10 
 
What would it [the assertion, TB] practically result in for us, were it 
true? It could only result in our orientation, in the turning of our 
expectations and practical tendencies into the right path […]. 
 
This is what a good assertion does: It serves as orientation, turning our 
practical tendencies into the right path. And this is what sincerity aims at; 
when our sincere assertion turns out to be false we have still done our best 
and we have not broken a rule; the assertion of a false yet practically relevant 
proposition is a better assertion than that of a true and irrelevant proposition.  
 
2.2. Cognitive relevance 
 
A further central aspect of relevance is the capacity of human beings 
to select the most relevant entities among the less relevant ones. The ma-
                                                 
9 The term ‘relevance’ without qualification is to be taken as ‘positive relevance.’ 
10 The relation between truth and practice is described – much better than by any (other?) 
pragmatist – by Wohlrapp (2014). 
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jor achievement of Relevance Theory is the Cognitive Principle of Rele-
vance (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 610): 
 
COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANCE 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of 
relevance. 
 
Wilson 2009, 395 puts it more explicitly: 
 
The spontaneous working of our perceptual mechanisms tends to pick 
out the most relevant inputs, the spontaneous working of our memory 
retrieval mechanisms tends to activate the most relevant potential 
contextual assumptions and the spontaneous working of our 
inferential mechanisms tends to yield the most relevant conclusions. 
 
We perceive exactly those frequencies of electromagnetic waves that 
are pertinent to our life: light; we direct our attention to moving objects 
rather than to the unmoved background, etc. This is the result of evolu-
tion: higher living organisms have this capacity; otherwise they would 
have become extinct. In fact, the ability to select the relevant is the most 
basic ability of living organisms. This is what human (and non-human) 
cognition does: picks the relevant information out of a messy context. 
Attention is “a cognitive process that selects out important information 
from the world around us (through all of our five senses) so that our 
brain does not get overloaded with an overwhelming amount of infor-
mation” (Solso et al. 2008, 87, cf. James 1890, 402). 
The ability to select what is relevant is the result of evolution. Hu-
mans and other animals have developed several “evolved psychological 
mechanisms” (Buss 2009, 50-53) like the predisposition “to learn to fear 
snakes,” which is  
 
designed to take in only a narrow slice of information – slithery 
movements from self-propelled elongated objects. Our evolved 
preferences for food, landscapes, and mates are all designed to take 
in only a limited subset of information from among the infinite array 
that could potentially constitute input (Buss 2009, 51).  
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The same applies to memory. If we remembered everything we 
experienced, we would have tremendous difficulty retrieving quickly 
those memories most relevant to direct adaptive action. A reasonable 
evolution-based prediction, therefore, is that human attention and 
memory are extremely selective, designed to notice, store, and 
retrieve information that has the most importance for solving 
adaptive problems (Buss 2009, 387). 
 
Animal learning is selective in the same way (Alcock 1993, 50-54): 
 
A hypothesis to account for the specialized, biased nature of animal 
learning is that these features reduce the risk that an animal will learn 
the wrong things or learn irrelevant information. […] Just as the ability 
to associate toxic effects with novel food items should be a function of 
the risk of sampling poisonous foods, so too the ability to learn the 
spatial features of an area should be related to the advantages gained by 
such learning. According to this view, in species whose males and 
females have different-sized home ranges, the sex that typically travels 
the greater distances should exhibit superior spatial learning ability. […] 
When tested in a variety of mazes, which the animals had to solve in 
order to receive food rewards, males of the wide-ranging meadow vole 
consistently made fewer errors than females of their species […]. But in 
both the prairie and the pine voles there was no difference in the 
spatial learning performance of males and females, which have similar 
home ranges and so are confronted with equivalent spatial learning 
problems in their natural lives. 
 
Moths are more or less deaf, but they can perceive the high-intensity 
ultrasound of bats, to which they react by diving, flipping or spiraling 
erratically, and thus avoid being caught (Alcock 1993, 126 f.). The ability 
to select the most relevant does not require a brain; it appears to be the 
most basic feature of life that has been developed together with the cell 
membrane (Campbell et al. 2008, 125, 131): 
 
One of the earliest episodes in the evolution of life may have been the 
formation of a membrane that enclosed a solution different from the 
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surrounding solution while still permitting the uptake of nutrients 
and elimination of waste products. The ability of the cell to 
discriminate in its chemical exchanges with its environment is 
fundamental to life, and it is the plasma membrane and its 
component molecules that make this selectivity possible. [P. 131:] 
Sugars, amino acids, and other nutrients enter the cell, and 
metabolic waste products leave it. The cell takes in oxygen for use in 
cellular respiration and expels carbon dioxide. […] Although traffic 
through the membrane is extensive, cell membranes are selectively 
permeable and substances do not cross the barrier indiscriminately. 
 
My claim is that behaving in a practically relevant way is the gist of 
intelligence, both innate and acquired by experience, communication or 
reflection. Knowledge or whatever there is in our minds is not an end in 
itself, as its purpose is to guide our actions. 
 
 
2.3. Relevance in Cooperation 
 
What Relevance Theory neglects is the biological foundation of co-
operativity and the relation of relevance to practice. Tomasello 2014 
presents a detailed description of the evolution of cooperativity in hu-
man beings. Cooperativity is “wired” in social insects and also in 
mammals like wolves and apes, which can be observed in their cooper-
ative hunting behavior. Tomasello describes the qualitative leap in the 
development of human cooperativity: “Humans but not apes engage in 
cooperative communication in which they provide one another with 
information that they judge to be useful for the recipient” (2014, 36). 
The critical difference between cooperativity with humans and with 
other mammals is the human ability to represent the perspective of 
others (2014, 56, 137 f.), thus they are able to judge what is relevant for 
the partner playing his role in the cooperative activity. Apes do not 
have this ability (Tomasello 2014, 52): 
 
If food is hidden in one of two buckets (and the ape knows it is only 
in one of them) and a human then points to a bucket, apes are 
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clueless [… ; ] it does not occur to them that the human is trying to 
inform them helpfully […]. They make the competitive inference “He 
wants in that bucket; therefore the food must be in there,” but they 
do not make the cooperative inference, “He wants me to know that 
the food is in the bucket.” 
 
Humans “began to make evaluative judgments about others as po-
tential collaborative partners: they began to be socially selective, since 
choosing a poor partner meant less food” (2014, 37). The evolution of 
cognitive relevance cannot be understood without its relation to practice: 
“in evolution, being smart counts for nothing if it does not lead to acting 
smart” (Tomasello 2014, 7). It is hard to see how one can be (positively) 
relevant without being cooperative or cooperative without being relevant. 
Relevance depends on the activities the agents are engaged in. Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle demands (1975, 1989, 26) the following:  
 
COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged. 
 
The activities need not be talk exchanges, as Grice’s examples show 
(e.g. 32); conversations are often held in order to support other practical 
purposes. Social animals like us are geared to expect cooperative behav-
ior from their neighbor; this expectation is innate and corroborated (and 
qualified) by experience.11 Cooperativity of our fellow human beings is 
the default assumption that can, of course, be overridden by negative ev-
idence. Sperber and Wilson, as do many other critics, allege that “Grice’s 
principle and maxims are norms which communicators and audience 
must know in order to communicate adequately” (Sperber and Wilson 
                                                 
11 Aristotle (Politics, 1253a 2-3) regarded man as a “social animal by nature;” Rousseau 
(1762: 289 [End of book IV]) saw “a principle of justice and virtue” to be innate, and Reid 
(1785: 193-195, VI, xxiv) elaborated on his principles of veracity and credulity: “we speak 
truth by instinct” and “in the matter of testimony, the balance of human judgment is by 
nature inclined to the side of belief.” 
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1986, 162). On the contrary: The fact is that it takes quite some intellec-
tual effort not to behave according to Grice’s rules.  
During a conversation one should not say what is irrelevant or with-
hold what is relevant (Grice’s Maxims of Quantity and Relation, 26 f.). 
What one says should be perspicuous (Maxim of Manner) as obscurity 
reduces the relevance of an assertion. Sperber and Wilson 1986 showed 
that Grice’s maxims can be reduced to relevance,12 even including the 
maxim of truth (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 583): 
 
We will argue that language use is not governed by any convention 
or maxim of truthfulness in what is said. Whatever genuine facts 
such a convention or maxim was supposed to explain are better 
explained by assuming that communication is governed by a 
principle of relevance. 
 
Truth is certainly not a sufficient condition for assertion; an assertion 
must be relevant to the activity the speakers are involved in. Is it neces-
sary? 
 
 
2.4. Is Truth Necessary? 
 
The demand for relevance excludes almost all of the true but inappropri-
ate assertions: Of the infinite number of assertions such as ‘zero is less than 
one,’ ‘zero is less than two,’ etc., it excludes all but the one that happens to 
be practically relevant. If truth is not sufficient for assertion – is truth neces-
sary? What is the use of a necessary condition that “reduces” the number of 
“appropriate” assertions to an infinite number? 
Certainly the maxim of truthfulness can be overridden by other norms: 
When commenting on a new haircut or wallpaper or a drawing by a six-
year-old child, truthfulness can be out of place. In most cases relevance 
implies truthfulness (at least sincerity, since the pursuit of truth is a life’s 
                                                 
12 However, despite harsh criticism (Clark 1987, Gorayska and Lindsay 1993 and many 
others) the followers of “Relevance Theory” hold on to the view that relevance is a mere 
cognitive matter independent of goals or practice. 
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work). However, if truth does not support the accepted purpose of the talk 
exchange then relevance wins out.  
A lie is not any false statement. An irrelevant false assertion will be 
simply ignored; a misleading false assertion will be punished, even harder if 
the speaker’s different goals are visible so that the intention to mislead can 
be alleged. On the other hand, a false assertion can even be held in high es-
teem if it discloses intended positive consequences. A classical example 
(from the Dissoi Logoi) is the act of foisting a medicine into a drink prepared 
for one’s father or mother who would refuse to take it otherwise. It is not 
truth what counts but helpful guidance vs. harmful misguidance in the ac-
tivity the assertion forms part of. Truth appears to be the core of assertion 
because in almost all cases only true statements are relevant, but this does 
not exclude the possibility that the important status of truth is derived and 
secondary to relevance. 
There are a considerable number of linguistic structures in utterances 
whose truth cannot be established as opposed to their relevance. One is fu-
ture contingents: ‘There will be a math test tomorrow’ is relevant today 
(when you can do some preparation) and will be irrelevant tomorrow (when 
it’s too late), although its truth can only be established tomorrow, after the 
test. Conditionals are always false because you can always find far-fetched 
conditions that render them false. ‘If you do these exercises, you will pass 
the test’ can be very helpful, despite the fact that the addressee can always be 
hit by lightning before having the opportunity to pass. Considering these 
far-fetched conditions, however, is irrelevant. The same holds for counter-
factuals: ‘If you had done your exercises, you would have passed the test’ can 
be a relevant hint for next time, although its truth can never be established. 
Evaluative statements like ‘This sundae is too big for you’ can be relevant, 
ending a futile discussion and avoiding sickness, although it might never be 
shown as true. A statement like ‘Christ has risen from the dead’ can guide 
successful practice although its truth cannot be shown. Three topics that 
have been thoroughly discussed in Relevance Theory are irony (for example 
Wilson and Sperber 2012, 123-145), metaphor (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 
277 f.) and loose talk (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 59 f.). An utterance like ‘I’ll 
be ready in a second’ is false (and harmless) in most cases, but the relevant 
inferences such as ‘you can wait until I’m done’ remain true. Van der Henst 
et al. 2002 found out that speakers asked to tell the time round up from 3:08 
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to 3.10 even if they have digital watches (Wilson and Sperber 2012, 54, 60), 
in their attempt to make their answer easier to process and thereby more 
relevant. The falsity of an utterance will be ignored if the deviation from 
truth is irrelevant. 
If somebody, let’s say from India, asked me ‘Where did you grow 
up?’ I could think of at least three possible answers: 
 
a) In Haar. 
b) In a suburb, 500 yards outside the city limits of Munich. 
c) In Munich. 
 
Option a) would be true but obscure (as nobody in India will have 
heard of that suburb) and therefore irrelevant. Option b) would be true but 
unnecessarily prolix and therefore less relevant. Option c) would be literal-
ly false but it would still be relevant as it triggers true inferences as ‘He 
grew up in an urban environment, is familiar with Bavarian culture etc.’ I 
would use the false answer c) and not even consider the true alternatives.  
The analysis of metaphor in Relevance Theory is quite revealing (Sper-
ber and Wilson 2012, 277 f.). Consider the utterance: ‘John is a soldier!’ 
The mental concept of a soldier includes a number of attributes that will 
be activated to different degrees dependent on the speech situation: 
 
a) John is devoted to his duty. 
b) John willingly follows orders. 
c) John does not question authority. 
d) John identifies with the goals of his team. 
e) John is a patriot. 
f) John earns a soldier’s pay. 
g) John is a member of the military. 
 
When the utterance is an answer to the question “What does John do 
for a living?,” the inferences f) and g) will be activated, a) and b) will 
probably not even come to the mind of the hearer. The inferences trig-
gered with the hearer are entirely different when the utterance is an an-
swer to the question “Can we trust John to do as we tell him and defend 
the interests of the department in the University Council?” In this case 
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a-d) will be triggered and f-g) will not come to the mind of the hearer, as 
his cognition is geared to picking out the relevant information. He will 
even discard the proposition of the utterance itself. The process of un-
derstanding is the same in both cases; it is not the case that the hearer 
first considers the literal interpretation, discards it, and then comes up 
with the metaphorical interpretation.13 The literal falsity of metaphorical 
utterances is irrelevant. Truth normally goes with relevance; if they are 
in conflict, relevance prevails.  
The constitutive rule of the assertive point can now be defined (alter-
ing Vanderveken’s definition, 1990, 105) as follows:  
 
CONSTITUTIVE RULE OF THE ASSERTIVE POINT: 
The assertive point consists in representing a state of affairs as opti-
mally relevant to the activity the addressee is involved in. 
 
The relevance norm of assertion defines the “good” assertion: 
 
RELEVANCE NORM OF ASSERTION: 
An assertion is regarded as “good” by an observer with respect to an 
activity to the degree the observer judges the utterance as relevant to 
that activity. 
 
 
3. The Relevance of Truth 
 
Does all that mean that truth is irrelevant? Not at all.14 Every subject 
has a theory of the world outside (whose existence, please, should not be 
denied). Let us use a common metaphor: this theory is like a map that 
serves as a guide for our entire life-practice. This map is not a precise 
replica of the world, which would be as useless as a map of Italy to a 
scale of 1:1. Our theory of the world can be as different from the world 
itself as Italy is different from a folded sheet of paper and nevertheless 
                                                 
13 It escaped the attention of Relevance Theoreticians that Weinrich 1966: 43-49 proposed 
exactly the same analysis of metaphor, if in the words of the sixties. 
14 What follows is substantially influenced by Wohlrapp 2014; the errors caused by adapta-
tion and by misunderstanding are of course  my own. 
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serve its purpose. It contains only relevant data (others will never be per-
ceived or soon be forgotten) gathered through experience and organized 
by the mind. This map can again be mapped onto a set of propositions 
that represent the theory (this is the representation of the theory we can 
talk about), a web of beliefs,15 which is one single coherent set of propo-
sitions the subject regards as true. The relations between the proposi-
tions that constitute the web are relations of support, e.g. entailment re-
lations or others used in non-deductive, substantial arguments.16 These 
relations are used in justification. An isolated belief is weaker than one 
embedded in relations of justification. That web, as a whole, is “verified” 
both by its consistency and through successful life-practice.17 Success in 
life-practice confirms the web as a realistic image of the world – as real-
istic as a map that corresponds to the landscape it is supposed to depict. 
We set off with common sense and when we run into a problem, we 
make repairs; cognitive relevance will help find the flaw. The “truths” in 
this web are mere defaults that can be changed whenever doubt comes 
up.18 Social truths are established by communication; the transpersonal 
perspective on these beliefs gives them the appearance of objectivity. Ob-
jective truth can be hoped for but will never be reached by human re-
search, which is harmless as long as our practice is successful. A true 
utterance does not correspond to some “fact” of the outside world but to 
a proposition in the web of beliefs maintained by those who believe it to 
be true because their interaction with the outside world on the basis of 
that belief is successful. Mankind used to be happy with the belief that 
the earth is flat for a long time, with counterevidence patched up as long 
as possible. The observation that the topmost part of incoming ships is 
                                                 
15 A metaphor attributable to Quine/Ullian 1978. 
16 “Substantial arguments” in the sense  used by Toulmin 1958. The web is not closed un-
der entailment: When I believe a set of propositions I do not necessarily believe everything 
that follows from that set because I might not realize the connection. This is not a minor 
problem for intensional semantic theory. 
17 A common misunderstanding of pragmatism results from applying the verification pro-
cess to some particular practice as if an isolated assumption (that helps achieving a particu-
lar goal) would establish truth. 
18 The pragmatist theory of truth gives no reason to pragmatize truth conditional seman-
tics; ‘A entails B’ in the language L means that whoever utters A will be committed to B as 
well by the truth conditional semantic rules of language L. 
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visible first was adapted by the speculation of the sea rising like a back or 
a mountain ridge above the earth level (“on the wide back of the sea,” 
Odyssey, γ 142). ‘That the earth is flat’ was regarded to be true because 
in those days common practice based on that belief was successful and 
counterevidence too weak. Now it is false because we believe otherwise – 
yet we should be aware that some of our truths might be ridiculed by fu-
ture generations. Nevertheless, we have the right to call them truths, just 
like the early Greeks had the right to call their truths “truths.” 
When a speaker makes an assertion complying with the relevance 
norm, the asserted proposition will be suitable for guiding the hearer’s 
activities (Gauker 2007: 132). The cooperative speaker believes it to be 
suitable for the hearer’s activities just as he believes it to be suitable for 
his own corresponding activities he would undertake in the hearer’s po-
sition. Therefore he chooses a proposition from his own web of beliefs, 
that is, from the set of propositions he believes to be true. In this way the 
truth of an utterance follows from its relevance (that is, normally; excep-
tions have been discussed above), and the truth/knowledge norm is de-
rived from the relevance norm. Taken on its own, the truth/knowledge 
norm is far too weak.  
The assertion norm: ‘an assertion ought to be relevant’ can itself be 
asserted – is this assertion true? 
It is true if and only if complying with it leads to successful prac-
tice.19 A true norm is one that leads to successful practice, that is, if and 
only if complying with it leads to social practice that satisfies the agents 
involved in that practice. This works even without reflection: successful 
behavior stays, unsuccessful behavior dies out. If there is disagreement 
among the agents about the success, those who are not satisfied believe 
the norm to be false; a consensus can only be achieved by political ac-
tion, preferably rational discourse. More often than not the entire society 
is mistaken about the truth of a norm, just like about the truth about the 
earth’s shape. There have been many atrocities in history that were ap-
proved of by an alarming number of people who considered themselves 
righteous. The falsity of a norm can only be established by a norm that 
                                                 
19 On a meta-normative level, the relevance norm of assertion is true if and only if it struc-
tures successful descriptions of assertion. 
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turns out to be more satisfactory in practice; of course, a rational dis-
course about norms can be useful for planning repairs, useful for as-
sessing ahead of time whether certain goals are good goals to work for, 
or useful for negotiating conflicts of interest, but it cannot establish the 
truth of a norm. The prohibition of alcohol in the US was a perfectly ra-
tional measure from an armchair point of view but it failed when put to 
practice. On the other hand, the abolition of slavery was successful alt-
hough it took quite some time to convince everybody that it was based 
on a true norm. The range of unsuccessful practice extends from trivial 
cases like a glimpse into a refrigerator, based on the false assumption 
that it contains a bottle of milk, all the way up to the failure of “real so-
cialism,” which took decades to become manifest and is still debated in 
some circles. The truth of a norm is a challenge trophy in political dis-
course. 
In conclusion, successful practice verifies normative propositions in 
the same way as descriptive ones. A web of beliefs (both normative and 
descriptive) that guides successful practice is a realistic image of the 
world. 
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The Austinian Conception of Illocution and its 
Implications for Value Judgments and Social Ontology 
 
Marina Sbisà 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I present the Austinian notion of illocutionary effect 
and discuss some of its philosophical implications as to value judgments 
and social ontology. 
Illocutionary acts are characterized by most authors as acts, whose ef-
fect is the production of the hearer’s uptake. They aim to be understood 
or, more specifically, to make the hearer understand the speaker’s com-
municative intention. This idea is to be found in early work on speech 
act theory by Strawson (1964) and Searle (1965, 1969). It seems both his-
torically fair and theoretically relevant to mention that it was not Aus-
tin’s idea. Indeed, reconstructing Austin’s perspective on illocution can 
help us see that speech act theory was originarily designed to have philo-
sophical implications that have failed to be made explicit ever since. 
In the next section I explain how the notion of illocutionary act as the 
expression of a communicative intention aiming at its own recognition 
became part of the mainstream version of speech act theory. I then ex-
plain what I believe Austin meant to say about illocution with his fa-
mous remark about the role of the hearer’s uptake, and what the result-
ing notion of a conventional illocutionary effect contributes to certain 
issues in discourse analysis and in philosophy, particularly those about 
value judgments and social ontology. 
 
 
2. Austinian Illocutionary Effects 
 
In introducing three ways in which illocutionary acts are, according 
to him, connected to effects, Austin writes: 
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Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have 
been happily, successfully performed […]. I cannot be said to have 
warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in 
a certain sense[…] the performance of an illocutionary act involves the 
securing of uptake (1962, 116). 
 
Peter F. Strawson, in his paper on “Intention and convention in 
speech acts” (1964), reads Austin as implying that no other effect than 
uptake is necessarily connected to the performance of an illocutionary 
act. This reading enables him to reinterpret Austin’s illocutionary force 
as a kind of speaker meaning (in the sense given to this expression by 
Grice 1957), that is, the intention of the speaker to achieve a response 
thanks to the recognition by the audience of her intention to achieve it. 
Searle shares Strawson’s view, but adds to it that the response aimed at 
should not be thought of as the actual formation of a new belief or other 
attitude in the audience, which would be a perlocutionary effect as op-
posed to an illocutionary one, and that the conventionality of language 
should be recognized as contributing to the understanding of the speak-
er’s intention on the part of the audience. He then defines the “illocu-
tionary effect” as the understanding of the meaning and force of an ut-
terance (1969, 47). Strawson’s reading of Austin’s notion of uptake later 
influenced the inferential approach to speech act theory of Kent Bach 
and R.M. Harnish (Bach and Harnish 1979), and continues to be influ-
ential.  
However, as I have already argued elsewhere (Sbisà 2009), Austin 
merely meant uptake to be a necessary condition for the successful 
achievement of the core effect of the illocutionary act, and just after the 
passage we have cited, he describes thus the second effect to which he 
holds the illocutionary act to be connected: 
 
The illocutionary act ‘takes effect’ in certain ways, as distinguished 
from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states 
of affairs in the ‘normal’ way, i.e. changes in the natural course of 
events [...] (Austin 1962, 117). 
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It is clear enough that he means this effect to be produced by all 
kinds of illocutionary acts (while the third effect he mentions, the invit-
ing of a response, is explicitly attributed to some kinds only). The prob-
lem with the illocutionary act’s ‘taking effect’ is that Austin’s characteri-
zation of it is vague and more negative than positive (saying what it is 
not rather than what it is), and exemplified by one case only, the formal 
and ceremonial act of naming a ship, from which it appears difficult to 
generalize.  
I think that the key to understanding what this mysterious effect con-
sists of, lies in considering what way of bringing about a state of affairs 
is to be contrasted with the “normal” way, that is, with the introduction 
of a change in the natural course of events. When we do something that 
interacts with a natural chain of causes and effects, our contribution and 
its effects come to belong to that chain, on a par with its other members: 
the efficacy of what we do is by natural causation. But in the case of the 
naming of a ship, the illocutionary effect is that the ship is given a name, 
so that certain subsequent acts (such as referring to the ship by another 
name) are out of order. Such an effect is not the output of a natural 
causal chain, nor of a change we introduce into such a chain. It occurs in 
a social frame and needs the audience to recognize that a naming proce-
dure was successfully performed. 
Austin may have been wrong to rely on this example alone, as if it 
were intuitive that we can generalize from it. But that Austin maintained 
that illocutionary acts have conventional effects, is already shown by his 
Condition A1 for the felicity of performative utterances (I recall that illo-
cutionary acts are the kind of actions that performative utterances per-
form): 
 
There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain 
words by certain persons in certain circumstances […] (Austin 1962, 
14, my italics). 
 
Thus, according to Austin, the core effect of an illocutionary act is 
“conventional;” that is, it is made possible by the social frame and 
brought about thanks to that kind of agreement between speaker and 
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audience about what is being done, which we may call uptake. The con-
ventionality that according to him is common to all illocutionary acts 
appears, then, to pertain primarily to effects. It should be noted that in 
the debate over the conventionality of illocutionary acts, attention has 
been paid mainly to the means by which the illocutionary act is per-
formed, while the nature of its effects has been neglected. This has led 
to recognizing as conventional acts only those illocutionary acts whose 
performance is explicitly and rigidly regulated by extralinguistic conven-
tions, while other illocutionary acts have been analysed, following Straw-
son’s suggestion, as intention-based. But if all illocutionary acts are con-
ventional for Austin, it must be is because they all have conventional ef-
fects. It is this sense of “being a conventional act” that has to be taken 
into account in order for us to grasp what Austin wanted to contend, or 
if we think there is something to be learnt from his conception of illocu-
tion.1 
Of course, what makes an effect conventional is still an open ques-
tion, which I will have something to say about in section 3. I will then 
move on (in section 4) to another matter not treated in sufficient detail 
by Austin: the problem of how to describe the conventional effects of il-
locutionary acts. 
 
 
3. When is an Effect “Conventional?” 
 
In his preparatory notes for How to Do Things with Words, Austin 
seems to be worrying about a possible contradiction between his doc-
trine of infelicities (the flaws in performative utterances that can make 
them “null and void”) and the received principle that nothing that was 
done can be made undone (the source of which is in Aristotle’s Nicho-
machean Ethics, 6,2) (cf. Sbisà 2007). He realizes that, when an utterance 
                                                 
1 Ruth Millikan, who defends the conventionality of illocutionary acts, does so on the basis 
of her conception of  conventionality as the repetition of patterns (Millikan 1998, 2005; see 
also Kissine 2013, 179-181). Although she focuses, as usual, upon the means by which the 
act is performed, the resulting view of illocution may be compatible with the Austinian 
view I favour (for a view based on Millikan’s, which seems to accept some of my points 
about the nature and dynamics of illocution, see Witek forthcoming). 
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designed to perform a certain illocutionary act turns out to be “null and 
void,” the act that it purported to perform does not hold and its alleged 
effects vanish. In a way, it seems that something which was done is in-
deed rendered undone. In fact, by-default agreement about some act and 
its effects gives provisional reality and efficacy to states of affairs (e.g. a 
couple’s being man and wife) that later on may be discovered not to hold 
(e.g. if it turns out that one of the spouses was already married). This 
provisional, by-default reality is puzzling, but seems to be typical of 
“conventional” effects. It corresponds approximately to the property of 
“defeasibility” pertaining, according to Hart (1949), to the ascriptions of 
rights and of responsibility: the liability to being annulled in particular 
circumstances. When an illocutionary act is “null and void,” not every-
thing in it is rendered undone: something was done in any case, and 
namely, the (flawed) performance of a procedure, and there are effects, 
though these might be different from those which that procedure is de-
signed to bring about (e.g. legal responsibility for bigamy). The discovery 
of infelicity makes the illocutionary act undone insofar as the bringing 
about of its conventional effect is concerned. In this sense, defeasibility 
can be seen as the hallmark of conventionality for actions and their ef-
fects.  
Obviously, if the effect brought about by a certain action is to be de-
feasible, it must be produced in a way which admits of annulment. This 
way cannot therefore consist in the causal modification of a material ob-
ject. Austin’s claim that illocutionary acts “take effect” in a way other 
than by interacting with a natural chain of causes and effects, together 
with his claim that they cannot be successfully performed (and therefore 
“take effect”) unless the audience’s uptake is secured (see section 2 
above), suggest that the way in which conventional effects can be 
brought about is precisely through by-default agreement among the rel-
evant participants as to their being brought about.  
The “uptake” to be secured by illocutionary acts is, therefore, an 
agreement of the participants (often implicit or even tacit) upon what 
has been done. When this agreement occurs (or can be presumed to oc-
cur by default, in the absence of any sign of disagreement), the illocu-
tionary act has been successfully performed and its conventional effect 
has been achieved (in the defeasible mode explained above). There are a 
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whole series of further problems as regards the securing of uptake: no-
tably, whether the actual bringing about of uptake is required or the 
mere effort of doing all that would reasonably lead to actual uptake, and 
whether it is the actual uptake or intended uptake that determines the 
illocutionary act performed. I cannot address these problems here, but I 
would suggest that there are many shades to them. For example, a pa-
tently wrong uptake will usually not be intersubjectively shared, and will 
therefore remain ineffective, while a plausible, not contested actual up-
take can reasonably be recognized as selecting the illocutionary act that 
is actually performed with an utterance displaying vague or ambiguous 
illocutionary force indicators.  
 
 
4. How to Describe Illocutionary Effects 
 
The claim that all illocutionary acts have conventional effects brings 
to the fore the problem of how to describe illocutionary effects. Quite 
obviously, and apart from any theoretical motivation and argument, this 
claim will be plausible only if, for any illocutionary act, one can describe 
an effect belonging to the conventional kind. In my discussions of this 
topic, I have proposed that illocutionary effects be described in terms of 
the distribution of deontic roles among the relevant participants in the 
situation (1984; 2006, 164-167). 
Interpersonal relations can be described in psychological terms, both 
cognitive and emotional, but they also have a deontic dimension, relative 
to what members are allowed or authorized or obliged or committed to 
do with respect to each other or possibly to third parties too. My proposal 
is that the illocutionary effect is a change in these aspects of the inter-
personal relation, which I call “deontic” inasmuch as they are connected 
with what one can or cannot or should or should not do (one might also 
call them “normative,” see Witek forthcoming).2 The illocutionary effect 
                                                 
2 John Searle too recognized and discussed the deontic dimension of social facts in his The 
Construction of Social Reality, from a perspective based on his notion of declaration and on 
“count as” rules (1995, 100-110). He concluded, however, that reference to deontic aspects 
was not particularly useful for his project.  
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is bi-lateral, since a change in the deontic role of one participant requires 
a corresponding change in the deontic role of some other one.  
The variety of illocutionary effects, so intended, can be described on 
an empirical and linguistic-phenomenological basis, without any pre-
conceived symmetry or constraint. The resulting typology is certainly 
weaker than a theoretical, principled one, but is perfectly suited to the 
aims of exemplifying conventional effects and of providing discourse 
analysis with empirically grounded heuristic tools. In such descriptions, 
we can use the lexicon of modal verbs (‘can,’ ‘should,’ ‘ought to’), other 
deontic verbs (e.g. ‘oblige,’ ‘commit,’ ‘entitle’) and nouns (e.g. ‘obliga-
tion,’ ‘commitment,’ ‘entitlement,’ ‘duty,’ ‘debt,’ ‘right,’ ‘license’). Not all 
states that can be described in such terms are the direct effect of an illo-
cutionary act; some may be the effect of non-verbal procedures approxi-
mately equivalent to an illocutionary act of a certain kind, others may be 
deontic-level consequences stemming from illocutionary effects. Here 
are examples of conventional effects of illocutionary acts, described in 
terms of the deontic states produced: 
• Marrying: bilateral rights + obligations 
• Naming : semantic rule + social norm (holding for all 
participants) 
• Promising: commitment (for speaker) vs right (for 
addressee) 
• Apologizing: exemption (for speaker) vs empowerment (for  
addressee) 
• Advising: bilateral non-strict obligations 
• Warning: obligation (for addressee) vs exemption (for  
speaker) 
The typical effects of Austin’s illocutionary classes can also be de-
scribed in these terms, approximately as follows:  
• Verdictives: license to act upon the judgement (for addressee) vs 
committment to truth or correctness (for speaker) 
• Commissives: right to expect a certain kind of behaviour from the 
speaker (for addressee) vs commitment to perform (for speaker) 
• Exercitives: obligation + (possibly) rights and powers (for ad-
dressee) vs commitment to support the addressee’s deontic 
state (for speaker) 
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• Behabitives: license to act upon the speaker’s expressed state (for 
the addressee) vs satisfaction of a task or debt (for the speaker) 
• Expositives: rights, obligations, etc. as above, affecting relations 
internal or relevant to discourse or conversation. 
Note that by focusing on conventional effects, we find ways of de-
scribing illocution other than the lexicon of performative verbs and thus 
provide the analyst with subtler tools for all those illocutionary acts, the 
force of which is the result of the combination of a number of indicators 
and is therefore complex or hybrid. It goes without saying that this way 
to describe illocution is not bound to assume one-to-one correspondence 
between sentence type and (intended) illocutionary act. 
Though not relevant to the topic of this paper, it should be stressed 
that the way of describing illocutionary effects presented here also pre-
serves the illocution-perlocution distinction, which is sometimes under 
threat from those approaches that treat all effects of speech acts (other 
than uptake) as perlocutionary ones and therefore external to the illocu-
tionary act. Distinguishing illocution from perlocution is not a matter of 
contrasting an act with its effects or consequences, but regards instead 
the kind of effects (material or psychological on the one hand, conven-
tional on the other) that are taken into consideration. Once this is clari-
fied, using the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction in the analysis of 
discourse and conversation may become easier and more fruitful. In-
deed, it should be possible to recognize the mediating role of illocution-
ary effects between speech and its psychological and behavioural effects.  
 
 
5. Philosophical Implications for the Value-Fact Distinction  
 
If, as I have tried to explain, the production of conventional effects is 
ultimately grounded in local tacit agreement, various consequences fol-
low as to the foundations of the human social world. Illocution appears 
as the locus of the “social contract.” The very agreement that something 
has been done by words, that after certain words are uttered the relation 
between the interlocutors changes in some way, is an instance of “social 
contract” which might (in principle) be conceived of as radically bottom-
up (while of course it is most often the renewal of a previously estab-
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lished social frame). Thus illocution (with language, which makes it pos-
sible) enables us to regulate our living together, building up shared envi-
ronments and (hopefully) reducing the need to resort to brute force and 
coercion in order to solve problems of coordination.  
The conception of illocution as presented here has also implications 
for the philosophy of action, since it comprises the non-trivial assump-
tion that performing an action is equivalent to making oneself responsi-
ble for its effect (a certain state of affairs in the world); for the concep-
tion of value and the value-fact distinction, which is in question whenev-
er the assertive or descriptive use of language is distinguished from or 
compared to the use of language in assessments, value judgments and 
other value-laden speech acts; and for social ontology, since it appears to 
introduce new kinds of entities into our social world. I will now touch 
briefly on some of the implications concerning the value-fact distinction 
and social ontology. 
How is moral judgment to be described in this Austinian frame-
work? In his conclusion to How to Do Things with Words, Austin sug-
gests that “good” is to be considered as at least in part an illocutionary 
force indicator (1962, 163-164). This reminds us of the theories of ethical 
language put forward by C.L. Stevenson or R.M. Hare, in which “good” 
is said to express approval or prescribe conduct. But is illocutionary force 
the same as Hare’s “neustic,” or is Austin’s view of moral language a 
sophisticated variety of emotivism? There are hints at different ideas in 
Austin’s conclusive chapter. 
He says that his classification of illocutionary acts, albeit tentative, is 
enough to “play old Harry” with the “fetish” of the value-fact dichotomy 
(1962, 151). But how could the mere shift of the problem of the analysis 
of “good” from locutionary meaning to illocutionary force have this ef-
fect? If facts are still represented in the “locutionary content,” while val-
ues are the effect of choices and preferences and therefore belong with 
illocutionary force, is the fact-value dichotomy questioned at all? 
In principle, the fact-value dichotomy can be questioned in two ways: 
by assimilating values to facts and facts to values. One of these ways is 
naive realism about values. Those who embrace it are admirable, be-
cause they display unshakable faith in the reality of the Good. But their 
position is liable to be borrowed and exploited by fundamentalism, 
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since, with naive realism about values, there comes the assumption that 
one can know them with at least the same degree of certainty with which 
we know facts. The other way stresses the human and actional compo-
nent in factual judgment. We are keen to recognize that value judg-
ments are actions: they involve choice. They are not so arbitrary or sub-
jective as emotional reactions, since they involve the application of crite-
ria, but still there is choice in them, at two levels at least: as to the crite-
ria to be adopted, and as to the appreciation of the relevant details of the 
situation which is subject to evaluation. But are factual judgments so dif-
ferent? Don’t we use criteria in them too (for example, when the judg-
ment results from an inference)? Moreover, factual assertions, too, de-
pend as to their content on our appreciation of the relevant details of the 
event or situation which is reported or described.  
Austin’s way of questioning the fact-value dichotomy is the latter. It 
is not so much expressed by his attempt to present matters of value as 
matters of force (as opposed to meaning), as by the way in which he 
speaks of value in his classification of illocutionary acts. There, he 
groups all judgments together in the class of verdictives, which are “the 
delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as 
to value or fact” (153), need not be final (152), and are concerned with 
something “which is for different reasons hard to be certain about” 
(152). The last feature is perhaps the most interesting one. Why should 
acts of judgment address only matters which are for some reason hard 
to be certain about? Insofar as our knowledge of events and situations in 
the world is based on our judgments (that is, on verdictive illocutionary 
acts), Austin depicts it as something not effortless, but involving actual 
search for evidence, adoption of criteria, or reasoning, which are kinds 
of active behaviour on the part of the speaker, with some degree of 
choice as to what is to count as evidence, which criterion is correct, or 
what reasons are good ones. Different agents might reach different find-
ings: we might then compare those findings and prefer the soundest 
and best grounded one, or, at least, the one which appears as such to us. 
But the same picture, with slight re-contextualization and small adjust-
ments, may be taken to hold for value judgments. 
It is not clear how Austin intended to deal with those statements of 
fact that are not about something difficult, unclear and the like. What he 
The Austinian Conception of Illocution 
 
145 
clearly wants to stress, though, is that whenever we issue a judgment we 
are engaging in a complex activity. Nonverbal perception may be “direct” 
and be both phenomenologically understood and verbally reported as the 
perception of the real object. But judgment, albeit a source of 
knowledge, is not a passive reflection of reality. For Austin, our 
knowledge is no mirror of anything: unlike mirrors, it involves an active 
stance. It is brought about by action, precisely by verdictive illocutionary 
acts. 
If verdictives, so characterized, may also be concerned with values, 
should we conclude that value judgments too produce knowledge? Can 
we say there is knowledge of values, not in the trivial sense in which one 
can describe some people’s axiology, but intending to admit value judg-
ments as production of knowledge? Austin does not tackle these issues. 
But in the Austinian perspective we are elaborating, I think we can go so 
far as to say that there should be room for knowledge of values, insofar 
as not only verdictives about facts, but also verdictives about value can be 
correct or incorrect. What it is for a value judgment to be correct, howev-
er, need not be defined in the same way as what is for a statement of fact 
to be true.  
 
 
6. Philosophical Implications for Social Ontology 
 
Be it as it may with values, Austin’s view of illocution appears to sup-
port realism as to deontic states, since those deontic states that illocu-
tionary acts are designed to bring about must be real ones if the act is to 
be an action at all. Indeed, without an effect, there would be no action. 
This view, once again, highlights action, and namely, the active produc-
tion of deontic states by social agents. As we have seen (in sections 2 and 
3), the key to such production is intersubjective agreement. While a 
stone may be there even if nobody realizes it is there, a state of right or 
obligation cannot exist unless there is some kind of agreement about its 
being the case. On certain occasions, this agreement may be cognitive 
and conscious, but it need not always be. It is enough for it to be implic-
it, for example, in the coordination of the lines of conduct of the relevant 
agents. For example, if a command is complied with without protest or 
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hesitation, it is safe to assume that the state of obligation stemming 
from it has been agreed upon (indeed, it has been acted upon). If, in 
complying with a command, an agent protests against being obliged to 
perform that action, this too reveals the basic acceptance of the speaker’s 
authority and the binding force of her illocutionary act. Lack of worry 
about one’s non-compliance may indicate a failure to take the received 
command seriously or perhaps the refusal to take it as a command at all. 
Nonverbal, by-default agreement suffices for the deontic state to be 
brought about and become a component of the situational context of the 
current interaction, from which it might even be inherited by other con-
texts, thus becoming a largely trans-contextual feature of the interper-
sonal relation among the agents involved. 
It should be noted that the production of deontic states follows both a 
forward-looking and a backward-looking direction. Looking forward, the 
output of an illocutionary act is a deontic state, which comes into exist-
ence thanks to the illocutionary act (as part of its performance). Looking 
backward, the accomplished illocutionary act and its outcome presup-
pose the satisfaction of certain conditions about the agent’s status before 
the performance. If the agent did not have the presupposed status, but 
the illocutionary act is accepted as such, her status is somehow reas-
sessed and redefined.  
This is one of the phenomena that Lewis (1979) dubbed “accommo-
dation” and has perhaps not been studied in sufficient depth with re-
spect to illocutionary acts, where it displays paradoxical features. The 
rise of a leadership (which did not exist at all before the first command 
of the new leader was recognized as such and obeyed) may be an exam-
ple of “accommodation;” it is certainly an example of the influence of 
presuppositions on social relations. The feeling is that it is from the 
recognition of that command on, and because of the presuppositions of 
commanding, that the agent starts enjoying authority over her address-
ee. The status of the agent is changed from that moment on, thanks to 
the presuppositions or felicity conditions of her act, which should have 
been true before that act. 
Many social realities can be described as sets of deontic states of the 
agents involved: property, marriage, a contract of employment, can all be 
almost completely specified by listing the rights, obligations, and other 
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deontic states that are assigned to their participants. Even complex insti-
tutions can be described in terms of what it is that those who participate 
in them can do or have to do, or can expect others to do, or must not do, 
and the like. Roles (in a family, in a peer group, or professional ones) 
often involve a weaker deontic state, that is, the kind of duty that corre-
sponds to other agents’ legitimate expectations. 
Deontic states such as having a right or an obligation are represented 
in language as the possession on the part of an agent of “the right to...” 
or “the obligation to...:” we speak of rights, obligations, duties, licenses, 
etc., as of objects of a particular kind, which we may call “deontic ob-
jects.” Here, I make no attempt to discuss whether this way of speaking 
is literal enough to amount to a shared assumption that rights, obliga-
tions, duties, licenses and the like exist as a peculiar category of objects. 
Laws, for example, are most certainly thought of as something that really 
exists: perhaps, as existing normative, and therefore deontic, objects. So, 
one may want to consider deontic states as consisting of the attribution 
of a deontic object to an agent. It is to be noted that the ability to bring 
about deontic states (therefore creating deontic objects, if you like) is the 
basis of our capacity for creating shared environments through language 
and is therefore central to culture and civilisation.  
 
 
7. A Puzzle and its Proposed Solution 
 
I conclude by indicating a limitation from which this fascinating per-
spective suffers. Are deontic states (and objects) steady and permanent 
enough, as one would expect of the building blocks of our social and cul-
tural reality, or are they constantly liable to cancellation because there 
might be infelicities in the illocutionary procedures producing them or 
the speaker might fail to secure uptake? Certainly, these states and ob-
jects appear in the perspective illustrated as being dependent upon hu-
man interaction (as well as framing it). It would seem that they cannot 
come into being, or survive, without the support of intersubjective 
agreement. Thus, Austin’s notion of illocution might be deemed inade-
quate for providing social ontology with secure foundations, or at the 
very least, it is not enough if what we are searching for are agent-
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independent objects. It is to be noted that deontic objects may even be 
observer-independent, but are not, and cannot be, agent-independent.  
Let us recall, though, what we have said above about the Austinian 
perspective on value judgments. Verdictives produce legitimate claims to 
knowledge (which, by default, can be taken as knowledge) if they are 
grounded in the agent-speaker’s recognized competence, but a perfectly 
felicitous verdictive may still be wrong. If it is a judgment about facts, it 
will be either true or false. And as to value judgments, Austin seems to 
admit of some objective correctness/incorrectness for them too.  
Now consider an issue of human rights. Imagine a social group in 
which a child is believed and dealt with as not endowed with any right. 
The way she is spoken to and about never comprises any right-granting 
illocution: she is never addressed with permissions, concessions, prom-
ises, apologies or wishes; moreover, no matter what she says (imagine 
she speaks, nevertheless), she is never taken as performing verdictives, 
exercitives, or commissives. Has she, then, no right? If by-default inter-
subjective agreement around her is that she is to be dealt with that way, 
can this be accepted as a reason to say that so-called human rights do not 
hold in her case? Of course not. Indeed, the notion of human rights is 
designed to apply precisely to such cases and to help protect people in 
such conditions. It can apply, I surmise, because judgments about jus-
tice are verdictives and therefore liable to be correct or incorrect. A 
judgment to the effect that the way those people deal with that child con-
forms to justice, would be clearly incorrect (whatever they may believe 
about their own behaviour and their reasons). We may conclude that in 
fact, the child does have human rights, or perhaps, more precisely, that 
human rights should be attributed to her. The former way of putting it 
assumes that her rights are already there, albeit unrecognized. The latter 
way amounts to claiming that she has a right to human rights. I would 
prefer the latter way of putting it, as it matches better not only our intui-
tions about justice, but also the perspective on rights as deontic objects 
outlined above. It is we, in fact, who both recognize the child’s right to 
human rights and issue a verdictive about her deontic state that is both 
felicitous and (hopefully) correct.  
The moral is that illocutionary uptake can be accepted and theorized 
as the basic source of deontic states and objects, without falling into a 
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counterintuitive (if not dangerous) sort of relativism, providing that the 
correctness/incorrectness of verdictives is not reduced to a mere matter 
of intersubjective agreement. This is one reason for having not just one 
level of assessment of speech acts, but two: in Austin’s terms, this 
means a felicity/infelicity assessment and an assessment aiming at de-
tecting (objective) correctness/incorrectness. Defeasibility is limited to 
cases of infelicity, while error and injustice are the targets of our contin-
uous efforts to redress and improve our relations with the world we live 
in as well as with each other.  
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The Relevance of Anthropology and the Evolutionary 
Sciences for Political Philosophy 
 
Christian Illies 
 
 
1. Political Philosophy for a Special Animal 
 
All discourse on, and analysis of, human society has as its prereq-
uisite some concept, simple or complex, of what it is to be a human 
being. Sociology, political theory and political philosophy require an-
thropology. Our understanding of ourselves relates directly to the way 
we wish to live – and to the set-up of our social world. According to 
Plato, for example, the human being is capable of ultimate insight, of 
grasping truth. This human capability can, however, be easily con-
strained by any number of human motives which cloud the perception 
of truth. This is the reason why Plato places education so centrally in 
the constitution of his polis. He recommends, among other things, that 
the citizens of the polis should grow up without knowing their own 
families (their parents and siblings). According to Plato, strong famili-
al bonds lead people to think of their own particular interests as more 
important than the public good. Two thousand years later, Thomas 
Hobbes can characterize human beings by their fear of death. In 
Hobbes’ analysis, a powerful state, governed by a powerful leader, is 
the only thing which will grant the sense of security necessary for the 
cohesion of a society of human beings. Therefore it is, according to 
Hobbes, in everyone’s self-interest to subordinate one’s own needs to 
the needs of the state. Rousseau, by contrast, holds the opposite opin-
ion. He sees a strong relationship between misanthropy and an almost 
unlimited confidence in human nature: “Men are evil – melancholy 
and continuous experience removes the need for proof. However, man 
is naturally good.”1 For Rousseau social constraints are the primary 
source of the corruption of human nature. These constraints, he 
                                                 
1 Rousseau 1755. 
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claims, are the cause of human hatreds and “all imaginable bad 
things.”2 
Despite differences of detail, all the above thinkers have one thing in 
common: they assume that taking the natural state of the human being 
as fundamental to socio-political order will result in the greatest good. 
Given this, Political Philosophy has the task of understanding how hu-
man beings naturally behave. Furthermore, politics must seek ways of 
controlling and moderating the unsocial aspects of human nature, and 
of encouraging and promoting the social. 
There was a fundamental change in the methodology of Political Phi-
losophy at the end of the twentieth century. From then until now two 
opposed interpretations of the interrelation between politics and anthro-
pology have co-existed:  
 
1) The social sciences have freed themselves almost completely from 
the idea that there is a basic nature common to all human beings. Af-
ter the “cultural turn” within these disciplines, they took it for grant-
ed that immediate access to facts is methodologically impossible, in-
cluding facts about the purported nature of human beings. Scientific 
theories are understood as a kind of “symbolic orders which have 
been produced by social processes and lead to ultimately contingent 
interpretations.”3 These systems of orders do not explain human na-
ture. Social scientists use them instead to construct a picture of the 
human being as a construction from nothing. One well-known ex-
ample of such use is that of Judith Butler. According to her, both our 
gender and our sexual identity are – like any other binary system re-
lating to the dichotomy between male and female – merely a cultural 
construct without any biological foundation.4 One might speak here 
of “culturalism.”5 Culturalism is an idea common to such diverse 
approaches as gender studies, structuralism, Foucaultian discourse 
analysis, deconstructivism, and constructivism. It presupposes that 
there is no immediate access to knowledge of human nature, and 
                                                 
2 Ibid.  
3 Cf. Reckwitz 2006, 24.  
4 Butler 1993. 
5 See the pointedly illustration in Fischer 2005. 
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that all so called “insights” regarding human nature are merely cul-
tural products. According to these approaches, any claim to a defini-
tive analysis of human nature is naive and must therefore be refuted. 
This has important consequences for the interpretation of biology as 
a natural science: According to culturalism, biology creates its own 
subject — biology only remains a “discourse of power which creates 
an illusion of objectivity, but which inheres its own contingency.” 
 
2) On the other hand, one might choose to understand the twentieth 
century as a triumphal procession of evolutionary sciences. These 
disciplines unquestionably shed light on the biological species homo 
sapiens. After Darwin had cleared the way for evolution-oriented be-
havioural research (on the model of anatomical and morphological 
research) it was common to use evolutionary models to account for 
the ways we behave, feel, and even think. Classical ethology, and later 
socio-biology and, even more recently, evolutionary psychology to-
gether came to new insights and made the bold claim that nature 
puts a short leash on the human being, that is, that the scope of pos-
sible behaviours is narrowed severely through evolutionary pathways. 
 
As a consequence of these two different approaches, political theory 
and evolutionary sciences became alienated from one another. One the 
one hand, every reference to “human nature” is vehemently rejected by 
political theorists. As Clifford Geertz puts it: “There is no human nature 
apart from culture.”6 This slogan had also a political dimension: Refer-
ence to nature was seen as a move by reactionary conservatives to justify 
inequality and to undermine emancipatory freedoms.7 On the other 
                                                 
6 Geertz 1973, 35.  
7 Obviously, political dimensions are more complex. European conservatives often used 
recent results of behavioural biology to show invariable human properties and a constant 
social behaviour. But in the United States, the majority of conservatives refused Darwin-
ism since it threatened their religious beliefs. “Many conservatives, it seems, find the Dar-
winian account of human nature at best useless and at worst pernicious” (cf. Holloway 
2006, 7). However, in recent years, there were many conservative theorists in the U.S. re-
ferring to Darwin, whereas European socialists nowadays do not shy away from evolution-
ary arguments neither. 
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hand, evolutionary scientists point to a growing loss of reality within the 
(culturalistic) social sciences. For natural scientists it is problematic that 
socially relevant disciplines still do not acknowledge the results of empir-
ical research. Some scientists even claim that social sciences should be 
re-constituted on evolutionary grounds. As Robert Trivers suggests, dis-
ciplines such as “political sciences, law, economics, psychology, and an-
thropology” should all become “branches of sociobiology.”8 
In the following, I will defend neither of the two extreme positions 
but will look for possibilities of updating the traditional synthetic view 
that is based upon an interrelation of natural and political sciences. To 
do so, I will focus on two questions: 
 
- What do evolutionary sciences tell us about human beings and about 
the development of culture? 
- What practical consequences can we draw from this for political phi-
losophy? (How can, for example, we make use of the knowledge of 
biological anthropology and evolutionary theory when conceiving 
prudent political structures and institutions?) 
 
The first question will be discussed in the following section (Section 
2) in which a thumb-nail sketch of the human being as interpreted by 
biology will be presented. After that, the consequences of this picture for 
political philosophy will be investigated (Section 3). 
 
 
2. Human Nature and Culture Seen from an Evolutionary Perspective 
 
2.1 The Human Being as a Creature of Possibilities 
 
What can we learn about the nature of human beings from biology 
and evolutionary theory?9 “Seeing a dog, a horse and a man yawn, 
makes me feel how much all animals are built on one structure,”10 wrote 
                                                 
8 Quoted from the German newspaper Die Zeit (Dossier Soziobiologie), July 29, 1978, 33.  
9 For a more detailed answer to this question, see Illies 2006, 120-155. 
10 Darwin 1838. 
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Darwin into his diary in 1838. In 1859, in his On the Origin of Species, he 
made only a few vague comments about human beings. But the evolu-
tionary perspective obviously gives a new foundation for (biological) an-
thropology, and thus it is no surprise that a few years after the publica-
tion of the Origin, other authors came up with evolutionary histories of 
the human animal: Thomas Henry Huxley, Ludwig Büchner, and Ernst 
Haeckel being but three examples.11 Darwin wrote his own anthropology 
later: The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex was published in 
1871, and The Expressions of Emotion in Man and Animal in 1872. His 
method was to compare observations of human and animal behaviour.12 
He found, for example, similarities in the expression of fear and sub-
mission. In both works Darwin raises topics which are still points of de-
bate today. All of them share the premise that there exist biologically se-
lected dispositions within human behaviour: for emotions and even for 
cognitive acts.  
Evolutionary biology has, in the last century, been honed by correct-
ing two points within Darwin’s theory. Firstly, biologists discovered the 
mechanism of heredity (about which Darwin had no developed theory). 
Secondly, not the species but the gene is now seen as the fundamental 
unit of selection. A property is selected because it gives a certain indi-
vidual (plant or animal) advantages over its fellows of the same species. 
This is the only way the property can be distributed within a certain 
population. As a consequence, selection primarily takes place between 
genes which encode certain properties. Selection on the level of a group 
or species is second-order.13  
This does not change the validity of Darwin’s basic assumptions, 
which are still accepted by the majority of evolutionary biologists. Hu-
man beings naturally have dispositions: emotions and ways of behaving 
and thinking. They were useful at a certain stage in our evolutionary his-
tory – for example in the age of hunter-gatherers – and therefore they 
have been positively selected (first for an individual and later for the 
whole species). We assume that these dispositions can be found in all 
                                                 
11 Huxley 1873; Büchner 1869; Haeckel 1875. 
12For Darwin’s methodology, see Hösle and Illies 1999, 85 ff. 
13 For the possibility of group selection, Wilson 1995, Sober 2000. Vehement defenders of 
group selection of the human are Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson (1988). 
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human beings: they are part of the “genetic core” of the species. Even if 
they are always integrated into culture, their generality does not allow for 
an explanation in purely cultural terms (at least, according to evolution-
ary biologists). This does not mean that these dispositions are found 
equally pronounced in every single human being or that they always 
cause identical behaviour. Behaviour varies from case to case and de-
pends also on the socio-cultural environment in which the life of an in-
dividual develops. 
But which of these results are important for political theory? We can 
distinguish four areas, even if only roughly. We shall call the first area 
elementary life requirements. These requirements human beings and most 
animals have in common: we (as all animals) must eat and drink, be ac-
tive and sleep, and reproduce. In addition, there are three groups of 
phenomena which, we would argue, have a genetic foundation: disposi-
tions towards sociability (cooperation, strategic alliances, altruism etc.), 
dispositions towards unsociability (aggression, defence against strangers, 
social ambition etc.) and dispositional beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. Jona-
than Haidt calls these emotions “moral emotions” since they either sup-
port social behaviour (including altruistic behaviour) or punish anti-
social behaviour.14 David Buss gives a more precise account which cate-
gorizes these feelings in to three groups, namely “respect for authority,” 
“a thirst for justice,” and “the evolution of care.”15 The last area is espe-
cially interesting since it not only touches on the socio-political, but also 
includes phenomena that seem to be over and above pure emotions. 
These include certain inborn patterns of thought, mainly relating to so-
cial crises which the individual experiences when dealing with other in-
dividuals, which might well be part of our genetic heritage. Leda Cos-
mides and John Tooby claim that we naturally think in categories of “so-
cial contract.”16 
It is likely that there are also genetic dispositions to normative struc-
tures – behavioural rules, norms, and values. Edward O. Wilson argues, 
along these same lines: “Precepts chosen by intuition based on emotion 
                                                 
14 Haidt 2001 and 2003. 
15 Buss 2004, 388. 
16 Cosmides and Tooby 1992; see also Cosmides 1989. 
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are primarily biological in origin and are likely to do no more than rein-
force the primitive social arrangements. Such a morality is unconscious-
ly shaped to give new rationalizations for the consecration of the group, 
the proselytizing role of altruism, and the defence of territory.”17 
A whole range of social behaviour seems to be determined (or at least 
influenced) by natural dispositions. This, at the least, is what biological 
anthropology can tell us about human nature. This does not contradict 
the fact that the human being needs a cultural community for his full 
development. The human being is not able to flourish completely by vir-
tue of these innate dispositions alone: without a cultural community, his 
dispositions cannot be manifested. Furthermore, specific cultural 
frameworks play decisive roles when it comes to the question of how 
these dispositions are to be developed. What, for example, does social 
standing mean? How does one attain to it in, for example, wrestling, 
singing, or a successful professional career? What status symbols mark 
it? These questions cannot be answered with reference purely to disposi-
tion alone: specific social settings determine the expression of the dispo-
sition. “The dispositions influence the development of human behaviour 
rather by suggestions than by prescriptions” – as Hubert Markl puts it.18 
From a biological point of view, the human being is primarily a creature 
of possibilities placed within a range of behaviour where the range is bio-
logically bounded but the behaviours are culturally affected. 
 
 
2.2 Problems in Biological Anthropology 
 
There is much to support Darwin’s idea that the evolutionary history 
of Homo sapiens also includes behavioural dispositions. The literature of 
the last few decades adduces many examples of human beings display-
ing strong regularities and culturally independent patterns of behaving, 
feeling, or thinking; and there are various explanations of their selective 
advantages. But what does this tell us? How can this rule out the possi-
bility that a regularity – even if it occurs in all human beings – is solely a 
                                                 
17 Wilson 1978, 167.  
18 Markl 1986, 86. 
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cultural regularity? Statistical methods can make genetic-disposition 
claims plausible, but can never prove them.19 One would need as a con-
trol group a number of individuals who grew up without any cultural 
framework; but such persons do not exist, and such a comparison is 
therefore impossible. Human development decisively relies on interac-
tions with other human beings. Furthermore, most dispositions in 
which political philosophy is interested relate to social action, i.e. behav-
iours enacted within a cultural framework (even if this framework may 
be minimal). It is a methodological precondition that our actions are in-
terwoven within a socio-cultural framework.20 
The analogy adduced by Darwin does not help here. Similar behaviour 
in animals and human beings can never be enough to give a positive proof 
of the existence of any disposition. For such a proof, one would need to 
show how certain genes encode proteins which build up a certain brain 
structure and thereby cause certain behaviours. At present no one can say 
when or whether biology will be able to demonstrate such details. 
Perhaps such a positive proof will never be forthcoming. Many critics 
assume that human culture developed in so a short time that genetic se-
lection of relevant dispositions was impossible.21 Also most dispositions 
(if they exist at all) are inherited poly-genetically, and this would make 
the whole concept of rival genes inapplicable. There is also the objection 
that many explanations for selective advantages are mere speculations 
and do not help in the understanding of the phenomena.22 
There is much biology would have to do in order to come up with a 
positive proof of genetic dispositions. One of the first steps biology 
                                                 
19 For an overview of objections against biological anthropology, see Kleeberg and Walter 2001. 
20 However, one might try to observe the interaction between “natural” humans (i.e. humans 
growing up without any cultural frame), since such humans could not learn anything from 
anyone. But even this would not be enough for a proof in the strict sense: Firstly, most behav-
ioural patterns which are genetically disposed require a minimal ability of communication, 
and language can only be acquired within a cultural frame. Secondly, even the observation of 
“natural” humans does not methodically exclude the possibility that they might learn a cer-
tain behaviour, if only during process in which they are observed. 
21 For example Kleeberg and Walter 2001, 51 f. But for the opposite opinion, see Lorenz 1974. 
22 Many critics say that sociobiology often re-describes already-known social phenomena 
with evolutionary terminology, but do not add anything to our understanding. Even Mi-
chael Ruse claims this rather snappishly in Philosophy of Biology Today, 1988, 66 ff. 
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would have to take is to articulate what actually might be grounded ge-
netically. What does it mean to have a “disposition?” What exactly are we 
claiming if we, for example, assume that human beings are nepotistic or 
reciprocal altruists by nature? Obviously this should mean that humans 
behave in certain situations in a particular way (which needs to be 
demonstrated by statistically significant evidence) and that the cause of 
this particular behaviour lies (at least partially) in biological structures. 
But actions are not properties like hair colour or the ability to roll the 
tongue. Actions are always the result of complex factors and procedures. 
Emotions may well have an important role in triggering action. Mark 
Ridley describes emotions as mediators between an inner calculator and 
outer behaviour.23 A disposition for altruism would then mean that we 
naturally have certain emotions, such as sympathy, which lead us into 
particular sets of relationships (for example, when a relative is in need) 
which lead to altruistic actions. But this cannot be enough; when human 
beings act, the behaviour is not determined; for then it would not be an 
act. A person who feels vertigo when looking down from a great height, 
will shy away from a precipice in fear. This is not an act. When we act, 
we are not simply determined by an emotion – we decide to behave in a 
certain way (at least, that is what most of us believe). That is the reason 
why early ethologists stressed that human behaviour is not entirely con-
trolled by instincts (as they believed the behaviour of other animals was), 
but rather that human beings can and must always make decisions. 
Even if emotions mediate between the inner calculator and behaviour, 
one would need to clarify the complex role of reflection (or of the human 
will). One might agree with Steven Pinker when he claims that the ex-
pressions ‘kin-directed’ and ‘reciprocal altruism’ (and we might add: the 
dispositions towards them) are a “behaviourist short-hand for a set of 
thoughts and emotions”.24 But we also need to clarify what is meant by 
those “thoughts.” 
This whole interrelation is barely understood — and as long as there 
are no plausible theories purporting to explain it, all theories of natural 
behavioural dispositions remain incomplete. This general problem is 
                                                 
23 Ridley 1996, 193. 
24 Pinker 1999, 403, my emphasis. 
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brought to the fore by various attempts to supply a conceptual analysis of 
“dispositions” which would make the explanandum more precise. What 
is it that could be genetically determined? Konrad Lorenz speaks about 
“inherited coordinates” (Erbkoordinaten) or “instincts.” Recent ethol-
ogists speak instead of “innate behaviour.” Edward O. Wilson postulates 
natural “epigenetic rules,”25 and other evolutionary biologists rather 
vaguely claim that there are “internal desires, emotions and lustful-
ness.”26 
Should these considerable problems lead us to the conclusion that 
political theory should take the possibility of genetic behaviour disposi-
tions with a pinch of salt? No. The hypothesis that such dispositions ex-
ist is still a plausible explanation for the fact that certain behaviour and 
phenomena are culturally invariant. This holds even though there is no 
positive proof of such genetic disposition and all such dispositional the-
ory needs to be spelled out more precisely. The hypothesis is plausible 
for two reasons. Firstly, it is consistent with many other insights in evo-
lutionary biology and in other related disciplines (such as neurobiology). 
Secondly, we do not have any other plausible explanation. If – as many 
contemporary political theorists argue – statistically significantly behav-
ioural patterns were merely cultural phenomena, it is rather puzzling as to 
why they occur within all or very many cultures.27 It is therefore, I be-
lieve, fruitful to pursue my initial question concerning the ramifications 
of the evolutionary sciences on the notion of human nature, even if the 
results of these sciences must still be regarded as speculations. 
 
 
2.3 Anthropological Foundations of Socio-Cultural Phenomena 
 
Thus far my analysis has been limited to the individual human being 
and the biological determination of her actions. But many see this limi-
tation as a conceptual barrier when asking why a biologically-determined 
human being gives her actions certain social forms and creates (or plays 
                                                 
25 See Lumsden and Wilson 1980. 
26 Hubert Markl, quoted by Voland 1999. 
27 One exception may be the — even less plausible — thesis that the human is completely 
free and there are no explanations for frequent behavioural patterns at all. 
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her part in creating) institutions controlling her own behaviour. (‘Insti-
tution,’ in this context, means a system of rules creating a certain social 
ordering. Institutions can be either formal or informal.) Unlike behav-
ioural biologists, who analyse the genetically-determined realm of possi-
bilities, I wish to investigate why human beings order their realm of 
possibilities in such a way as to create their socio-cultural worlds. 
Arnold Gehlen was one of the first philosophers to arrive at such an 
analysis. His starting point is the human being as a biological creature, 
but he arrives at a social philosophy and a theory of institutions. He does 
not, however, begin with the rich biological realm of possibilities, but 
rather focuses on the shortcomings and limits of human nature. He de-
scribes the human being as an “undetermined animal” (referring to a 
formulation by Nietzsche). This “undetermined animal” has many 
shortcomings, since there are no controlling instincts or stable behav-
ioural patterns in its nature. Even though his analysis is in many ways 
outdated (as demonstrated above) it is still worth taking a look on Geh-
len’s explanation of complex social structures. According to Gehlen, so-
cial institutions compensate for the shortcomings of natural instincts. 
They unburden the human being by giving him stability and control of 
his actions. Gehlen distinguishes three ways in which the socio-cultural 
world (first and foremost the institutions) is influenced and affected by 
natural human dispositions: 
(i) The lack of other behavioural controls makes it necessary for human 
beings to create unburdening institutions. 
(ii) Even if dispositions do not entirely control the human being, these 
instincts still guide her actions in general directions (for example, to-
wards ingestion). Institutions are to be understood as “forms of over-
coming life-important tasks or circumstances,” since, for example, “re-
production or defence or ingestion require a regulated and continuous 
cooperation.”28 
(iii) Gehlen also claims that institutions arise during a process of devel-
opment. They are not the result of any conscious plan but the result of 
the unplanned action of many individuals. “The living together of hu-
mans is stabilised in forms of orderings and rules, which come into ex-
                                                 
28 Gehlen 1961, 71. 
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istence just by themselves. One has to look for their steering mechanism 
within the area of instincts, but never in the rational calculation of 
ends.”29 
About the process of democratisation, Gehlen claims that this has its 
own dynamic and does not follow any sociological rationale: “The demo-
cratic form of government for example is adopted by many peoples like 
the European way of clothing.”30  
We might present two general objections to Gehlen’s thesis. Firstly, 
his theory of institutions is too neutral as to question of their validity and 
justification. He explains institutions more or less purely functionally in 
terms of a stabilising power. But whether an institution, first and fore-
most the important formal institutions within law and politics, are phil-
osophically legitimated is not an interesting question for Gehlen. Sec-
ondly, Gehlen does not reflect whether and how the individual institu-
tions are involved in a selective competition with one another. He does 
not say whether a non-biological evolution within the socio-cultural 
frame is possible or not. Gehlen does not think in a sufficiently evolu-
tionary way. He considers the functionality of institutions but seems not 
to care about their variation or selection. This is a rather “thin” under-
standing of Darwinism. It is, of course, a very evolutionary way of think-
ing to assume that a phenomenon has an advantageous property. For, 
according to evolutionary theory, properties are functional adaptations 
(at least in general; there are some exceptions, such as the “genetic drift”). 
This is, however, only a conclusion drawn from Darwinism and not a 
central tenet of Darwinism itself. Thirdly, Gehlen’s starting point con-
flicts with the insights of modern evolutionary biology. It is hard to see 
how his assumption, that human beings are deficient (“Mängelwesen”), 
holds when we obviously have highly specialised behavioural disposi-
tions.31 Furthermore, the assumption of deficiency contradicts the logic 
of evolutionary thought. For the human being was – at a certain point in 
time – a successfully selected primate. She must, then, have been well 
                                                 
29 Gehlen 1969, 95. 
30 Gehlen 1964, 91. 
31 Gehlen argues against this that the possibilities human beings have is so-to-say the “flip-
side” of an incomplete being and he is contrasting human imagination with rationality. 
See Gehlen 1940. 
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adapted. (The compensation of physical shortcomings via cultural 
achievement is a phenomenon which occurs much later in history and 
cannot be an explanation for the positive selection of Homo sapiens over 
other hominidae). 
I wish now to focus on some other attempts of relating the biological 
to the socio-cultural. In his studies of ancient religions Walter Burkert 
(1996) raises the question of the biological roots of our symbolic culture 
(religion is a good example of such culture). Like Gehlen, Burkert sees 
religion as a cultural phenomenon which guides human action and 
gives its adherents orientation. It is therefore a functional institution. 
Burkert does not see religion as a compensation for our natural short-
comings, but understands it as a consequence of biological skills. Thus 
he conforms to the widely accepted opinion that human beings have 
many dispositions which allow for a wide range of realisation. 
But what is meant by a disposition towards religion? Burkert claims 
that it is an extension of the cultural framework created by the ability to 
communicate in a language. “Parallel to language, religion too, as an ef-
fective means of most serious communication, can be hypothesized to 
have arisen at a certain stage in prehistory as a competitive act, a way of 
gaining an advantage over those who did not take part in it.”32 That lan-
guage has a biological foundation is not only obvious because of its uni-
versality, it can also be shown by reference to the very special physiologi-
cal apparatus needed for vocalization. According to Burkert, one must 
assume a combined evolution of the biological conditions for language 
and language itself. One cannot separate nature from culture here, since 
language is a so-called hybrid phenomenon in which nature and culture 
are intertwined. Language allowed early human beings not only to 
communicate, but also to create a common linguistic world of meaning 
which gave them guidance and orientation. 
But in what way is religion an adaptation? Although Burkert (1996) 
admits that a detailed explanation of its development and selective ad-
vantages remains part of the inaccessible pre-history of humankind, one 
can make educated guesses as to how religion contributed to evolution-
ary fitness. 
                                                 
32 Burkert 1996, 19. 
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One factor is the orientation religions (and other institutions) provide. 
In a complex environment religions offered categories for interpretation 
which helped to order and structure the natural world. Burkert refers 
here to Niklas Luhmann’s thesis that religion allows for a “reduction of 
complexity,” and adds that religion gives “orientation within a meaning-
ful cosmos for those who feel helpless vis-à-vis infinite complexity.”33 
Religion helps to orientate the individual both in a theoretical and a 
practical way. It offers sense and gives practical solutions to difficult 
problems. Its offers are universal since religion broaches all topics af-
fecting human life: elementary needs (such as hunger and thirst), ele-
mentary actions (such as giving and receiving), special experiences (such 
as death), and emotions (such as fear and happiness). Religion thus 
gives the human being a certain distance from these phenomena. Reli-
gious reference to trans-empirical principles makes it easier to deal with 
difficult situations. According to Burkert, all this contributed to human 
evolutionary fitness. Another factor is the motivating power of religion: it 
can channel and encourage particular behaviours. Rituals encourage 
continuous repetition of certain behaviours.34 Religion motivates by en-
duing reality with transcendental seriousness. It integrates fear and 
hope, and events and actions, into an ordered moral and metaphysical 
scheme.35 
Both Gehlen and Burkert treat institutions as functional features of 
the human being. But Burkert understands the human being from the 
perspective of her dispositions (and possibilities) rather than from the 
perspective of her shortcomings. He also assumes that the human insti-
tutions and the nexus of individuals in community offer a higher evolu-
tionary fitness than that which can be attained by individuals function-
ing alone. He therefore concludes there must have been positive selec-
tion for this combination. Human beings without religious disposition, 
and therefore without its institutional manifestation (as, for example, the 
Neanderthal) appear to have vanished. But Burkert does not address the 
question as to whether there is competition among institutions and 
                                                 
33 Burkert 1996, 26. 
34 Cf. Burkert 1996, 44. 
35 Cf. Burkert 196, 47. 
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therefore a (Darwinian) evolution of institutions.36 His primary goal is to 
demonstrate how culture – and especially religion – builds upon biologi-
cal dispositions and how it reacts to these dispositions.37 
 
 
2.4 The Natural Framework of Cultural Developments  
 
The above authors attempt to connect the socio-cultural and the biologi-
cal using the individual human creature as a starting point. Other authors 
begin by looking at collectives. One can see how some societies and cultures 
are influenced by natural (but non-human) circumstances: by, for example, 
the characteristics of a landscape, the climate, or the local flora and fauna of 
a region. Such observation has been used in political philosophy, in Mon-
tesquieu’s De L’Esprit des Lois (1748). He sees, for example, a connection be-
tween the climate of a region and its legal system. However, his specula-
tions remain largely unjustified. The same is true of Ellsworth Hunning-
ton’s attempts in Climate and Civilisation (1915), in which he proposes maps 
of “climatic energy” which lead to certain cultural developments. 
Jared Diamond’s arguments are more convincing. By reference to 
certain environmental parameters he explains evolutionary scenarios ac-
cording to which the members of a tribe either died out, became hunters 
and gatherers, or created complexly organised states.38 In Guns, Germs 
and Steel. The Fate of Human Societies (1997), he identifies four natural 
factors which have played a decisive role in the development of human 
cultures over the last 13,000 years. 
1) He points us to the richness of regions with wild plants and animals 
which could be domesticated. Only where there is enough richness of this 
kind, is there the possibility of agriculture. Agriculture and the nutrition 
surplus which is allows enable both the specialisation of professions (there 
can be non-agricultural professions) and the growth of population.39 
                                                 
36 He distinguishes bigger developmental steps, for example from a primarily oral towards 
a written culture and religion. See Burkert 1996, 214 ff. But he does not say whether this 
has to be seen as an evolutionary process of selection. 
37 Cf. Burkert 1996, 36. 
38 Diamond 1997, 501 f.  
39 Diamond 1997 , 502. 
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2) Diamond also refers to the agricultural circumstances which allow the 
“diffusion and migration” of innovation. The Eurasian regions benefit-
ted from their east-west orientation, which allowed such exchange. With 
its east-west axis, it is not divided by impassable seas or mountains (ob-
stacles for the exchange of plants, animals, and technical innovation). 
Moreover, useful plants (such as the pea) and domestic animals (such as 
the chicken) could flourish in all areas of this region because, by virtue 
of its east-west orientation, it presents much the same climate within its 
latitudinal boundaries. This not the case for North America, for example, 
because of its north-south orientation.40 
3) The relative propinquity or isolation of continents from each other is 
another significant factor according to Diamond. Relatively isolated con-
tinents, such as America, did not profit from the innovations of societies 
on other continents, whereas Africa’s relative proximity to Eurasia al-
lowed Africans some contact with some Eurasian invention. 
4) The size of habitable area and population are also important. A higher 
population is an advantage: the more people, thus the more creative 
people – and the more ideas and innovations. China, for example, has 
had more human resources than New Guinea by virtue of its large popu-
lation. It is, however, an advantage if the geographical circumstances al-
low for a number of rivalling and competing societies within a limited 
space. Diamond sees this as one of the main reasons for the swift politi-
cal rise of Europe (and for the decline of the technically more developed 
China). Fragmentation into several small states (in Europe facilitated by 
a geography featuring many islands, peninsulas, seas, and mountains) 
creates, according to Diamond, high innovation pressure. Societies had 
to choose between decline, innovation, or the rapid acquisition of the 
innovations of other cultures (in, for example, the field of weaponry).41 
In sum, Diamond focuses on the natural in human history, and seeks to 
shed light on causal interrelations.42 His book has been accused of defend-
ing a kind of determinism. He refutes this by pointing out that human crea-
tivity is also a condition of development. But he looks upon individual 
                                                 
40 Diamond 1997, 208-230. 
41 Diamond 1997, 503. 
42 Diamond 1997, 506. 
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achievements with the eyes of a natural scientist. Why were there so many 
technological developments in Europe when time seemed to have stopped 
in Tasmania? For Diamond, the difference lies not in any special talents Eu-
ropeans may have, but rather in the difference of environmental and cultur-
al conditions.43 
But why is Diamond’s history of the natural sciences interesting for po-
litical philosophy? It is because of the possibility of applying his reconstruc-
tion of development to contemporary societies in such a way that we might 
not only predict their future, but perhaps also be able to direct and influence 
that future. Diamond himself explores this in his Collapse: How Societies 
Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005) in which he analyses the conditions for the 
decline of cultures. In addition to social factors (such as warfare), Diamond 
identifies some natural circumstances which have contemporary relevance, 
notably the lack of resources caused by unsustainable methods of dealing 
with the environment and natural commodities. One need only consider the 
clearing of whole regions of forest in North Africa, which has destroyed the 
livelihoods of the population. Diamond accords due respect to human be-
ings and their freedom by claiming that these environmental changes are 
not inescapable facts of history. Some of these circumstances are caused by 
human short-sightedness. Some circumstances are natural events to which 
humans beings did not react appropriately in good time. He concludes that 
it is the attitude and flexibility of cultures which determines whether or not 
natural circumstances lead to decline (as the work’s subtitle implies). Cul-
tures must be prepared to modify their behaviours and values if they are to 
react successfully to existential threats in a changing environment. Other-
wise, they will be negatively selected. 
 
 
2.5 The Darwinian Evolution of Cultures 
 
Is it merely a metaphor to speak of the “natural selection” and “evo-
lution” of cultures or of elements of a culture, such as institutions? Not 
                                                 
43 This reinforces the objection of determinism since Diamond stresses over and over that 
natural factors are the “deeper causes” for the critical empiric line of thought in the Greek-
Jewish-Christian tradition which finally lead to the rise of Europe. Cf. Diamond 1997, 507. 
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necessarily, since Darwin’s explanation for the development of species 
can theoretically be applied in many fields. With its concepts of varia-
tion, inheritance, and selection, Darwin’s theory can explain the devel-
opment of very different phenomena. It appears to be necessary that rep-
licating entities which are all dependent on limited resources compete 
with each other. Also it appears to be necessary that the passing on of 
properties is relevant to the survival of any such entity.44 Thus evolution 
can take place even where the replicating units are not DNA helices so 
long as the relevant characteristics of a competition exist. Darwin him-
self attempted to explain the development of language using the concept 
selection. More recently we have seen evolutionary models for the devel-
opment of creative thought and cultural traditions (D. Campbell), for the 
development of scientific theories (S. Toulmin), the distribution of com-
puter viruses via the internet (S. Blackmore), and for the way our im-
mune system works (C. Plotkin).45 In all these cases, analysis in terms of 
replicating entities competing for resources proves fruitful. The entity 
which prevails in the long run is the one which exhibits the most useful 
properties – properties handed down to it by its parent or predecessor 
entity.46 Toulmin, for example, argues that some theories prevail over 
others because of their greater explanatory and integrative power, and 
are thus handed down (replicated) more than less efficient theories 
(which finally vanish). 
Daniel Dennett usefully talks about the “substrate neutrality” of the 
principle of selection.47 If one accepts this idea it makes sense to ask to 
what extent cultures and institutions exhibit Darwinian selection pro-
cesses — independently of the question regarding their biological roots 
or the consequences for the biological fitness of human beings. Very 
much in this sense, already Darwin’s contemporary Herbert Spencer 
(1820-1903) distinguished three stages of the evolutionary process: an 
                                                 
44 See Christian Illies 2005. In this paper I try to give reasons why this insight is necessary. 
45 Campbell 1960; Toulmin 1972; Blackmore 1999, 55 f.; Plotkin 1993. 
46 There are also borderline cases in which a property is selected without being “inherita-
ble.” But this does not lead to evolution. If the “better fitting” properties are re-acquired in 
the new generation, there is only the same selection process taking place in every genera-
tion. 
47 Dennett 1996, 82, 353, 398, 430. 
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“inorganic” evolution of space and earth, an “organic” evolution of living 
creatures, and finally a “superorganic” evolution which includes the de-
velopment of social structures including moral frameworks. (Arnold 
Gehlen simply ignored this possibility, and Walter Burkert did not ana-
lyse it in any depth — despite the fact that it has prima facie plausibility 
and had been mooted since the 19th century).48 
Let us consider a recent example: the theory of the development of 
institutions by Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992). Hayek sees in-
stitutions and other cultural artefacts as existing in evolutionary compe-
tition. He assumes that human beings need rules and, therefore, always 
follow them.49 But human reason is too limited to do justice to the com-
plexity of action, especially because an individual cannot well estimate 
the consequences of her actions (and inactions). Rules are helpful, ac-
cording to Hayek, to overcome this constitutional lack of knowledge. 
They reduce complexity and limit the logical space of all related circum-
stances only to the ones which are possibly relevant.50 For Hayek, sys-
tems of rules, and institutions, represent accumulations of historical ex-
periences and the knowledge of a culture. They provide standard solu-
tions for complex decisions and show the individual what she should 
(and could do). Language is the decisive condition for creating, mediat-
ing, and adopting such systems of rules, because only language allows 
us to store such rules and to pass them on to younger generations. This 
process intensified with the advent of written language in later human 
history. Hayek’s concept of the system of rules applies both to the per-
sonal and the social realm of human behaviour: how, for example, to 
plan my own day and how to greet other people. The rules can be more 
formal or less formal. Rules of jurisdiction (laws) are, for example, very 
                                                 
48 Hodgson (2004) discusses the early attempts that apply Darwinism to social phenomena. 
49 von Hayek 1996, 22. A recently often discussed example for an evolutionary theory of 
culture is Dawkins’s memetics. Memetics understand all cultural phenomena (ideas, mel-
odies, pottery, institutions, hallucination etc.) as “memes,” i.e. cultural units that show 
similar behaviour in the “selection chamber” of culture as genes do in the biological room. 
According to memetics, a meme is to be selected because understanding humans pick it 
up and reproduce it — and it fits well into the landscape of memes.(See Blackmore 1999). 
50 von Hayek 1994, 171. This comes pretty close to Gehlen’s and Burkert’s view that insti-
tutions are necessary for orientation. 
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precisely articulated, whereas moral rules (ethical norms) are often ra-
ther informal.  
Regarding the historical development of systems of rules and insti-
tutions, Hayek uses the three Darwinian concepts of variation, inher-
itance, and selection. Variation happens whenever there is an innova-
tion: a new rule or a new course of action which deviates from tradi-
tion. It can be introduced by a creative act, but also by mistake — as, 
for example, when one misinterprets an old rule. After that, selection 
takes place.51 Whether a new rule or convention for social interaction 
within a group will be selected or not depends on how advantageous 
following it might be for the individual. Advantageous rules will be 
adopted, whereas disadvantageous rules will be ignored – and finally 
die out. One might speak of a process of “trial and error.” Thus there 
will be adaptations to the past experience, which are a result of the se-
lective elimination of less appropriate behaviour.52 Hayek seems to as-
sume that selection takes place both within a group and between dif-
ferent groups. In the latter case, an element of biological evolution 
comes into place: groups with less advantageous rules will be also 
physically dominated or eliminated by the other groups. Hayek identi-
fies the mechanism of inheritance as the imitation of rules. Advanta-
geous innovations and useful rules will be followed by others. An im-
portant part of the mechanism of inheritance, according to Hayek, is 
language-acquisition since language assumes a metaphysic of classifi-
cations and relations. In learning a language, one adopts a way of view-
ing, ordering, and acting within the world.53  
According to Hayek, knowledge is accumulated during a long evolu-
tionary process in institutions, (i.e. cultural traditions and habits) but 
also in language and artefacts. The individual uses this corporate 
knowledge by following the institutions, by learning a language, or by 
using a tool. Even if she is not aware of it, she cumulatively incorporates 
experience.54 Understood in this way, cultural evolution is a process of 
social learning, in which the knowledge of whole generations is collected 
                                                 
51 von Hayek 1994, 157 f. 
52 von Hayek 1991, 34. 
53 von Hayek 1973. 
54 von Hayek 1960, 43. 
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and passed on to provide efficient solutions to problems experienced. All 
in all, Hayek sees this process as something positive. The invisible hand 
of selection leads to an accumulation of useful experiences – if this evo-
lution is not interfered with. State-directed economies and un-free socie-
ties experience negative consequences from interference since positive 
development is grounded in the freedom and unpredictability of human 
actions.55 Consciously chosen rules can never produce the same wealth 
of knowledge and experience that unconscious processes of develop-
ment bring about. Von Hayek therefore rejects wide-scale changes of so-
cial institutions but grants that small reforms may be beneficial to indi-
vidual members of society. 
But is this inconsistent with a Darwinian analysis of institutions, 
wherein the institutions are seen to develop by a purely mechanical se-
lection process? No. It is not a Darwinian tenet that the cause of varia-
tion is blind – only that selection is. So it is plausible to assume that 
there will be competition between different institutions – Independently 
of their origin – and the result of this competition is solely decided by 
the criterion of efficiency. Only efficiency determines which institutions, 
and with which properties, will last permanently and which will vanish, 
and when.56 Consciously chosen rules have no advantage over uncon-
sciously evolved rules in the remorseless selection process. For Hayek, 
there is nothing to indicate that consciously chosen rules have any ad-
vantage over others. Conscious interventions are one way of producing 
variation, but there are many others. A theory of the development of in-
stitutions which includes only those rules which have been consciously 
stipulated by human beings remains deficient. According to von Hayek, 
only with the analytical tools of Darwinism can the long-term develop-
ment of institutions be fully explained.57 
                                                 
55 von Hayek 1960, 50. 
56 Similar for the mechanism of inheritance: It was often argued that cultural inheritance 
of institutions were Lamarckian since it allows for the transfer of acquired properties. This 
is plausible, but stands in no contradiction to a Darwinian evolution of institutions since 
also here, variation, (blind) selection and inheritance (however it looks like) remain deci-
sive. Darwin himself is Lamarckian regarding inheritance when he assumes in the the 
Origin of Species that acquired properties can be inherited. 
57 That is the line of argumentation in  Hodgson and Knudsen 2006. 
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There may, however, be cases in which the development of institu-
tions does not follow Darwinian principles. Such is Hayek’s diagnosis of 
state-directed economies mentioned above, but also of totalitarian socie-
ties in which natural selection is precluded by violence. According to 
Hayek, this scenario often leads to bad development, because the posi-
tive natural accumulation of experiences and improvement of institu-
tions has not been allowed to take place. This danger is especially pro-
nounced in a modern technically-advanced world because the state has 
enormous power at its disposal, and may choose not to leave room for 
spontaneity.58 Therefore, Hayek claims, it is a crucial responsibility of 
politics to be aware of this danger. Politics must fashion a framework of 
freedoms for the natural evolution of institutions, so that open evolu-
tionary competition will be possible.59 But this fashioning of the frame-
work of freedom, one might object, could require the conscious stipula-
tion of rules after all.  
 
 
3. Convergence as Objective 
 
3.1 Evolutionary Sciences and the Justification of Normative Judgments 
 
The above approaches have in common that they seek natural expla-
nations for specific social behaviour and cultural phenomena and for 
their development which are relevant to political philosophy (and to the 
political sciences in general). Thus they are helpful in understanding our 
institutions, their history and function. But they cannot contribute to the 
justification of institutions, political ideals, or objectives. This accords 
with Hume’s law: that one cannot get from a descriptive ‘is’ to a pre-
scriptive ‘ought’ without any additional normative arguments.  
As early as 1903 George Edward Moore, in Principia Ethica, extended 
Hume’s law to the evolutionary sciences: there is no direct connection 
between the evolutionary ‘coming to be’ and the normative ‘ought.’ 
Darwinian evolution must be understood as a blind (i.e. not goal-
                                                 
58 See von Hayek 1960, 50. 
59 See von Hayek 1976, 30. 
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oriented) process which does not imply any ideal or any evaluation of its 
outcome. That is also the reason why Moore rejects all evolutionary eth-
ics proposals. (And there is a corollary: It is impossible to use evolution-
ary sciences to argue successfully that all morality is an illusion. For if it 
could be shown by philosophical arguments that there actually are correct 
moral judgments, and one could not deny this by reference to natural 
sciences which are normatively blind.)60 
Of course, it is possible to claim that evolution selects “fitter” entities, 
but “fitter” is a functional description relative to context. A fitter entity 
has properties which grant it a higher reproduction rate under certain 
circumstances, but not the status of being of more value than other enti-
ties. Many parasites and viruses are very fit for their host environment, 
for example, but we do not accord them greater value than other life 
forms: in fact, we evaluate them negatively. “Never use the terms higher 
and lower,” Darwin himself advised, as a kind of warning against over-
laying the descriptive with the normative.61 
Evolutionary explanations are not sufficient for normative judgments 
– at least not if one holds that normative judgments must be justified in 
the strict sense. This is the sense in which rational arguments are neces-
sary to validate normative judgments — and only if they are rationally 
validated, are they valid and obligatory in virtue of a “legitimate legitima-
tion,” as Manfred Wetzel puts it.62 This applies both to ethics and to po-
litical philosophy, if the latter claims to be able to make normative dis-
tinctions between institutions (such as forms of government) or if politi-
cal philosophers formulate objectives for political action. To be sure, it is 
one of the most difficult of philosophical questions what kind of rational 
argument, or even what kind of methodology, would be sufficient for a 
normative justification in this area. But we do not, fortunately, have to 
answer it in this paper. For our purposes here, it is enough to say that 
the methodology of the evolutionary sciences cannot grant a “legitimate 
legitimation.” 
                                                 
60 For a more detailed account, see Illies 2006, 225-235. 
61 Darwin wrote this in the margin of his copy of Vestiges of Creation by Robert Chambers, 
who postulated an evolutionary upward movement. See Di Gregorio 1990, 164 f. 
62 “Kraft einer legitimen [sic] Legitimation als gültig und verbindlich.” See Wetzel 2004, 
209. 
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But why did it – and why does it still – appeal to many authors (such 
as Herbert Spencer, Edward O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins) to analyse 
normative ideals with evolutionary arguments? One reason is the pre-
sent crisis in philosophy regarding the rational justification of moral 
values. No single methodology is commonly accepted. There is another 
reason: the particular interrelated-ness of descriptive and normative 
judgments in biological anthropology. In addition to descriptive state-
ments (statements about human dispositions and evolutionary processes 
of development) and normative judgments (“ought sentences”) there are 
also evolutionary explanations of how human beings arrive at normative 
judgments – descriptive statements about whether and how human be-
ings have dispositions for normative judgments. One obvious example of 
this is what David M. Buss calls “a thirst for justice”.63 Leda Cosmides 
and John Tooby take this as a basis for their claim that we have a genetic 
disposition to think in the category of social contract — that means in 
normative categories. But can this be a justification for the social con-
tract? I would deny this with reference to Hume’s law. It is and always 
will be a descriptive statement to explain the biological causes which lie 
behind the giving of a normative judgment, and a normative judgment 
cannot follow from a descriptive statement. Let us look at an example. In 
1848 there was a rock-blasting accident in which an iron rod was driven 
through the head of the American railroad construction worker named 
Phineas Gage. Much of Gage’s left frontal lobe was destroyed, but he 
somehow (to everyone’s surprise) survived this accident. But Gage was 
no longer the polite gentlemen he was before the accident: he turned 
very negative. Today, neurologists might explain in some detail why 
Gage gave only negative judgments about his fellow men after the acci-
dent happened. But the fact that neurobiologists could explain these 
normative judgements does not mean that they are justified. Explana-
tions are simply not reasons.  
There might be a reason why evolutionary anthropology often con-
fuses descriptive and normative judgments. It seems to follow from our 
biological nature that we ask for a “legitimate legitimation” at all. It is a 
special characteristic of the human being that her complex brain allows 
                                                 
63 Buss 2004, 388. 
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her to stand at a linguistic distance from herself, and to consider herself 
free to choose between possible objectives, wishes, and the satisfaction 
of various needs. Max Scheler pointed this out in his philosophical an-
thropology when he describes humans as capable of suppressing his 
impulses. While animals must always say ‘yes’ to their needs and desire, 
we are able to say on occasion ‘no’ to our drives and impulses.64 
Standing at this distance, humans ask the universal ‘why’ question: 
we seek explanations for everything that exists, for good reasons for 
what we want to do, and for good reasons for what we ought to do. From 
this human characteristic arises the need for theoretical ordering and for 
practical orientation – two things Gehlen and Burkert identified (in dif-
ferent ways, of course) as the beginning of culture, politics, and religion. 
This human need culminates in the desire for a legitimate legitimation. 
We are not satisfied with easy answers to the problem of justification.  
 
 
3.2 Convergence as the Objective of Political Activity 
 
Political philosophy, if it acknowledges both the possibility of the 
normative and the existence of the inherent laws and processes in the 
world (made known to us by the empirical sciences), must fulfil the task 
of bringing about states of society where what is (normatively) best 
might become real. One part of this task might be the guaranteeing of 
universal human rights by positive law. The task itself may have to be 
spread over time in a somewhat complex way. For example, one might 
distinguish between what is possible at present, what is possible in the 
middle-term, and what is possible long-term (with the added complexity 
that present actions may increase or decrease the range of possible fu-
ture actions). Johann Gottlieb Fichte adopted this methodology of politi-
cal philosophy as the ground for his work Der geschlossene Handelsstaat 
(= the closed trading state). His idea can be easily identified by looking at 
the structure of the work: Fichte beings with the account and justifica-
tion of an ideal (an institution of which he believes he can with good 
reason approve, i.e. the closed trading state). He then describes the reali-
                                                 
64 Scheler 1975, 55. 
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ty of his time: he gives an analysis of actual commercial intercourse. Fi-
nally he gives political recommendations as to how to implement the 
ideal in the real world.65 The implementation, then, is not a task of polit-
ical philosophy, but of actual politics.  
Political philosophy cannot, however, always distinguish between 
these aspects as clearly as Johann Gottlieb Fichte did. It is especially dif-
ficult in practice to define the boundaries between the justification of 
normative judgments on the one hand, and the task of making the nor-
mative actual on the other. Normative ideals are generally part of the 
basic cultural equipment of a historically developed society. Normative 
ideals are used in practice and are not, therefore, a part only of normative 
approaches, but also a part of descriptive approaches (even though these 
latter approaches cannot justify them). Furthermore, discourses of nor-
mative justification are also embedded in culture and can often be un-
derstood only in their proper contexts. Finally, one must distinguish the 
validity of normative ideals from their factual acknowledgement, and 
this in turn must be distinguished from actual compliance with these 
norms. The latter two are both parts of the descriptive world and it is 
therefore difficult (but important) to give a strict definition of them. It 
remains necessary – following Hume’s law – to distinguish the justifica-
tion of normative ideals from the description of ideals people actually 
hold to. 
Not even the subtlest analysis of the world, knowledge of cultural 
contexts and of the realities of the acknowledgement of ideals can lead to 
a legitimate legitimation of normative ideals. But neither can a set of jus-
tified normative values lead to any good in the world. Even a perfect un-
derstanding of our normative ideals does not tell us how to implement 
them in the world: ideals without empirical data are empty; empirical 
data without ideals are blind. 
How are we to understand the relation between the justification of 
ideals and the gathering of empirical knowledge? One usually assumes a 
reflective equilibrium between those two activities. The empirical sci-
                                                 
65 This is equivalent to the “mixed syllogism” already Aristotle used as a basic logical hy-
pothesis of applied ethics. Given a normative a priori premise and a descriptive a posteriori 
premise, one can infer a special normative statement that represents an application of the 
firstly mentioned ideal to the descriptively grasped part of reality. See Hösle 1999, 169. 
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ences can be of use in aiding the implementation of ideals. If we hold, 
for example, that the right to political participation is fundamental, we 
need to analyse a culture to know exactly about what is meant by political 
participation within that culture. Furthermore, motivation for empirical 
research often comes from relevant questions which have arisen from 
normative ideals. The ideal of political participation will, for example, 
focus our attention on possible mechanisms of manipulation; and these 
we must understand if we seek to protect human beings from them-
selves. The reflexive process is subtle. We begin with a rather general 
formalisation of the ideal, and might perhaps have only a limited rele-
vant knowledge of the empirical world. During reflection, we sharpen 
that ideal, but also focus on the relevant aspects of the empirical world 
which will help us implement the ideal. Inspecting the empirical world 
might also lead us to a more in-depth critique of an ideal. If an ideal 
cannot be implemented, one should seriously question its legitimacy. 
Thus the reflective equilibrium between the normative and the descrip-
tive approaches helps us make normative ideals substantial. An im-
portant consequence of this equilibrium is a certain dynamic within po-
litical philosophy: Normative judgments have only presumptive validity, 
since they must remain open for revision and challenge by new objec-
tions which might become necessary in face of new empirical insights. 
The constantly varying contexts of a world in change should lead to con-
stantly varying substantialisations of our ideals. But none of this entails 
that the justification of moral norms depends on social or cultural con-
text – contrary to what the contextualists, for example, claim. 
What does it mean to implement normative ideals in the empirical 
world? We cannot work, especially in politics, with so simple a deduc-
tion as tells us only that the normative ideal should be applied or instan-
tiated according to this or that circumstances. (One might imagine such 
a simple process of substantialisation only, perhaps, in the case of pro-
hibitions.) Generally, one would have to focus on long-term processes of 
development of political structures and institutions towards a normative 
ideal. There are a number of reasons for this. Change often can only 
happen in a rather plodding way – via reform and not via revolution. 
Complex institutions, deeply-rooted traditions, and strong attitudes can-
not be reformed quickly. Attempts to do so either fail completely or re-
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sult in immense social costs (remember Gandhi’s attempt to abolish the 
caste system in India). Often slow reform is the more efficient, and 
sometimes the only possible, way. Not everything is possible at every 
point of time. Normative ideals cannot be implemented directly in many 
cases, but only indirectly through changing a certain framework. The 
best way to fight poverty in a region could be, for example, the creation 
of a better education system. This is something we can learn from the 
evolutionary sciences: processes of development have their own logic. A 
prudent political philosophy will accept this, but will also try to use this 
inherent logic to nudge evolution into the right direction.  
With other words, political philosophy is about the “convergence” of 
social developments and normative ideals. The normative ideal should, 
in the long term, become a naturally practiced ethical life within a cul-
ture. Only thus can the normative ideal become substantive in a perma-
nent and stable way. It is the enduring insight of Hegel that morality be-
comes concrete only in the actual practice of the ethical life. We might 
add that such an ethical life must be arrived at by evolutionary processes 
and must have proved itself through the process of selection. Conver-
gence is not only a first-order objective, but also a higher-order ideal, an 
ideal ideal, as we might say, since it is the ideal way for ideals to become 
reality.  
 
 
3.3 The Natural Conditions of Convergence 
 
All actions, including political actions, take place within contextual 
frameworks of conditions. Without frameworks, there would be no op-
tions, and actions could neither be limited nor promoted. Political phi-
losophy seeks to analyse and utilise these conditions. It is not, a priori, 
possible to reach impossibilities, and not therefore useful to aspire to the 
impossible. Therefore, political philosophy must strive for the best with-
in a framework of limited possibilities. This might be achieved by chang-
ing the conditions, but if the conditions are immutable, one must 
choose or design institutions or actions which fit into the framework of 
immutable conditions and lead to optimal results, or at least to the best 
possible ones.  
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But what consequences can we draw for political philosophy from 
the diverse natural conditions which determine our actions? By natural 
conditions I mean to include those created by both nature within our-
selves and nature around us, and also the inherent logic of evolutionary 
development. If the examples of cultural explanation in Section 2 are 
sound, political philosophy could improve our society the better with 
them than without them. We will differentiate four different aspects of 
this conditional framework which have been handed over to political 
philosophy by anthropology and the evolutionary sciences. Even though 
the distinctions are not sharp, the differentiation will prove useful. 
 
(i) There are fundamental conditions, as we can learn from Dia-
mond. Ignoring them makes success impossible. Cultures should not, 
for example, be wasteful with their natural resources since they cannot 
survive without them. It is obviously not reasonable to expect human be-
ings to act in a way which is impossible for them, and we do not need 
any specialised sciences to tell us what is impossible for us.  
More interesting are the areas where we could learn from anthropol-
ogy what is almost impossible for us – areas where our genetically-
disposed actions and emotions make things difficult for us. One exam-
ple is our desire for social rank and respect of fellows. A society without 
social rank is not only hard to justify, but also unachievable. Attempts to 
achieve it, from the French Revolution to Communist experiments, have 
all failed and led to new ranking systems instead.  
But if one desires do deal wisely with what is almost impossible, one 
should still be critical towards what is alleged as impossible. One should dis-
tinguish between a disposition and its development and manifestation. In 
most cases, certain actions are impossible for human beings because their 
dispositions developed in a certain way, not because their dispositions pre-
clude such actions in principle. One example is antagonistic behaviour. 
Whether it is possible for a human being to solve conflicts without aggres-
sion depends significantly on whether she experienced peaceful conflict so-
lutions in her adolescence — and whether she is in general familiar with 
such peaceful solutions. To understand the convergence of human action 
with normative ideals, one must understand the human being as a creature 
of possibilities. And one way of doing that is to focus on moral education. 
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(ii) Human beings have a natural constitution. This cannot be ig-
nored. But more than that: one should make use of one’s natural consti-
tution in order to reach normative objectives. If institutions make use of 
this constitution to steer impulses to act in a certain direction, they can 
implement ideals without using force. If it were possible to connect so-
cial ranks in a society to the achievement of politically desirable virtues, 
there would be a competition between citizens over their contribution to 
the common good. This is something Plato and Aristotle had in mind, 
and is certainly welcome from the perspective of modern political phi-
losophy and practice.  
Liberalism in the 18th century had similar ideas. For the develop-
ment of a liberal community one does not need a new kind of human 
being; rather all the shortcomings and weaknesses of human beings as 
they are could be useful in the attainment of this goal. This is what Kant 
had in mind when he called human beings the “crooked wood.” But be-
ing an optimist, Kant acts on the assumption that even evil (for example 
avaricious and egoistic) motives could have positive consequences. For 
Kant, nature is designed to make harmony spring from human discord, 
even against the will of man.66 Competition is enough to erect the high 
house of a harmonic society by making use of the human weaknesses. 
Contemporary political philosophy does not necessarily share Kant’s op-
timism (that also influenced Hayek). But the main point still pertains: it 
should be on the political agenda that we use everything which moti-
vates human beings to implement normative ideals, even our unsocial 
instincts. We should, therefore, also give prima facie unsocial motiva-
tions and dispositions a chance of expression in case they turn out to be 
useful in the long run. 
Anthropology can contribute to this by showing us which disposi-
tions need to be controlled, and evolutionary sciences can show what in-
herent logic we have to deal with if we want to control them. Under-
standing this inherent logic does not entail trusting in a self-developing 
selection process which will reach a desirable outcome steered by an 
“invisible hand.” The bottom-line of evolutionary theory is that evolution 
is not goal-oriented. But evolution is compatible with the stipulation of 
                                                 
66 Kant 1776, 143. 
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goals,67 as Darwin made clear with reference to the breeding of domestic 
animals and useful plants (at beginning of his Origin of Species). If selec-
tion is goal-oriented, by, for example, the breeding program of a cultiva-
tor, it may lead to the desired result.  
But now there are two conditions one has to consider if one wishes 
give a direction to an evolutionary process. These are the last two aspects 
of the conditional framework for political philosophy which one can in-
fer from anthropology and the evolutionary sciences. Let us consider 
them. 
 
(iii) In an evolutionary process, after many generations, a property 
(or an entity having a property) will prevail over its competitors, only if 
that property or that entity is better fitted than its competitors for the 
conditions in which selection takes place. “Prevailing” means to have 
more descendants in future generations than one’s competitors. This 
also applies to cases of non-biological entities which are in an evolution-
ary competition. It is important for the evolutionary success of an entity 
to have advantages over its competitors. 
How can we use this insight in a prudent way in order to control po-
litical developments? Well, we must design institutions that accord with 
the normative ideal in such a way that they could prevail over competing 
institutions. To use an expression of game theory: Institutions have to be 
“evolutionary stable strategies.” That means that a strategy (behavioural 
rules, institutions, etc.) must be more useful for the relevant actors than 
any other potential strategy. We should, for example, ask how to design 
democracy in such a way that it is evolutionary stable within our society 
and cannot be annulled by extremist tendencies. To reach such a goal, 
prohibiting extremist parties and forbidding the self-disempowerment of 
the democratic parliament are wise means.  
 
(iv)The conditions of selection itself must also be given attention. 
What property or entity prevails in the long run depends both on the rel-
evant property or entities and on the selective circumstances. To reach 
convergence, one should therefore modify the conditions of selection in 
                                                 
67 See Illies 2006, 81-90. 
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accordance with the objective. Robert Axelrod, for example, argues that 
children have to be educated in small groups since only in those condi-
tions can a reciprocal altruism develop. (It is in these conditions that al-
truism becomes the prevalent strategy, and children can then develop 
the habit of cooperation). Any society needs, in order to survive, a deeply 
rooted altruism tying its members together. In contrast, schools without 
stable classes provide unfavourable selection conditions for altruistic 
strategies. Prudent politics should therefore avoid them as much as pos-
sible, and promote instead small, stable classes.  
In this way, political philosophy can make a productive use of empir-
ical data coming from anthropology and biological sciences: Politicians 
must analyse in a very concrete fashion, for each kind of circumstances, 
what behaviour and what institutions are generated by and compatible 
with given environmental conditions and political constellations. Such 
an analysis will heavily rely on considerations concerning what behav-
iours and what institutions were selected in the past. Even if we are only 
at the beginning of our attempt to understand the complex interrelation 
between nature (and its evolution) and cultural phenomena, such inves-
tigations promise to offer new insights into our practical problems. Po-
litical philosophy has to integrate the insights of anthropology and evolu-
tionary sciences in an increasingly creative and constructive way, in or-
der to pursue the goal of convergence between ideal and reality.68 
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Realism, Human Action and Political Life. 
On the Political Dimension of Individual Choices 
 
Gabriele De Anna 
 
 
1. Realism and Political Philosophy
 
Discussions about realism are a characteristic trait of the last few 
decades of philosophical debate in the analytical tradition.1 These de-
bates have opened the way to a return of realism in many areas of phi-
losophy and in different philosophical contexts.2 Starting in the areas of 
metaphysics, epistemology and theory of cognition, discussions about 
realism have reached into philosophy of cognition, theory of action, the-
ory of normativity (Dancy 2003) and ethics (Brink 1989; Smith 1994; 
Audi 2013). 
The fields of theory of action, theory of normativity, and ethics are 
closely linked to political philosophy. Hence, discussions about realism 
should have important implications for political philosophy. These im-
plications, however, are generally overlooked, with a few recent excep-
tions (Audi 2011; Groff 2013). In political philosophy, the leading para-
digm is still dependent on the social contract tradition, and on the con-
ception of human action which goes with it. According to this concep-
tion, human action is directed towards ends set by our psychological 
makeup, and reason has a purely instrumental role in reaching those 
ends. The political implication is that we can be free in a negative sense: 
i.e., to the extent that we have no internal or external constraints jeopard-
                                                 
1 Brock and Mares (2007) offer an overview of the debate. A paradigmatic example of the 
centrality of problems related to realism in contemporary philosophy is the work by Hilary 
Putnam. See De Anna 2001. 
2 Maurizio Ferraris has spoken of a “new realism” as a characteristic feature of contempo-
rary philosophy at large (2012). His claims opened an interesting debate in Europe: cf., for 
example, Ferraris and De Caro 2012 and Gabriel 2012 and 2013. 
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izing the attainment of our ends.3 Political power is hence always a bur-
den to our freedom, although it might be a necessary one. These views 
about individual freedom and political power have important implica-
tions concerning the reasons which keep us together in a political com-
munity and, hence, on the ontological consistency of the political com-
munity. 
This conception of human action has marked the social contract tra-
dition from the times of Hobbes and is rooted on the naturalist meta-
physics underpinning that tradition: it accounts for human action with-
out the need to introduce “queer” properties in the world, e.g. values, 
norms, teloi, goodness, ideas, etc. This view still prevails in the contem-
porary leading paradigm of political philosophy due to the great influ-
ence of the work of scholars such as John Rawls.4 It still recommends 
itself in the political arena, since it promises to grant political neutrality 
and to avoid all conflicts: it grants to each individual the possibility of 
acting according to his or her conception of the good, by trumping any 
attempt to offer an objective characterization of the good, which might 
have a claim to be imposed on everyone. On this view, the implication is 
that discussions about the good in political contexts (and by that I mean 
both in political philosophy and in political practice) should be avoided. 
Any claim about the good – it is said – would have disastrous, totalitarian 
implications, if brought into the political arena. Debates about realism, 
hence, are acceptable all the way up to moral philosophy, but should not 
be allowed to enter the realm of political discourse. The point is that po-
litical life is meant to bring about peace and agreement, by mediating 
among different perspectives of the good. In order to do this – it is usu-
                                                 
3 On this acceptation of the term ‘negative freedom’ and on its role in the social contract 
tradition see (Castellano 1993, 25-43; Ferry 2002). 
4 The claim that Rawls is committed to a negative conception of freedom could seem dubi-
ous. He openly claims (1971, 201 and ff.), indeed, that he wants to remain neutral about 
what freedom is, and that he accepts both conceptions of freedom (negative and positive) 
described by Benjamin Constant. However, Constant redefines the classical terms ‘positive 
freedom’ and ‘negative freedom’ from the political point of view, on the basis of assump-
tions about a conception of action and of practical reason (one typical of his time) which 
takes individual freedom to be merely the absence of internal or external constraints. 
Rawls follows Constant in this, as it is clear from the pages which immediately follow the 
reference to him. 
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ally thought – references to the good should be limited as much as pos-
sible, in order to avoid the possibility that theoretical disagreement 
might result in practical disagreement and ultimately in social conflict. 
In this essay I would like to counter this implication, by making 
some considerations about the relevance of realism in action theory and 
in ethics for political philosophy. I will claim that the premises which 
are normally taken to ground the above implication are not warranted: 
considerations about action theory and normative theory suggest that – 
contra the leading paradigm – our practical reason is not purely instru-
mental (section 2) and political power is not necessarily a constraint to 
our freedom (sections 3). In my view, this calls for a revision of the onto-
logical status of political communities (section 4), and suggests that dis-
cussions about the good are not only innocuous, but even required for 
the sake of social peace (section 5). 
 
 
2. Human Action, Reasons and Normative Realism 
 
What is a human action? By action I mean the control over one’s 
causal powers which one can be understood to own and be held respon-
sible for. As Elisabeth Anscombe (1957) famously noted, an action is 
such if there is a person who owns it. For someone to own an action 
means that there is someone who may respond by giving a reason to the 
question “why did you do that?” For example, a person gives some mon-
ey to a beggar on the street and we ask him “why did you do it?” He can 
answer, for example, “because he's hungry.” I say that he can answer so, 
because sometimes the person interrogated could lie and hide the rea-
sons that she had. 
We can grasp the full meaning of this definition of action if we think 
of cases where one does something, but that doing cannot be said to be, 
strictly speaking, one’s action. Suppose that, without realizing that there 
is a friend of mine behind me, I turn around and accidentally slap her 
on her face. “Why did you slap her?,” someone might ask. “I did not slap 
her,” I would answer, “I just bumped onto her accidentally.” In these 
cases, we would also refuse responsibility for what happened: to the 
question “why have you hurt her?” we would answer “It was not my 
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fault.” Further, the person affected could not be angry to us, at least as 
far as she is rational. 
It follows that a human being does what he does as human being 
(and not as a mere body that occupies space and moves) because he is 
guided by reason, and, therefore, is rational. Of course the amount of 
rationality that we need to claim that one owns certain actions and is re-
sponsible for them is pretty minimal, to use a term introduced by Robert 
Audi (2001, 50). Rationality is minimal in this sense: When we say that a 
person is rational in order to stress that she is “in herself,” that she does 
not do things that are out of control, as when, for example, she acts un-
der the causal influence of narcotics. We can imagine in such a case that 
when she wakes up – someone else can ask “is she rational now?”. Ra-
tionality, in this sense, admits of weaker or stronger degrees to which a 
person or a belief can be rational. This definition of rationality can simp-
ly involve consonance with reason, or it can involve a stronger commit-
ment to finding out truth and doing good. This distinction between de-
grees of rationality intersects with my argument to follow, but I will not 
have the space to discuss these intersections here. I am persuaded, how-
ever, that the notion of reason for action that I am employing applies 
across the board, even in the case of minimal rationality. 
Reasons for actions have an objective side and a subjective side. The 
objective side depends on the fact that reasons purport to give a descrip-
tion of states of the world. In the example above: “he is hungry,” i.e. a 
description of a state of the world is given as a reason to explain an ac-
tion. This state of the world is not by itself a reason, however, and – be-
sides other things – it must be seen as a reason by a subject in order to be 
such. 
A key feature of the instrumentalist view about practical reason 
which underpins the leading paradigm of political philosophy, as men-
tioned in section one, is that it takes this subjective facet of reasons as 
proof that a reason is the conjunction of an objective element – a belief 
about states of affairs – and a subjective element – typically a desire con-
cerning the relevant states of affairs (Davidson 1963). This leads to the 
view that our reason can rule our beliefs, without thereby being neces-
sarily able to affect our agency: only if a relevant belief is also in place, 
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can reason affect our agency. This is why reason is only instrumentally 
relevant in satisfying desires, which are set independently from it. 
The desire-belief analysis of reasons is particularly appealing to natu-
ralistically oriented philosophers, since it seems to account for many 
morally relevant aspects of our experience, without committing one to 
the existence of moral facts or normative features of reality. Desires – 
i.e., perfectly natural features of our psychology – would explain norma-
tive features of our behaviour. Hence, this account of reasons is normal-
ly accompanied by some form of moral anti-realism. This view is now 
far from gaining a large consensus (Dancy 2003, Vogler 2002), however, 
there are still important grounds for complaint, as follows: If the view 
were correct, one could have a certain belief about a moral judgment, 
e.g. that “action a is mandatory,” and not have a reason not to do a. In-
deed, reasons – under these assumptions – would be conjunctions of 
beliefs and desires, and one could lack the desire to a. This finds itself in 
tension with a feature of our moral discourse, namely that moral beliefs 
give us reasons to act even when we lack the corresponding desires. 
The shortcoming of the desire-belief account of reasons for action 
seems to me to suggest that the fact that reasons have subjective and ob-
jective facets should not lead to an analysis which breaks reasons for ac-
tion into an objective and a subjective part. Rather, in analyses of rea-
sons for action, subjective and objective aspects should be kept together. 
Let us see how this can be done. 
The fact that a reason for an action has a content and, then, describes 
states of the world, entails that reasons for actions can, on the one hand, 
be adequate or inadequate, and, on the other hand, are objective. They 
may be adequate or inadequate, since their contents can be true or false: 
things can be as they suppose or not: “Why have I given him some 
coins? Because he was hungry.” But the beggar could have not been 
hungry, and in this case the propositional content of the reason would 
be false. Furthermore, reasons are objective: whether the beggar was 
hungry or not does not depend on the feeling or the beliefs of the agent 
who thought he had those reasons for acting, but on how things were in 
reality. Even if the fact of wanting something is given as a reason by an 
agent, that wanting is a reason only in so far as that agent really had that 
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want, and this is an objective state of the world, no matter how question-
able grounding a reason on that fact might be. 
So far I have claimed that the reasons which explain our actions can 
motivate us, and have truth-evaluable contents, i.e. they are in a way ob-
jective. This does not imply that all we do is rational, since our practical 
rationality can fail in two primary ways. Firstly, agents do not always 
know the truth values of the contents of their reasons: one may have a 
partial view of the situation, and thereby believe true contents to be false, 
or the other way around. In cases of this sort, one’s reasons may turn 
out to be inadequate. For example, one might think one has a normative 
reason to do what one does, but in realty, is not justified. Secondly, the 
reasons which explain one’s action and moves one’s will might fail to 
really justify one’s choices: one’s explanatory reasons may be motivating 
but fail to be normative (Audi 2010). Indeed, the justification one gives 
for one’s actions may be bad reasons, and so may not really justify these 
actions. “Why did you steal the bag from the lady?” Answer: “The lady 
seemed quite rich; I was hoping to find a rich haul.” All this suggests 
that an agent is an agent only if she is rational (if she is guided by rea-
sons, and therefore the effects of her movements are not purely ran-
dom), but also that the rational capacity of a human agent is in many 
ways limited. 
Above, I said that reasons may be adequate or inadequate, and that 
this depends on the fact that their content can be true or false. This as-
sumes that the reasons are not simply their contents. What are they? 
The above example shows that a person can express her reason to act by 
uttering a sentence as an answer to a why-question. This suggests that a 
reason is a function of its content determined by the particular situation 
in which a sentence expressing that content can be uttered (although, 
the sentence does not have to be uttered: often we have reasons to do 
what we do, even if we do not express them verbally, either aloud or in 
an introspective form). The content of a reason represents a state of af-
fairs, which, in the eyes of the agent, justifies her action. This fact justi-
fies, I believe, considerations about the conditions of its possibility, both 
on the subjective and on the objective side. A state of affairs can be seen 
as a reason by an agent, since that state of affairs is recognized as having 
some order – i.e., as something positive and good – but it is seen as an 
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order or an asset that is deficient in some ways and that can be improved 
by the agent herself. A reason for an action, then, expresses a way in 
which that action realizes a good, the possibility of which is recognized 
by the agent in reality. In our example, the utterance of ‘he is hungry’ 
can be seen as giving reason if these conditions are met: (i). There is an 
individual, i.e. a human, which is recognized as having an intrinsic or-
der (e.g., being a living organism, with a digestive apparatus needing 
food) and being worthy as such; (ii). The individual is recognized as be-
ing deficient in his order (e.g., lacking the food he needs); (iii). The 
agent realizes that he has the power to complete the lack of order in that 
individual. 
To say that the end of human action is a good is not to support an 
overly optimistic outlook on human nature, but only to recognize a fea-
ture of our agency which is compatible with our fallibility: the good 
sought by the agent is such in his view, but he can fail in the recognition 
of the good for the two kinds of limitations of our rationality seen above. 
The claim that the agent seeks a good by recognizing and completing an 
order which is already partially realized in reality can help us explain bet-
ter the sources of our limitations. Indeed, the information on the basis 
of which an agent recognizes an order in reality and a way of improving 
it may be defective in ways which undermine the normative reasons one 
thinks that one has. For example, I believe that something is a living or-
ganism which needs food, but it is really just a sophisticated robot which 
only needs electric charge. Similarly, one might be defective in their sub-
jective response to the lack of order to be found in reality and to the pos-
sible ways of improvement. So one might recognize that someone else 
needs food, and see providing him some spirits as the best way to make 
up for that. In both cases, one does not have the normative reasons one 
thinks one have. 
So far I have highlighted connections between reasons for action, 
goods, and normativity. These notions can be interpreted in a moral and 
in a non-moral sense. There might be reasons, goods to be achieved, and 
normative grounds for incompatible directions of action. We have rea-
son to follow, achieve and consider only all things considered reasons, 
goods, or normative grounds, respectively. Furthermore, not all all things 
considered reasons are moral: I may have a reason to go for a walk (e.g., it 
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may be just that I desire it), without that being a moral reason. A moral 
reason is one that is seen by the agent as requiring an obligatory re-
sponse from him, as from any other rational agent who happens to be in 
a situation similar in relevant ways. Where the border between the realm 
of non-morally relevant and morally relevant reasons lies depends on 
what the agent sees at good, and, consequently, it might or might not be 
justified. 
The conclusion we have reached shows that human action is in a 
sense intrinsically normative: not in the sense that it can be always ex-
plained by reasons which are normative, but in the sense that it can be 
explained only by reasons that the agent fallibly beliefs to be normative. 
This leads to a form of normative realism: the grounds of normativity – a 
partial order and ways of implementing it – can be found in reality. 
However, this is an epistemically moderate sort realism: the good as 
such can only be recognized from the point of view of an agent and prac-
tical rationality of agents is fallible, as we have seen. Let us now look at 
practical fallibility in further depth. 
 “Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor,” as Ovid wrote: our prac-
tical fallibility is a common human experience of all times. The point is 
that our practical rationality is limited, and the study of its limitations is 
one of the major contributions of contemporary moral philosophy. First-
ly, there are the epistemic limitations we have already considered above: 
an agent always has a practical vision of the situation in which she acts, 
and facts which elude her recognition could be relevant for her choices. 
Secondly, our practical reason is not just a form of reasoning, but it is a 
network of cognitive and volitional capacities which include both reason-
ing and insight. Often, we just see what is good or bad, without having 
to reason about it. The interaction between these faculties offers several 
occasions for failure. Thirdly, we often have different reasons suggesting 
different courses of action and must choose between them. Our choice 
can be less than fully rational because of our epistemic limitation, but 
also because of the influence that our desires and our habits exercise on 
our deliberative processes. Virtue theory is relevant in this connection: 
our habits are virtues when they enable reliable rational deliberative pro-
cesses in us, and shape the structure of our desires in ways which are 
conductive to recognizing and following good reasons for action. Habits 
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are also important in shaping our insights about good and evil, and in 
establishing the weight we give to different reasons in our deliberative 
processes. Fourthly, and finally, we are free to act against our best judg-
ments, even if our tendency to rationalize our bad deeds suggests that 
thus acting violates and forces our nature in important ways.5 
 
 
3. Politics as Something We Do 
 
The limitations of our practical rationality suggest important ways in 
which our agency is connected to, and depends on, the communities to 
which we belong. First, communities contribute to the constitution of 
our moral identity; second, communities can help our moral flourishing; 
third, communities can be burdens to our flourishing. Let us consider 
these points in turn. 
Communities contribute to the constitution of our identity in two 
main ways (De Anna 2012b, Chs. 3 and 4). First, our practical rationality 
depends on our linguistic abilities, and our linguistic abilities are shaped 
by community-based linguistic norms. Furthermore, pragmatics has 
shown many ways in which our community-normed language can create 
rituals and social facts which are both contents of our practical delibera-
tions and grounds for our practical judgments. Second, our habits, our 
virtues and our vices, are largely influenced by the education we received 
and, even as adults, by the social environment in which we live. Howev-
er communities shape our moral identities, they do not determine them: 
our practical rationality and our freedom are constitutive of us in ways 
that a community cannot change.  
Communities can help us to improve our practical rationality for at 
least two reasons. First, they furnish us with rules for interpreting moral 
reality which are the result of long traditions and often survived because 
they were good-conducive. This puts us in a better position than we 
                                                 
5 This fourth point is only available to compatibilists and libertarians about free will. I 
think that an acceptable conception of free will must lay in one these two families of posi-
tions, since I believe that deterministic conceptions of action fail to account for our experi-
ence of freedom and for our moral experience: two sections of our experience which are 
too basic to be bracketed away. I will not argue for this point here, however. 
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would be in if we had to start moral reasoning from scratch. Second, in 
communities we have to confront views of the good different from our 
own, endorsed by others: this forces us to press our epistemic limits and 
to improve our outlook of reality, and pushes us to develop our reason-
ing abilities for the sake of being able to justify our choices to others 
(Mill 1859, Ch. 1). 
Communities can, however, also be burdens to us: if we grow up in 
an abusive context we might develop quite distorted conceptions of what 
is good, and even in adult life, by being embedded in vicious social con-
texts, we might end up acquiring habits which put our capacity to recog-
nize and respond to good reasons at risk. 
The political community has a special role – among other communi-
ties – in shaping moral individuality. We can distinguish various kinds 
of community, depending on the purpose for which they exist and for 
which humans form or remain in them. The political community is dif-
ferent from other communities, since it does not exist for a particular 
purpose: the family is formed for the sake of everyday life (procreation 
and mutual support), an entrepreneurial society for the sake of a certain 
business, a sports club for practicing a certain sport. The political com-
munity, however, has no particular purpose of this kind. Why does the 
political community exist? We can note that by being in the political 
community we can do, at our best, anything we want to do. The political 
community helps us to excel in what we want to do. This means that it 
helps us to be better agents. The purpose of the political community, 
therefore, is to help us to develop our practical rationality, and it survives 
and keeps existing to the extent that, at least in a limited way, it fulfils 
this function (De Anna 2012a, Ch. 2). 
These claims are relevant both at the descriptive and at the normative 
level. What the political community does, and what it must do, is per-
fecting us. This is not a conceptual confusion, but it is a necessary con-
sequence, once we have abandoned the Humean assumption that hu-
man action is reducible to the combination of a desire and a belief. Since 
the political community is the result of our actions, it can only be under-
stood as a good, a reason we have to stay together. The aim of perfecting 
its members in practical rationality is therefore what causes a political 
community to be what it is, and what allows us to identify it as an “ob-
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ject.” Being a functional object, the political community has an end 
which is both the principle of identity and the normative ground for the 
choices that the community needs to make. Hence, its aim is also a cri-
terion for assessing a community. 
This account of the political community also explains a fact of our 
experience: the political community is superordinate to other communi-
ties, since it assesses whether and how they carry out their tasks, and 
rules them. All communities are outputs of our actions. Since the politi-
cal community aims at allowing us to do what we do at our best, it will 
also help us to make the most of the actions with which we constitute 
other communities. Hence, the political community also perfects other 
communities. To do this, it will have to take a stand about what is good 
for each of them, and it will have to rule them. 
Authority is the mode through which the political community 
achieves its end (Green 1990). By “authority,” I mean that the political 
community cannot use mere power, contra a common assumption of 
the social contract tradition: its ability to act is based on the recognition, 
on the part of its members, that it pursues a good and that it is reliable. 
Hence, authority is based on consent, seen as a rational recognition of a 
good, not as an option for any project whatsoever. This does not mean 
that every individual will agree with any decision of the authority. Rather 
it means that, although we can often be critical of the institutions and 
their decisions , we continue to think that, for the role they have taken in 
the course of their history, they are still worthy of our trust and that it is 
more rational to follow their prescriptions than to ignore or dismantle 
them. Authority is therefore not followed because it uses force (although 
sometimes it will also have to do that) and its exercise is always morally 
qualified, the criteria being whether it achieves a good that the commu-
nity can share and whether there is a normative reason for its decisions. 
The choices of authorities can be good or bad. 
To say that the political community should help its members to rec-
ognize and pursue the good does not mean that it should always enforce 
what seems good on those who have a decision-making function, for two 
reasons. First of all, even those who are in a position to make a decision 
that has political significance have limited practical rationality. For this 
reason, they should always doubt their understanding of what is true 
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and good. Second, those who hold political decision-making roles should 
not fully enforce all the goods that they recognize, since they must also 
consider the beliefs and expectations of the members of the community 
in which they have a role of authority, for three reasons. First, they shall 
only impose those goods that can be recognized as such, at least by a 
(non-necessarily numerically) significant section of the community, oth-
erwise authority collapses. Second, if an objective good radically trans-
cends the possibility of recognition of the members of the community, 
given their epistemic level, imposing it would de-humanize those on 
whom it is imposed. Human action is based on the ability to act freely 
and rationally. To impose an end on someone’s action when one genu-
inely cannot recognize that good as such, despite one’s sincere efforts, 
would amount to forcing one to act against what one sees as good and 
that kind of action would be to treat them as non-human. Third, even in 
the case of agents who want to do what they recognize as evil – i.e., who 
want to use their freedom in dubious ways, political authority must 
sometimes tolerate evil, in matters of no great moral weight: the growth 
of moral identity can sometimes require the experience of pain and the 
sense of defeat or loss that follows from moral failure. Accepting minor 
evils can lead to greater goods. 
These observations on the nature of the political community suggest 
that the community is something we do, and something we have a rea-
son to do, i.e. something which we see as good for us, since it helps us 
to reach a practical good which is such for all of us, i.e. the common 
good. The recognition and the pursuit of that good cannot be decided in 
the abstract, but only in the historical circumstances of the life of a 
community, i.e. from the point of view of the agents who give rise to the 
community or keep it existing by consenting to it. The upshot is that a 
certain plurality of visions of the good can and should be accepted, ac-
cording to the concrete historical circumstances of the community. The 
structure of the community, i.e. the features of all the individuals who 
constitute it and the arrangement of the kinds of humans that thereby 
shape it, define the range and the scope of the common good which a 
political community can recognize and seek. 
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4. Moderate Political Realism 
 
We have seen that the notion of a good is fundamental in shaping 
the choices of individual agents and in constituting the communities 
that individuals give rise to, including the political community. This ep-
istemically modest moral realism marks a considerable distance from 
the leading paradigm of political thinking, according to which political 
societies are aimed only at peace, seen as the end of conflict, i.e. at allow-
ing people to satisfy at the highest possible degree their desires – or 
whatever pro-attitudes they might have – under the assumption that 
those desires are the rulers of reason, and are not ruled by it. By con-
trast, the role that I have attributed to the good in human action suggests 
a quite different outlook concerning the relation between individuals 
and political communities. Political communities turn out to be more 
ontologically consistent than the leading paradigm suggests. Moral real-
ism leads to a form of political realism. 
Given the role of the good in shaping individual action and, hence, 
political consent, when political authority takes a position on a certain 
issue, such a commitment is seen as a moral judgment by the members 
of the community, and, thereby, it will influence their perception of the 
good and their moral reasoning. Similarly, when authority does not take 
a stand about a certain moral issue, even its silence will have a moral 
role, since it will be read – for example – as the statement that all alter-
native courses of action are morally on a par with this one. The silence of 
authority, then, is not neutral, but it has moral significance. 
This conclusion indicates that there is a quite strong tie between the 
political sphere and the individual sphere. The nature of the political 
community suggests various ways and different forms in which individ-
ual choices can influence the political sphere. In general it can be ob-
served that, if, as we have seen in the last paragraph, the end of the polit-
ical community is the good and the true, and if, as we have seen in the 
second paragraph, the goal of the individual is the good, then every hu-
man action is, in principle, politically relevant and therefore has a politi-
cal dimension. This does not mean, of course, that every human action 
must conform to a political decision or, still less, that it must depend on 
one: it just means, on the one hand, that each action can be evaluated by 
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political authorities and, secondly, that the mere fact that an action is 
performed calls for a public, political recognition of its legitimacy. 
We could say that the moral identity of an agent is shaped (though 
not determined) by his membership to a community, and primarily to a 
political community. Moral individuality is politically significant because 
the actions to which it gives rise, in their individuality and particularity, 
question, challenge and test the notion of the good that is recognized by 
the political community through the functions of its legitimate authority. 
This link between the individual and the public or communitarian 
dimension is also realized in other forms of community. Think of the 
linguistic community at large. The linguistic act with which one makes a 
promise is effective if it follows a certain ritual: for example, the person 
who performs it should pronounce the words with a serious tone, look-
ing at his interlocutor in the eyes, without laughing or making strange 
gestures in the meantime. Now suppose that I want to accomplish effec-
tive speech acts in order to produce a promise, but I do not follow the 
ordinary ritual. Of course, my actions will not deviate too much from the 
original ritual because otherwise my gestures would be ineffective. But 
suppose that I begin to perform acts that are intended to be valid only if, 
while I utter certain ritual words, I jump up and down. Among my 
friends, the rumour might spread that I give that meaning to this kind of 
acts and they may begin to use the same ritual. My new ritual might 
eventually be accepted by the entire community (and thereby acts which 
follow it will be accepted in the eyes of all members of the community) 
only if my new rule is universally accepted, that is if it gives birth to a 
recognized alternative of the rite of promising. My claim that one can 
promise in a certain way, in short, cannot be limited to my actions, but 
must have a “public” recognition. 
The case of the political community is different from that of other 
communities, due to the specific features of the political community: its 
direction to a good pertaining to all. An action done by a member of a 
political community has a claim to be recognized as good or at least neu-
tral by the whole community. We have seen that political authority may 
have to tolerate evil actions for the sake of avoiding greater evils. This 
silence can be read in an ambiguous way by the members of the com-
munity. Nevertheless, when one wants to do X, one thinks that X is good 
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or neutral, and one cannot therefore be satisfied if the authority lets 
someone do X for the sake of mere tolerance: she expects the recognition 
of the goodness or neutrality of X. For this reason, the acceptance of a 
plurality of mutually incompatible positions about the distinction be-
tween what is morally neutral, what is morally obligatory or permissible, 
what is tolerable and what is not tolerable will always be an unstable po-
sition, which calls for a solution to the epistemic and social problems 
which sometimes justify it. In short, political authority cannot but com-
promise itself about truth and about the good. 
The upshot of this is that by deciding to regulate a certain kind action 
or not to regulate it, authority cuts spaces of privacy from the realm of 
the public. The realm of privacy is then defined by the range of actions 
which are considered morally indifferent or tolerable. The realm of the 
public is that concerning matters in which authority judges that actions 
of members must be regulated. The sphere of moral indifference is 
filled with reasons that an agent is not obliged to respond to. The sphere 
of the tolerable is filled with reasons that an agent is obliged to respond 
to, although political authority judges that it is not reasonable to impose 
that obligation. The sphere of the public is filled with reasons that every 
rational agent has an obligation to respond to and such that authority 
judges necessary to enforce a response to them. 
As we have seen at the end of the second section, the border between 
the domains of morally relevant and morally neutral reasons depends on 
the perception of the good of each individual agent. Given that the polit-
ical community is something done by individual members in the ways 
considered in section three, the border between what is permissible, 
what is tolerable, and what must be publicly enforced cannot be set a 
priori: it depends on the perception of the good of the members of the 
community, on their shared traits – that is, their shared character and 
habits, and on the notion of a common good that they, as a political 
community, have reached at a certain point of their historical trajectory. 
This is not to say that such a distinction has no criteria of correctness: as 
we have seen, authority can persist and strengthen itself to the extent 
that it can reliably conduct its members to the good. The point, however, 
is not trivial. It suggests that we cannot expect that communities with 
different existential trajectories recognize the same borders between the 
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private and the public, between what is morally indifferent or at least 
tolerable, and what is to be ruled. Like the good, an explanation of an ac-
tion can only be recognized from the point of view of the agent, and just 
as an agent’s response depends both on his rationality and on the fea-
tures of his moral identity, so the common good of a community can on-
ly be practically recognized from the point of view of the community, i.e. 
from the point of view of its members. The moral identity of the mem-
bers, however, is shaped, although not determined, as we have seen, by 
the political community in which they live. We can now add that habits 
and moral individualities are not homogenous within a community: any 
community has an internal articulation of groups and sub-communities 
which is the result of its historical development. In a way, the articula-
tion of a community constitutes its individuality. Just as human individ-
uals can recognize the goods to reach towards with their actions only 
from the points of view of their moral individualities, so a community 
can only recognize the common good which can be accessed from the 
point of view of its articulation. 
The conclusion we have reached constitutes a sort of moderate politi-
cal realism: it takes political communities to have a certain degree of on-
tological consistency. The tie which binds the community together is the 
fit between the habits and the moral individualities of its members and 
the articulation of the community. This marks an important difference 
from the view of society supported by the leading paradigm: according to 
that view, individuals are independent atoms united only by the need for 
protection and by the desire to maintain the highest possible degree of 
independence. Virtually any set of rational beings can be bound together 
in that way. By contrast, my view purports that only humans suitable for 
a certain community can find a place where they fit in its articulation. 
The suggested realism, though, is moderate. By this I mean that the 
unity of the political community cannot be overstated. The bond is not 
such that it can ontologically determine its members. One is what one is 
– i.e., a rational agent with certain individual features – even if one does 
not remain in one’s community. According to the point of view that I 
am suggesting, a strong form of an organic conception of political enti-
ties, such as Hegel’s, makes the opposite mistake to the leading para-
digm. 
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An example is useful here to illustrate the half-way ontological status 
of political bonds that I propose. In our current multicultural societies, 
we often encounter people who have experienced abandoning their 
motherland and starting a new life abroad, very often in remote parts of 
the world. The very existence of migrants shows that the ontological sta-
tus of a person is not determined by her motherland(s). Migrants can go 
somewhere else and live a rich and fulfilling life, a life which is very of-
ten – and this is usually what they hope when they leave – much better 
than the life they could have expected in their motherland(s). However, 
no matter how well integrated they are in their new countries, many ex-
perience the feeling that they cannot be fully understood by their new 
fellow citizens, and that they cannot fully understand them either. Often 
they search for ways of socializing or living a public life which remind 
them the typical modes of their homelands. It is as if their habits and 
their ways of responding to situations of life were tuned for a certain 
form of social and political life, and they keep looking for it. As is typical 
for human affairs, this is not universally true, and there are cases of 
people who cannot fit in their homeland and find relief in other political 
communities. But as usual, in human affairs, generalizations hold statis-
tically, not absolutely. Furthermore, the very fact that someone does not 
fit in one’s homeland and has to flee shows that a fit is required for a 
functional and successful relation between individuals and political in-
stitutions. Hence, even if we are not ontologically made to be in our 
communities, in a sense we are shaped by them and for them. 
 
 
5. The Good in Political Discourse 
 
I started off by pointing out that, according to the leading paradigm, 
talking about the good in political contexts should be avoided, because it 
can fuel disagreement, whereas politics should seek the end of conflict. 
This normative implication is normally grounded – among others – on 
two premises: (i). That the ends of human actions are not ruled by rea-
son, but by desires which are potentially divergent and irreconcilable 
across different people; (ii). That political societies are formed for the 
sole sake of maximizing desire satisfaction. In the above sections I have 
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supported a view of human action and the political community which 
denies the views of practical reason and political society proposed by the 
leading paradigm. This takes the ground from under the feet of the 
normative implication about talking of the good in politics. My points, 
however, set the stage for two other steps, one descriptive and one nor-
mative: I would like to claim that talking about the good in political dis-
course is both unavoidable and, further, welcome. 
Ought implies can. So, we ought not to speak about the good in polit-
ical contexts only if this can be avoided. However, the points I have 
made above about individual action and the political community suggest 
that we cannot avoid speaking about the good in political contexts. 
Hence, it is not true that we ought not to speak about the good in politi-
cal contexts. This means that the normative implication of the leading 
paradigm on which I have been focusing from the beginning of this es-
say is not only ungrounded, it is also false. One might wonder: why do 
the points I made above about individual action and the political com-
munity suggest that we cannot avoid speaking about the good in political 
contexts? Well, recall that individual human agents aim always at what 
they see as good, and political communities aim always at what they can 
see as the common good. This implies that even if we do not use the 
word ‘good’ – or one of its derivatives or analogues – we still speak about 
the good when we speak about human action, individual or political. By 
not using the world ‘good’ – or one of its derivatives or analogues – we 
do not avoid really speaking about the good, but we speak about it in 
disguise. 
An apt example can be found in the leading paradigm itself. That 
paradigm promises to be neutral about the conceptions of the good that 
individual citizens embrace, and affirms that political discussions 
should focus on other issues. At the same time, however, it cannot really 
allow that all conceptions of the good which can possibly be held by citi-
zens be equally acceptable, since those which deny equal respect for the 
opinions of all should be ruled out from the spectrum of reasonable, ac-
ceptable positions. This claim, however, conceals a commitment toward 
a certain conception of the good, according to which a certain good is 
ranked as the highest, and as setting criteria for the evaluations of ac-
tions: this is the conception according to which the human will, or hu-
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man freedom (seen as the possibility of realizing at the highest possible 
degree one’s desires or pro-attitudes) is the highest good. My contention 
here is not that this conception is wrong, it is simply that it is a concep-
tion of the good, even if it is under disguise. My last, normative point is 
this: if commitment and reference to a conception of the good in politi-
cal contexts is unavoidable, then political philosophy and political prac-
tice should openly discuss the good in individual and political action, ra-
ther than in disguise. There are at least three simple reasons which sup-
port this normative claim. First, as Mill pointed out (1850, Ch. 1), when 
a statement, a theory, or a worldview, albeit true, is passed through a 
processes of public scrutiny and discussion, the rational warrant and the 
conviction of those who hold it are strengthened. Openly discussing the 
good reinforces confidence in it. Second, when conceptions of the good 
belonging to different political stake-holders are not openly discussed, 
unwarranted alliances can be formed, and these are likely to lead to un-
expected breakdowns, which are likely to ruin trust and cohesion among 
citizens. Third, when supporters of different conceptions of the good ar-
gue openly in favour of their views, they might eventually come to real-
ize – when that is the case – that they lack knock-down arguments which 
might convince all fellow-citizens of their views. When this happens, 
members of the community can be more tolerant toward positions dif-
ferent from their own, since they are able to recognize that other people 
hold views different from theirs, and do so rationally , not as a result of 
bad faith or hidden agendas. Hence, trust and collaboration will in-
crease. 
The leading paradigm does not question the legitimacy of talking 
about the good in political contexts for mistrust of these reasons, but ra-
ther for the fear that such a talk could be dangerous and increase social 
conflict. I would like now to argue that this fear is totally unwarranted. 
Certainly, the fear would be warranted if the assumptions of the leading 
paradigm that we have discussed were true, i.e. if practical reason were 
just an instrument for the satisfaction of desires which are quite arbi-
trary and criterion-less, and if the political community only had the role 
to stop, through its power, the conflict which would certainly arise 
among citizens entirely guided by potentially irreconcilable desires. In-
deed, in this case, if everyone were to bring their own personal concep-
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tions of the good as objective and real matters that everyone else should 
recognize and approve, conflict would increase. 
I have countered those assumptions, and the views that I have pro-
posed in their place promise very different results. I have suggested that 
human reason is not just the instrument for the satisfaction of criterion-
less desires, but the capacity to recognize an already partially realized 
order in reality and to find ways to improve it. I have also contended that 
the political community is not just an expedient to anesthetize conflict, 
but it is a way to reach a common good sharable by all members of the 
community. If this is so, the political discussion of different perspectives 
of the good is not likely to increase disagreement, but to overcome it. 
Furthermore, disagreement would be overcome not by the imposition of 
arbitrary solutions to all parts through the exercise of mere power, but 
by the rational agreement on a sharable perspective on the good reached 
through a discussion concerning what is good. 
The key point of the argument is that reasons have a content which 
presuppose the recognition of an order partially realized in reality and of 
possible ways of implementing it. Disagreement originates in the limita-
tions of our practical rationality, which I mentioned in section 2. The 
partiality of the point of view of each individual, and the constraints 
which might bias our responses to the normative reasons which we 
might otherwise recognise, play the fundamental role in generating dis-
agreement. Unlike desires which are deft to reason, however, our differ-
ent perspectives on the good can, in principle at least, be reconciled 
through rational processes. The first step would be to reach a sharable 
description of the facts which constitute the landscape in which a deci-
sion has to be taken. 
My point is not that once all the facts are spelled out properly practi-
cal disagreement will necessarily be overcome. Such a thesis would not 
be supported by my arguments. The account of practical reason given in 
section two is consistent with the possibility that two subjects might dis-
agree about what reasons they have, even if they agree on all the relevant 
facts. Indeed, I claimed that there is a subjective aspect of reasons, and 
different subjects may respond in different ways to the same facts. If one 
could show that human subjects are all akin in their metaphysical struc-
ture such that they will respond in similar manners when facing the 
Realism, Human Action and Political Life 
 
209 
same situations a stronger case for the possibility of agreement could be 
made. But I have not said anything to support that thesis in this essay. 
My argument here, however , does not rest on such a strong thesis. In 
order to reach my conclusion, it is enough to claim that discussions 
about the good increase the chances of overcoming disagreement in re-
spect to strategies in which reference to the good is avoided. 
My point is that if we do not try to rationally assess and compare our 
different perspectives on the good, the disagreement among our views 
will certainly be maintained, and all the sacrifices which will have to be 
made of the parties in order to give equal satisfactions to everyone, will 
be taken ultimately as unjust frustrations of one’s desires. On the other 
hand, if we try to assess and compare our perspectives on the good, it is 
at least possible that some of us can correct our judgments about order 
in a direction leading to agreement. Even in less fortunate cases, when 
one does not revise one's own response to normative reasons which lead 
to disagreement with others, realizing that others have grounds for their 
reasons will make accepting this alternative reason as an obligation 
more tolerable. Hence, political practice should involve also a rational as-
sessment and a discussion of the perspectives on the good supported by 
the members of the community. 
It can be concluded that the debates about realism in epistemology, 
action theory, normative theory and ethics have important consequences 
on political philosophy too, and that a careful study of latter is needed.6 
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Determining Ius according to Thomas Aquinas. 
A Realistic Model for Juridical Decisions1 
 
Elvio Ancona 
 
 
1. The New Role of Jurisdiction in the Contemporary Juridical Universe and 
the Problem of the Criterion of Judgment in Determining what is Just 
 
One of the most significant phenomena in the transformations un-
derway in the contemporary juridical universe is the centrality that juris-
diction has taken on in States of constitutional law and in the global jurid-
ical space.2 This is not a matter merely of its decisive role in shaping a just 
legal system and in applying the laws, a matter which, however, has al-
ready been highlighted by the various exponents of juridical hermeneu-
tics.3 Neither is it simply a matter of the new institutional role carried out 
by the judiciary, invested with the task of “substituting” for the legislator, a 
role exercised in the spaces left empty by an incomplete, contradictory, or 
even inexistent legislation. This role reached imposing dimensions above 
all in the post-war social welfare State.4 The increased cogency of superior 
sources, such as the Constitution and international and supranational 
treatises, centred on safeguarding fundamental rights, makes the situation 
even more complex, creating a pluralistic and polycentric layout, on ac-
count of which, even if there were laws and these were clear and could be 
easily applied, oftentimes it would not be sufficient merely to refer to 
them in resolving the hard cases of our times.5 In this situation, then, the 
                                                 
1 The work for this publication was partially supported by the Italian National Project PRIN 
2012 L’Universalità e i suoi limiti (prof. Loris Sturlese, National coordinator), Research Unit 
of the University of Udine, Dipartimento di Studi umanistici (Prof. Andrea Tabarroni, 
Unit coordinator), funded by the Italian Ministry of Research. 
2 Cf. Malleson 1999; Ferrarese 2002, 187 ff.; Bork 2003; Allard and Garapon 2005; Cassese 2009.  
3 Cf. Esser 1972; Zaccaria 1996. For other precedents in the post-war philosophy of law of the 
thesis of the primacy of judgment in administering justice, cf. Bastit 2006, especially 144. 
4 Cf. Cappelletti 1984.  
5 Cf. Garapon 1996.  
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judge takes on weight and importance, since he is now obliged to base 
himself to a much greater degree on principles and on values than on the 
rules, and thus finds himself restored to his classic role of procurator of 
justice,6 no longer being able to be considered a mere spokesman for the 
law.7 
But at this point, a grave problem emerges. Once the role of positive law 
has been re-dimensioned, how can the judges’ discretion be oriented, and 
how can their whims be limited? And no less an issue, how can a just deci-
sion be guaranteed? Perhaps there are other parameters to be observed? Are 
there other limits to the creativity of the courts? It thus becomes necessary 
to answer the question regarding the criterion of judgment. 
It immediately becomes evident, regarding this issue, that, to avoid 
the difficulties just mentioned, if this criterion cannot be subjective, nei-
ther can it be the abstract objectivity of the law. We must thus ascertain 
whether there exists another type of objectivity. 
The Thomistic reflection on ius offers in this regard some interesting 
indications. It presents itself, in fact, as a particularly privileged observa-
tory, since in it, too, the legal system finds in judgment its fulcrum and 
judgment proves to be regulated by a criterion that is not primarily the 
application of the law but the achievement of justice. 
Achieving justice is carried out, however, in this case according to an es-
sentially realistic kind of objectivity,8 as shown by the definitions of ius as 
ipsa res iusta and of the medium iustitiae as medium rei, and as will emerge in 
the following pages from the study of the thought that underlies them. 
In this essay, what will be firstly sought is to specify the conception 
of judicially-oriented law promoted by Thomas Aquinas; then, an exam-
ination of the peculiar solution proposed by Aquinas to the problem of 
the measure in judicial decisions will follow. So it will be possible to un-
derstand better, in its realistic objectivity, recognizable through dialec-
tics, the meaning and role of justice in the Thomistic doctrine of ius. 
                                                 
6 The reference is to the known Aristotelian representation of the judge as «living justice» 
(Nicomachean Ethics, V, 1132 a 20 ff.). 
7 The reference is to the known Montesquian representation of the judge as “the mouth-
piece of the law” (Esprit de loix, XI, 6).  
8 On realism in the Thomistic legal thought, De Bertolis (2000, 33-34) gives particular at-
tention. 
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2. Ius as Ipsa Res Iusta according to the Thomistic Conception 
 
Let us begin then with an initial consideration. The Thomistic reflec-
tion on ius proves particularly interesting because for Aquinas as well, 
judgment, in determining what is just, carries out a leading role and car-
ries it out precisely as an expression of justice, so that, through judg-
ment, what is just is determined correctly not only on the basis of the 
application of the law, but, perhaps in an even greater measure, on the 
basis of the ways in which it is applied.9 This is due, above all, precisely 
to the role that the first of the moral virtues10 plays here, and thus to the 
close relationship that the Dominican master establishes between iust-
itia, ius and iudicium, since what Thomas calls ius is nothing other than 
obiectum iustitiae11 and iudicium is actus iustitiae.12 
To understand, then, how Thomas conceives the determining of ius 
it is firstly necessary to keep in mind that quaestio 57 de iure appears in 
the Summa Theologiae at the beginning of the part in the Secunda secun-
dae dedicated to the virtue of justice.13 This is a placement made to some 
degree necessary by the fact that, since justice, as for that matter every 
habitus,14 is specified by its own formal object, its respective treatment 
could not but begin with the defining of this object, which is ius sive 
iustum.15 
                                                 
9 See, in particular, in this regard, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 5 and ad 2, with the excel-
lent comment by Villey 1987, 57-74. We note that in this present essay the Thomistic texts 
are cited, always by referring to the editio optima (cf. http://www.corpusthomisticum. 
org/reoptedi.html) and without mentioning each time the name of the Author, with the 
customary abbreviations.  
10 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 66, a. 4. 
11 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. 
12 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1. 
13 We are referring to the part of the Secunda Secundae that goes from q. 57 to q. 122 and 
about which – Thomas writes in the proemio – “quadruplex consideratio occurrit: prima 
est de iustitia; secunda de partibus eius; tertia de dono ad hoc pertinente; quarta de prae-
ceptis ad iustitiam pertinentibus.” See in this regard Ambrosetti 1974, 1-20.  
14 Cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 54, a. 2. 
15 Regarding this endiad, it is necessary to recall how it presupposes the identification es-
tablished both in the commentary to the Nichomacean Ethics, where it is said that the ju-
rists “idem nominant […] ius quod Aristotiles iustum” (Sententia Ethic., V, l. 12, vv. 15-16), 
and in the passage of the Etymologiae di Isidoro (Lib. V, cap. 3; PL 82, 199) referred to in 
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To be able to adequately define it, yet, Thomas had to be able to dis-
tinguish its main meaning from those secondary to or derived from it. 
Like the nomen medicinae, in fact, so too ius is an analogous term, which 
possesses multiple meanings. Aquinas lists them with precision: “the 
term ius was initially given to the just thing in itself [ad significandum ip-
sam rem iustam]; subsequently it was extended to the art through which 
one knows what is just; then it came to indicate the place where justice 
is done, as when one says that someone appears in iure; and finally it 
was named ius also that which is established by he by whose office is re-
sponsible for rendering justice, even when what he decides is unjust.”16 
We can easily understand that it is with the enucleation of the first 
meaning, the main one, that we have the acceptation on the basis of 
which ius is qualified as obiectum iustitiae.17 The ipsa res iusta is truly 
nothing other than the iustum, which for Thomas constitutes the object 
of the acts of justice,18 and which is precisely identical to the ius.19 
The acceptation of ius as ipsa res iusta remains, however, still some-
what mysterious and vague, telling us only that it involves “something 
objective”20 and being able to refer equally to a thing, an action or a per-
formance of a work.21 Its meaning can, moreover, be specified precisely 
                                                                                                       
the Sed contra of article 1 of this quaestio: “ius dictum est quia est iustum” (Summa Theol., 
II-II, q. 57, a. 1, s. c.).  
16 “[…] etiam hoc nomen ius primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam rem iustam; 
postmodum autem derivatum est ad artem qua cognoscitur quid sit iustum; et ulterius ad 
significandum locum in quo ius redditur, sicut dicitur aliquis comparere in iure; et ulteri-
us dicitur etiam ius quod redditur ab eo ad cuius officium pertinet iustitiam facere, licet 
etiam id quod decernit sit iniquum” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1).  
17 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1. 
18 Cf. Ibid.: “Sic igitur iustum dicitur aliquid, quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae, ad quod 
terminatur actio iustitiae.” 
19 Cf. Ibid.: “Et hoc quidem est ius.” 
20 So it is for Giuseppe Graneris: “qualcosa di oggettivo e non soggettivo” (Graneris 1961, 
78); so it is also for Ambrosetti: “qualcosa di reale e di obiettivo” (Ambrosetti 1974, 7). For 
a widespread treatment, see in any case Darbellay 1963, 59-77. 
21 Cf. Delos 1932, 231, n. 1; Darbellay 1962, 68; Ambrosetti 1974, 7 (all of which refer to the 
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 61, a. 3). See also Finnis 1996, 223: “per ‘cosa,’ come si chiarisce dal 
contesto, egli [l’Aquinate] intende atti, oggetti e rapporti in quanto oggetto di relazioni di 
giustizia.” 
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by considering the implications of the fact that, as we have just seen, it 
proves to coincide with the obiectum iustitiae.  
Justice, in fact, is in turn defined as “the habit through which – with 
constant and perpetual will – one’s own right [ius suum] is attributed to 
one.”22 Now, - Thomas writes a little further on – “it is said to be own of 
each person that which is due to him according to a proportional equiva-
lence [quod ei secundum proportionis aequalitatem debetur].”23 One deduc-
es that the ius, the ipsa res iusta, is that which is each individual’s “own,” 
not inasmuch as it is already possessed, but inasmuch as it is due him 
by others. With one important clarification: secundum proportionis aequal-
itatem. Aquinas also defines it thusly: “that is said to be just in our activi-
ty what is proportional to the other according to a certain equality [quod 
respondet secundum aliquam aequalitatem alteri];”24 or thus: “ius, or 
iustum, is a work adequate to the other according to a certain equality 
[aliquod opus adaequatum alteri secundum aliquem aequalitatis modum].”25 
It must not, however, be understood in the sense of a facultas, the 
subjective power or right of each person over that which is due them, 
nor does it seem that this could be considered even as one of the sec-
ondary meanings of ius, like some scholars26 retain on the basis of an 
interpretation with a fairly long lineage.27 While it cannot be denied that 
occasionally Thomas has used the term ius in this sense,28 he not only 
                                                 
22 “[…] iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius 
suum unicuique tribuit” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 1).  
23 “Hoc autem dicitur esse suum uniuscuiusque personae quod ei secundum proportionis 
aequalitatem debetur” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 11).  
24 “[…] illud enim in opere nostro dicitur esse iustum quod respondet secundum aliquam 
aequalitatem alteri” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1). 
25 “[…] ius, sive iustum, est aliquod opus adaequatum alteri secundum aliquem aequalitatis 
modum” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 2).  
26 Cf., to quote the most representative ones: Hering 1939, 295-297; Thomas 1956 (Intro-
ducción by T. Urdánoz), 187 ss., 196 ss.; Lamas 1991, 317 ff.; Finnis 1998, 132 ff. 
27 Cf. F. De Vitoria, Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Sancto Tomás, q. 62, n. 5; F. 
Suarez, De legibus, l. I, c. 2, n. 5. See, on this point, Folgado 1960.  
28 Hering 1939 has identified fourteen Thomistic passages in which ius appears as subjec-
tive right. This makes sense, as Tierney has observed, because “the canonists often used 
the word ius to mean a subjective right, and when Aquinas discussed the same or similar 
issues […] he unreflectively borrowed their language” (Tierney 2002, 416-417).  
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fails to mention it in his “official”29 list, but in all likelihood did so on 
purpose. It has been authoritatively recalled, in fact, that he could not 
have confused ius with the faculty to exercise it,30 nor the limitation of a 
power with the power itself.31 
But if it is not subjective right, neither is ius the lex, as is sustained by 
an even more ancient and venerable line of interpretation.32 Indeed, lex 
is something other than ius proper. Responding to a specific question on 
this point,33 Thomas states this clearly: “lex non est ipsum ius, proprie lo-
quendo, sed aliqualis ratio iuris.”34 Aliqualis ratio iuris: many translations 
have been proposed,35 but we may note that they are all linked by the 
idea that in this passage, ratio denotes the lex as a measure of the ius. 
Lex, therefore, is not the ius, but the measure, the principle, in reference 
to which the ius is determined by justice.  
The lex, however, both the lex naturalis and the lex positiva, consti-
tutes only that which one might call the “extrinsic measure” of the ius,36 
a measure, for that matter, common to the objects of all the moral vir-
                                                 
29 Cf., supra, n. 15.  
30 Cf. Lachance 1933, 401. 
31 Cf. Villey 1969, 149.  
32 See on this matter, regarding the tradition that originates with the biblical exegesis of 
the Fathers of the Church, Villey 1976, 19-50. For more specific reference to the second 
Spanish Scholastic age, cf. Folgado 1960, I, 22.  
33 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, arg. 2. 
34 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2. It is hardly the case to recall how in the literature on 
the Thomistic juridical doctrine the relation between ius and lex has been understood in 
many ways: it goes from opposition (cf. Villey 1973, especially 28) to complementarity (cf. 
Tierney 2001, 26), to identification, by metonimia (cf. Kalinowski 1973, 64, 70, 72) or, with 
specific reference to the expressions lex naturalis and ius naturale, to equivalence (cf. De 
Bertolis 2000, 71 and n. 105). 
35 We limit ourselves here to mention the translations of the main national editions of the 
Summa: “la règle du droit” (Thomas Aquinas 1932, 14); “la norma remota del diritto” 
(Thomas Aquinas 1984, 32; Thomas Aquinas 1996, 446); “die Ursache des Rechts” (Thom-
as Aquinas 1987, 5); “cierta razón del derecho” (Thomas Aquinas 1956, 233; Thomas 
Aquinas 1990, 471); “an expression of right” (Thomas Aquinas 1947); “a design for a right” 
(Thomas Aquinas 1975, 7); “nějaký výraz práva” (Thomas Aquinas 1937-1940).  
36 Cf., in this sense, Summa Theol., I-II, q. 90, proemium. G. Letelier Widow stresses suita-
bly the need to discover the “extrinsic” character and not “external” of the Thomistic lex 
(Letelier Widow 2010-2011, 212-215). 
Determining Ius according to Thomas Aquinas 
 
219 
tues. In addition to it, there is an intrinsic measure, exclusive to the ius 
inasmuch as it is an obiectum iustitiae. Precisely as obiectum iustitiae, in 
fact, the ius is characterised by a specific rectitudo proper to it, which 
arises per comparationem ad alium, and not, as occurs with the other vir-
tues, only in relation to the moral dispositions of the acting subject. 
“This is why,” Aquinas argues, “the object of justice, which is called 
iustum, is determined in itself [determinatur secundum se] in a special way 
with regard to the other virtues. And ius is, precisely, this.”37  
The ius is therefore determined as aequalitas according to a twofold 
measure, that is, both in relation to the lex, and in relation to the inter-
ests of others, or more completely, it is termed aequalitas with respect to 
what is due by lex to others. And so it is that ius attributes its “own” to 
each one, realising in this way, as we have seen,38 the opus typical of jus-
tice. 
One may therefore conclude that the ius is determined in the man-
ner in which justice determines it, according to its own peculiar modes 
of action. There remains, moreover, still to understand how exactly 
this determination is made, that is, more concretely said, how its rela-
tion with its two measures is articulated. Well, we can doubtless find a 
great help in our search by considering that the specifying act of the 
virtue of justice is iudicium.39 In fact, it is through iudicium that justice 
determines the ius sive iustum.40 To this now, we must therefore turn 
our attention. 
 
 
3. The Judicial Determination of the Ipsa Res Iusta as Medium Iustitiae 
 
To iudicium Thomas dedicates the six articles of quaestio 60 of the 
Secunda secundae. 
In the first article, Utrum iudicium sit actus iustitiae, he affirms that 
the determination of the ius occurs in judgment. Judgment, in fact, 
                                                 
37 “Et propter hoc specialiter iustitiae prae aliis virtutibus determinatur secundum se obiec-
tum, quod vocatur iustum. Et hoc quidem est ius” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1). 
38 Cf., supra, n. 24. 
39 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1.  
40 Ibid.  
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writes Aquinas, “properly indicates the action of a judge as such. A 
judge, moreover, is such inasmuch as he is ius dicens. Now, as we have 
seen, ius is the object of justice. Therefore judgment, according to its 
first definition, implies the defining or determining [definitionem vel de-
terminationem] of the ius sive iustum. The fact, however, that one defines 
correctly what regards virtuous ations depends properly on the habit of 
the virtue, so he who is chaste evaluates correctly what regards chastity. 
Therefore, judgment, which implies the upright determination of what 
is just [rectam determinationem eius quod est iustum], belongs properly to 
justice [proprie pertinet ad iustitiam].”41 
Judgment is therefore the act that says, defines, or determines, the 
ius sive iustum. One can well understand then that from the considera-
tion of the factors that have seemed to us relevant to the meaning of ius, 
one can deduce the primary requisites of judgment. We may list them in 
the following terms: judgment must be an act of justice,42 judgment 
must determine that which is each person’s own (or that which is due 
each person),43 judgment must be emanated in accordance with the 
lex,44 judgment must re-establish equality in relations with others.45 It is 
only when judgment is described in this manner that it states, defines, 
or determines the ius. 
If all this can be recognised without difficulty, other specifications 
are necessary, however, regarding the role of justice in the determina-
tion of the ius that takes place in judgment.  
On this matter, it is necessary above all to highlight an important 
implication underlying the affirmation that “judgment belongs, properly 
                                                 
41 “[…] iudicium proprie nominat actum iudicis inquantum est iudex. Iudex autem dicitur 
quasi ius dicens. Ius autem est obiectum iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo iudicium 
importat, secundum primam nominis impositionem, definitionem vel determinationem 
iusti sive iuris. Quod autem aliquis bene definiat aliquid in operibus virtuosis proprie 
procedit ex habitu virtutis: sicut castus recte determinat ea quae pertinent ad castitatem. Et 
ideo iudicium, quod importat rectam determinationem eius quod est iustum, proprie 
pertinet ad iustitiam” (Ibid.).  
42 Cf. Ibid. 
43 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 67, a. 4. 
44 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 5. 
45 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 63, a. 4. 
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speaking, to justice.»46 Given that judgment, as we have described it, is 
first of all the act of the judge, it is necessary straightaway to specify that 
it is not merely reducible to this act, but must be understood, more gen-
erally, as the act of the just man, whoever he may be.47 The judgment of 
the judge constitutes only the main analogous instance of it. 
Judgment, in addition, takes other meanings in the Thomistic text: 
“the term iudicium, which in its first meaning designated the correct de-
termination of what is just [rectam determinationem iustorum], was later 
employed to denote the correct determination in any field [rectam deter-
minationem in quibuscumque rebus], both on in speculative contexts and 
in practical contexts.”48 Here, what comes into relief, in addition to the 
judgment of the judge and of the just man, is the reference to an even 
wider meaning of the term, common to various types of intellectual op-
erations, but above all what emerges is the note that identifies it with 
precision: the recta determinatio. The rectitudo of the determinatio, in fact, 
does not in itself imply justice, but only the congruousness in identify-
ing the action proper to each object, in the speculative context as well as 
the practical realm.49 
The problem, therefore, that Thomas poses, given that it is not only a 
question of justice, is to ascertain whether, as the argumenta which in-
troduce the article suggest,50 there come together, in the formation of 
the different types of judgment, other habitus, in particular prudence, 
charity, and the other moral virtues. And anticipating this eventuality, 
Aquinas asks, moreover, whether there is a contribution they make to 
that specific judgment that consists in determining the ius, and, if so, 
what virtue would have pre-eminence.  
In the answers, the Dominican master develops and clarifies his own 
thought. In the first and third, he affirms that there is not only the 
                                                 
46 Cf., supra, n. 40. 
47 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 2 e 4. 
48 “[…] nomen iudicii, quod secundum primam impositionem significat rectam 
determinationem iustorum, ampliatum est ad significandum rectam determinationem in 
quibuscumque rebus, tam in speculativis quam in practicis” (ivi, ad 1).  
49 See in this regard the distinction between «three senses of quod est rectum» proposed by 
Pattaro 2010, 689-691.  
50 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1, argg. 1, 2 e 3. 
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judgment of the just man, but there are as many judgments, albeit in a 
wider sense [extenso tamen nomine iudicii],51 as there are moral virtues: 
«thus, in the things regarding justice judgment proceeds from justice; in 
the same way, in the things regarding fortitude, it proceeds from forti-
tude»52. Nevertheless, the judgment of the just man maintains its own 
specificity, at least inasmuch as – since justice regulates relationships 
with others – it is mainly identified with the judgment of the superior 
who in such relationships serves as an arbitrator [qui utrumque valeat ar-
guere].53  
Among the types of judgments considered, there is then the judg-
ment of the spiritual man, inspired by charity, in regard to which we 
read in the second answer the following parallel: “The spiritual man re-
ceives from the habit of charity the inclination to judge uprightly of eve-
rything according to the divine laws, observing which he pronounces his 
judgment through the gift of wisdom; the just man pronounces his 
judgment according to the human laws through the virtue of pru-
dence.”|54 
More articulate is the discourse on prudence, which is invoked in 
this passage and had already been widely discussed in the first reply. 
The first reply stated that the upright judgment presupposes two factors: 
the dispositio iudicantis, on which depends the inclination to judge right-
ly, and the virtus proferens iudicium, the faculty empowered to directly ar-
ticulate the judgment. If, therefore, under the first aspect, at least in his 
quae ad iustitiam pertinent, the judgment proceeds from justice, under 
the second, the judgment is an act of reason and thus requires the exer-
cise of prudence.55 
                                                 
51 Cf. Ivi, ad 3. 
52 “Et sic in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent iudicium procedit ex iustitia: sicut et in his 
quae ad fortitudinem pertinent ex fortitudine” (ivi, ad 1). 
53 Cf. Ivi, ad 3. 
54 “[…] homo spiritualis ex habitu caritatis habet inclinationem ad recte iudicandum de 
omnibus secundum regulas divinas, ex quibus iudicium per donum sapientiae pronuntiat: 
sicut iustus per virtutem prudentiae pronuntiat iudicium ex regulis iuris» (ivi, ad 2).  
55 Cf. Ivi, at 1: «[…] ad iudicium duo requiruntur rectum. Quorum unum est ipsa virtus 
proferens iudicium. Et sic iudicium est actus rationis: dicere enim vel definire aliquid 
rationis est. Aliud autem est dispositio iudicantis, ex qua habet idoneitatem ad recte 
iudicandum. Et sic in his quae ad iustitiam pertinent iudicium procedit ex iustitia […]. Sic 
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Now, we know that the specific task of prudence is to determine ra-
tionally within the moral virtues the medium virtutis.56 But we also know 
that in the case of justice the medium is the aequale in relationships with 
others.57 As writes Thomas, “the happy medium of justice [medium iust-
itiae] consists in a certain equality of proportion [in quadam proportionis 
aequalitate] of an external reality with an external person.”58 We must 
therefore conclude that the specific duty of the prudence proper to the 
judge or the just man is to determine rationally the aequalitas in what is 
due to each one. And aequalitas is, as we have seen,59 an essential and 
indispensable attribute of the ius, its formal constitutive element. 
The ius is therefore realised in judgment by justice as its efficient 
principle, but specified by prudence from the point of view of formal 
causality, i.e. – we could more succinctly say – It is “determined” in 
judgment as willed by justice and known by prudence. And since, as we 
have seen,60 the prudential determinatio is the work of reason,61 it is then 
                                                                                                       
ergo iudicium est quidam actus iustitiae sicut inclinantis ad recte iudicandum: prudentiae 
autem sicut iudicium proferentis. Unde et synesis, ad prudentiam pertinens, dicitur ‘bene 
iudicativa.’” On the rational nature of jurisprudence, see, in particular: Super III Sent., d. 
33, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 4; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 56, a. 2, ad 3; ivi, II-II, q. 47, aa. 1 and ff.; Sen-
tentia Ethic., VI, l. 4.  
56 Cf. Super III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 3; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3; ivi, II-II, q. 47, a. 
7.  
57 See, in this regard, the lectiones 4-10 of of the Thomistic commentary to book five of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, as well as: Super IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 4, ad 4; ivi, d. 15, q. 1, a. 
1, qc. 2; Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 10; ivi, q. 61, aa. 2-3; ivi, q. 81, a. 5, ad 3; ivi, a. 6, ad 1; 
ivi, III, q. 85, a. 3, ad 2; De malo, q. 13, a. 1.  
58 “[…] medium iustitiae consistit in quadam proportionis aequalitate rei exterioris ad per-
sonam exteriorem” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 10).  
59 Cf., supra, nn. 22-24.  
60 Cf., supra, n. 54.  
61 Particularly significant in this regard is the introduction of the famous passage that ends 
with the definition of the lex as aliqualis ratio iuris: “[…] illius operis iusti quod ratio deter-
minat quaedam ratio praeexistit in mente, quasi quaedam prudentiae regula. Et hoc si in 
scriptum redigatur, vocatur lex” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2). One should also 
note that here the decisive action of prudence in judging is manifest also in the application 
of the lex. It is in relation to the latter aspect that, referring to the process of positivisation 
of natural lex described in Summa Theol., I-II, 95, 2, Massini Correas highlights another 
connotation of determinatio: “en la prudencia se trata no sólo de una mera conclusión, sino 
también de una determinación, precisión o especificación de lo correcto, adecuado o debido 
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properly also as a rational expression of prudence that the judgment, re-
storing the aequalitas in relationships, determines the ius.62 
This result, however, creates a problem. We have to ask ourselves: 
how does the objectivity of prudential reason manifest itself in Thomis-
tic juridical language? Which epistemic forms does it take in the judicial 
search for the happy medium? What scientific measures does it adopt? 
What in substance is its specific rectitudo? Thomas does not offer us 
much more than his references to the “equality of proportion,” i.e. to the 
criteria of distributive justice and geometric proportionality, but we can 
nevertheless find some further information on this point in his doctrine 
of medietas, and in doing so, we make further headway in this last leg of 
our journey.63 
 
 
4. The Determination of Medium Iustitiae as Medium Rei in the Via Media 
 
In the wake of his Master, Albert the Great,64 Thomas believes that, 
unlike other moral virtues, in the case of justice the medium virtutis is 
not only medium rationis but coincides with the medium rei.65 And the 
medium rei is precisely what can be discovered judicially only through a 
careful comparison of the respective juridical positions of the parties. 
                                                                                                       
en una situación concreta” (Massini Correas, 18). For other meanings taken on by the term 
determinatio in the lexicon of the Late Medieval university institutions, cf. Weijers 1987, 
348-355, 404-407. 
62 Cf. Thomas 1956 (Introducción by T. Urdánoz), 311-312. More generally, on the interac-
tion between prudence and the moral virtues, see Ramirez 1978, 187-188. 
63 The “equality of proportion of an external reality with an outside person” (see, supra, n. 
57) which takes place in the judgment implies that geometric proportionality which shapes 
distributive justice (cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 61, a. 2). We limit ourselves here to refer to 
this, and not also to commutative justice, certainly not to deny the importance of the latter, 
but because only the former is required in every kind of judgment, even when the judg-
ment relates to swaps or trades (see Summa Theol., II-II, q. 63, a. 4).  
64 Cf. Albertus Magnus, De bono. Quaestio IV (addita), a. 7; Id., Super Ethica commentum et 
quaestiones libri quinque priores, V, l. 5; ivi, l. 8. Some references to the Albertine doctrine of 
medium rei are found in Tarabochia Canavero 1986, 123-126 and 129, n. 49.  
65 Cf. Super III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 64, a. 2; ivi, II-II, q. 58, a. 
10; ivi, q. 61, a. 2, ad 1; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 13, ad 7; Quodlibet VI, q. 5, a. 4; Sententia Eth-
ic., V, l. 1, vv. 35-38.  
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The judges themselves are presented as medii vel mediatores in this 
sense, “as if they reach what is the medium in that they lead to what is 
just,” i.e. on the grounds that they establish “what is equal between the 
parties [quod est inter partes aequale], where the equal is the middle [me-
dium] between the more and the less.”66 
 However, an important clarification is necessary at this point. On 
the one hand, as the medium rei, the medium iustitiae cannot regard only 
the claims of the parties, addressing rather their effective right; on the 
other hand, the claim of each party is not at all insignificant in finding 
the medium iustitiae, since it is always beginning from that claim that 
what is right can be recognized. 
This is a fundamental implication of the Thomistic perspective, and 
it shows its difference from all the theories that conceive of what is just 
as a mere enforcement of laws. This difference is in fact strictly linked to 
the role that the parties play in determining the ius and to the conse-
quences that derive from it also on the epistemological level.  
Indeed, although on the topic there exist in the treatise de iustitia of the 
Summa Theologiae some particularly significant articles,67 to find the most 
interesting indications from the epistemological point of view, we have to 
abandon the terrain of reflection on the ius and consider the theological 
and philosophical contexts that serve as a backdrop for a peculiar branch 
of the doctrine of medietas, which surfaced through the technical use of 
                                                 
66 Sententia Ethic., V, l. 6, vv. 152-153, 157-158. But consider the whole sentence that 
contains the passages mentioned: “[…] quia iustum est medium inter damnum et lucrum, 
inde est quod, quando homines dubitant de hoc, refugiunt ad iudicem, quod idem est ac si 
refugerent ad id quod est iustum; nam iudex debet esse quasi quoddam iustum 
animatum, ut scilicet mens eius totaliter a iustitia possideatur. Illi autem qui refugiunt ad 
iudicem videntur quaerere medium inter partes quae litigant, et inde est quod iudices 
vocant medios vel mediatores, ac si ipsi attingant medium in hoc quod perducunt ad id 
quod est iustum. Sic ergo patet quod iustum de quo nunc loquimur est quoddam medium, 
quia iudex qui determinat hoc iustum medius est, in quantum scilicet constituit id quod 
est aequale inter partes, aequale autem medium est inter plus et minus, ut supra dictum 
est” (ivi, vv. 143-159).  
67 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 67, a. 3; ivi, q. 68, a. 2. It should be noted, among other things, 
how in these articles, even in an era when the inquisitorial procedure was widely being 
used, above all in the ecclesiastical jurisdictions, Thomas shows his preference for an ac-
cusatory-type legal system. See on this point: Laingui 1994, especially 37-38.  
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the phrase via media. We read what perhaps is the most effective descrip-
tion of it in the passage of the Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem 
where Aquinas invokes the Boethian controversy against the opposing 
heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches. There he proposes: “because, as Boe-
thius writes in the book De duabus naturis, the way of faith ‘is the interme-
diate between two heresies [via fidei inter duas haereses media est] in the 
same way as the virtues lie in the middle (between two vices) [sicut virtutes 
medium locum tenent], virtue consisting of the happy medium [omnis enim 
virtus in medio rerum decore locata consistit],’ and since, if an action is ful-
filled either this side or that side of what it should be, it strays from the 
virtue, let us try to understand about the themes we are discussing what 
lies this side or that side of the truth, so that we can judge all this errone-
ous, and the middle way as the truth of faith.”68 
Two operations are accomplished in this passage: first, the identifica-
tion of via media as the way of truth between two errors; secondly, the 
assimilation of the via media with the Aristotelian doctrine of the medi-
um virtutis.69 The medium virtutis thus must be found in the same way in 
which the via media between two errors is found.  
To understand well this thesis, we must consider that, normally, the 
expression via media designates a doctrine elaborated by combining two 
opposing opinions.70 The via media, therefore, corresponds to a type of 
solution frequently found in scholastic disputes, where, as Villey noted, 
“la détermination du Maître a moins pour rôle de réfuter l’une des deux 
                                                 
68 Contra impugnantes, c. 4, § 6, vv. 335-343: “Quia vero, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de duabus 
naturis, via fidei “inter duas haereses media est, sicut virtutes medium locum tenent: om-
nis enim virtus in medio rerum decore locata consistit:” si quid enim vel ultra vel infra 
quam oportuerit fiat, a virtute disceditur; ideo videamus quid circa praedicta sit ultra vel 
infra quam rei veritas habeat: ut hoc totum reputemus errorem, mediam autem viam fidei 
veritatem.” A similar reference to Boethius is found in the Summa Theol., I-II, q. 64, a. 4 
arg. 3. The quoted text is the treatise Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Nestorium et 
Euthychen, par. 7 (P.L. 64, col. 1352C).  
69 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1106 to 26 ff. 
70 The original meaning of the via media was therefore methodological, and only later it 
took on a ecclesiological-political connotation, when the phrase was used, in the first half 
of the 14th century, in the polemical context of the dispute regarding the two powers. See, 
in this regard, Pacaut 1958.  
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thèses antagonistes que de les concilier, les coordonner.”71 It is necessary 
at once to alert the reader that this is not always the path Thomas fol-
lows, and that indubitably in his writings the via media does not always 
correspond to the way of truth. But, as results from studies by Philipp 
W. Rosemann,72 we can say that, when he considers it, for the most part 
Thomas prefers it.73 Why? Because for Thomas, there exists a “relation 
privilégiée” between the truth and that which is in the middle.74 
The strength of this relation depends above all on the fact that the 
medium gathers in itself all that is true in the extremes, casting off their 
respective excesses. Aquinas affirms this in several places,75 even giving 
                                                 
71 Villey 1987, 70. Enlightening in this regard are also the observations of M.-D. Chenu: 
“La risposta agli argomenti che, nella seconda parte dell’alternativa, talvolta in ambedue, 
non concordano colla posizione assunta, si presenta il più delle volte sotto forma di una 
distinzione. È raro che la posizione avversaria venga respinta del tutto; piuttosto si 
circoscrive la parte di verità sulla quale faceva leva; si distingue l’aspetto, il punto di vista 
che essa riusciva a cogliere felicemente (“haec ratio procedit de…”); si colloca, in qualche 
modo, la sua verità particolare in un complesso che le assicura cittadinanza, senza 
respingerla” (Chenu 1953, 81). 
72 Cf. Rosemann 1994; Rosemann 1996, spec. 40-45.  
73 Rosemann has found, according to research conducted with the aid of the Index of P. 
Busa, that of the seventeen times in which the expression occurs in the Thomistic corpus 
in its technical meaning at a distance of no more than one word, in fourteen cases it refers 
to a doctrine sustained by Aquinas (Secundum aliquid, cit., 115). For the passages in which 
the via media is preferred, see: Super II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; Super III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, 
a. 6; Super IV Sent., d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 3; ivi, d. 43, q. 1, a. 5, qc. 3; Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 7, 
n. 25; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, a. 6; De ver., q. 6, a. 2; ivi, q. 11, a. 1; ivi, q. 24, a. 12; De 
malo, q. 5, a. 3; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 8; Super Decretale, n. 1; Contra impugnantes, c. 4, § 6; 
Sentencia De sensu, I, l. 10, n. 10. 
74 Cf. Rosemann 1996, 40. 
75 Cf. Contra Gentiles, III, c. 108, n. 7: “[…] verum medium est inter duos errores, quorum 
unus est secundum plus, alter secundum minus;” Summa Theol., II-II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 3: 
“[…] verum secundum suam rationem importat quandam aequalitatem. Aequale autem est 
medium inter maius et minus;” ivi, a. 4, arg. 2: “[…] veritatis medium non est propinquius 
uni extremo quam alteri, quia veritas, cum sit aequalitas quaedam, in medio punctuali 
consistit;” De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 13: “Inter affirmationes ergo et negationes oppositas ac-
cipitur medium virtutum intellectualium speculativarum, quod est verum;” Contra impug-
nantes, cap. 2, § 3: “Est enim errantium consuetudo, ut quia in medio veritatis non possunt 
consistere, unum errorem declinantes, in contrarium dilabantur;” Sententia Ethic., II, l. 9, 
n. 8: “[…] medius est ille, qui dicitur verus, et medietas dicitur veritas;” ivi, IV, l. 15, n. 7: 
“[…] ille qui verum dicit, medium tenet, quia significat rem secundum quod est; veritas 
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the impression, noted by Rosemann, that he retains that “la vérité et 
l’erreur comme, pour ainsi dire, commensurables.”76 The scholar ob-
serves, in fact, that the truth seems situated, if we look at the expressions 
of the Dominican master, in the middle point of a continuum at whose 
extremes are located two contrary propositions, neither of which can be 
sustained77. In the via media one should notice that “chacun des deux 
solutions opposées correspond à un aspect particuler du probleme et 
que, pour obtenir une perspective total, plus large, il convient de les fu-
sionner.”78 
It would, however, constitute a grave misunderstanding if, as may 
occur for the medium iustitiae,79 the via media were to be understood in 
purely mathematical or arithmetic terms, modeled on a truth that ap-
pears, as Rosemann writes, “en un certain sens quantifiable.”80 Such an 
interpretation would be contradicted if nothing else by the comparison 
with medium virtutis invoked in the cited passage:81 just as, in fact, the 
medium virtutis has a qualitative rather than quantitative meaning, the 
same must be said of the medium veritatis. It is useful, rather, to advance 
the hypothesis that the images and the lexicon of geometry and mathe-
matics take on in this kind of cases an essentially metaphorical value.82 
                                                                                                       
enim in aequalitate consistit quae est medium inter magnum et parvum;” Super Hebraeos, 
c. 13, l. 2: “[…] cum enim veritas consistat in medio, cuius est unitas, et ideo uni vero multa 
falsa opponi possunt, sicut uni medio multa extrema […].” 
76 Rosemann 1996, 44. This is how he explains it: “En effet, loin d’être des opposés irré-
conciliables, elles se trouvent d’après le saint docteur sur une même échelle, où elles ont 
une mesure commune. Tomber dans l’erreur, dès lors, n’est pas défendre une position qui 
soit sans aucun rapport avec la vérité; c’est plutôt aller au-delà ou rester en deçà d’elle. 
Aucun erreur ne peut être si grande qu’elle tue tous les germes de vérité en elle. C’est 
pouquoi la vérité peut surgir au milieu de l’erreur” (Ibid.).  
77 Cf. Ivi, 30. 
78 Ivi, 43-44.  
79We refer here to the case of commutative justice whose medium is determined precisely 
by recourse to arithmetical proportionality. Cf., in this regard, Summa Theol., II-II, q. 61, a. 
2, and ad 2. 
80 Rosemann 1994, 109.   
81 Cf., supra, n. 67. 
82 This, too, is an Aristotelian thesis (cf. Nichomachean Ethics, II, 5, 1106 to 26 – 6, 1107 to 
9) that Thomas has in several places taken over and made more precise (see, for example, 
Super III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 ad 3; Contra Gentiles, III, c. 134, n. 7. ibid., par. 136, no. 
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The real characteristics of the relationships involved are instead primari-
ly of the qualitative type. The medium virtutis is such because it stands 
for what is good between two evils. And the medium veritatis is such be-
cause it corresponds to what there is of truth between two falsehoods. 
Therefore, it is in this sense that the via media should be considered as 
the way of truth between two errors.83 
On the other hand, if the doctrine of the medium virtutis helps us to 
grasp the true nature of the via media, the latter, in turn, demonstrating 
its usefulness on the epistemological level, shows us what it means to 
find the medium virtutis, at least when it coincides with medium iustitiae.  
In this regard we must first note that if the via media combines in it-
self what is true in two opposing but equally unsatisfactory solutions to a 
problem, reaching it means to recognize the truth that might be present, 
albeit only in part, secundum aliquid, in the two theses to be rejected. 
“Utrumque vere opinatum fuit ... et secundum verum est aliquid utrumque”84 
and “Utraque enim pars obiectionum vera est ... secundum aliquid”85 are the 
                                                                                                       
12; Summa Theol., I-II, q. 64, a. 1, and ad 2; ivi, II-II, q. 147, a. 1, ad 2; De malo, q. 14, a. 1, 
ad 6; ivi, q. 15, a. 1, ad 9; Sententia Ethic., II, l. 2, vv. 134-136; ivi, l. 6, vv. 63 ff.). Livio 
Melina notes in this regard: “La sottolineatura più diffusa è quella che ricollega il criterio 
del medium virtutis alla ratio recta: il criterio che permette di stabilire la medietà non è 
meccanico o quantitativo, ma implica una valutazione razionale propriamente morale” 
(Melina 1987, 109). See in this sense also Elders 1978, especially 369. 
83 We must bear in mind in this regard that Thomas, in his commentary on the Aristoteli-
an Ethics, considers typo, or figuraliter, argument as the most appropriate way of proceed-
ing to the expositive method of moral science: “[…] oportet ostendere veritatem figuraliter, 
idest verisimiliter, et hoc est procedere ex propriis principiis huius scientiae. Nam scientia 
moralis est de actibus voluntariis: voluntatis autem motivum est, non solum bonum, sed 
apparens bonum” (Sententia Ethic., I, l. 3, n. 4); “[…] omnis sermo qui est de operabilibus, 
sicut est iste, debet tradi typo, idest exemplariter, vel similitudinarie, et non secundum 
certitudinem” (ivi, II, l. 2, n. 4); in particular, we read: “[…] dictum est de virtutibus in 
communi et earum genus typo, id est figuraliter, manifestatum est, dum dictum est quod 
sunt medietates, quod pertinet ad genus propinquum, et quod sunt habitus, quod pertinet 
ad genus remotum” (ivi, III, l. 13, n. 12); “[…] intendendum est tractare de iustitia secun-
dum eamdem artem, secundum quam  tractatum est de praedictis virtutibus, scilicet figu-
raliter et aliis huiusmodi modis” (ivi, V, l. 1, n. 3). On the use of Thomistic similes, analo-
gies, and metaphors, see Chenu, Introduzione, cit., 145-147. 
84 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 1, a. 2. 
85 Summa Theol., III, q. 64, a. 3, ad 1. 
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two Thomistic utterances on which Chenu has drawn the reader's atten-
tion86 for the first time and which were faithfully reproduced in subse-
quent studies of Villey87 and Rosemann.88 But even a quick consultation 
of the Index Thomisticus highlights how widely spread in the production 
of Aquinas is the use of similar expressions. Within a maximum dis-
tance of 10 words, only examining correlations between the lemma veri-
tas and the lemma uterque, there are eleven instances where they are as-
sociated with this meaning,89 while the co-occurences of the inflected 
forms of verus and uterque appear with this meaning forty-five times in 
forty-two places.90 So we have a total of at least fifty-six contexts, distrib-
uted in fifty-one texts,91 which show in what ways Thomas concretely 
                                                 
86 Chenu 1953, 166. 
87 Villey 1987, 70.  
88 Rosemann 1996, 30. 
89 Cf. Super II Sent., d. 15, q. 3, a. 1; ivi, a. 3; ivi, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5; Super III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, 
a. 2, qc. 3; Super IV Sent., d. 45, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 1; Summa Theol., I, q. 43, a. 8; ivi, I-II, q. 71, a. 
5; De malo, q. 2, a. 1; In I Phys., l. 11, n. 12; In Meteor., I, c. 1, n. 7; Catena in Mc., c. 14, l. 4.  
90 Cf. Super I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; ivi, d. 16, q. 1, a. 4; ivi, d. 28, q. 2, a. 3, expos.; ivi, d. 
33, q. 1, a. 2; ivi, d. 37, q. 4, a. 2; Super II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3; ivi, d. 25, q. 1, a. 5, expos.; ivi, 
d. 27, q. 1, a. 3; ivi, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3, expos.; ivi, d. 42, q. 1, a. 5, expos.; Super III Sent., d. 7, q. 
2, a. 2; Super IV Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2; Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 100, a. 10; ivi, II-II, 
q. 1, a. 2 (2 times); ivi., III, q. 35, a. 5; ivi, q. 64, a. 3, ad 1; De veritate, q. 10, a. 12 (2 times); 
ivi. q. 22, a. 8, ad arg.; ivi, q. 22, a. 14; ivi, q. 24, a. 12; De spiritualibus. creaturis, a. 8, ad 10; 
ivi, a. 10; De malo, q. 2, a. 1; Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, a. 2; In Phys., I, l. 11, n. 12; ivi, l. 13 n. 5; 
Sententia Politic., III, l. 3, n. 8; Sententia Ethic., IX, l. 8, n. 8; In De generatione, I, l. 6, n. 7; 
Super De Trinitate, II, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4; In Jeremiam, c. 29, l. 3; Super Threnos, c. 5, pr.; Catena 
in Mc., c. 5, l. 3; Catena in Lc., c. 24, l. 4; Catena in Io., c. 4, l. 1; Super Io., c. 2, l. 1; ivi, c. 4, l. 
2; ivi, c. 6, l. 1; ivi, c. 14, l. 2; ivi, c. 20, l. 2 (2 times); Super Rom., c. 10, l. 3; Primae 
redactiones Summae contra Gentiles, III.  
91The total number of contexts is obtained by summing the passages that use the two cor-
relations, the total number of texts is taken from the sum of the places of the correlations, 
subtracting the duplications (Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 1, a. 2; De veritate, q. 10, a. 12; De 
malo, q. 2, a. 1; In I Phys., l. 11, n. 12; Super Iov., c. 20, l. 2). Inevitably, we don’t consider 
the other, more numerous, possible lemmatic combinations which would allow us to find 
in the Thomistic corpus the adoption of the proceedings in question. This sampling is 
therefore a purely illustrative and non-exhaustive list, since, for the purposes of our re-
search, it is enough to know that, as demonstrated by the citations listed in the previous 
two notes, this method was used by Aquinas throughout his Scholastic career.  
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practiced and sometimes even theorized the technique that grounds the 
via media. 
Now, precisely on account of the parallelism that is identified in pas-
sage shown above92 between the domain of theology and that of ethics, the 
same approach can be applied in the field of moral virtues, in particular 
that of justice. 
This transposition, however, can be implemented in a non-artificial or 
fallacious manner93 for the same reason that, according to Rosemann, jus-
tified the transfer of the ethical principle of the happy medium from the 
practical level to the level of theory in the above passage, where Aquinas 
quoted Boethius: “elle s’explique par le fait que pour les penseurs chré-
tiens de la patristique et du moyen âge, le savoir intellectuel, d’une part, et 
la vie morale et spirituelle, d’autre part, n’étaient pas encore nettement 
compartimentés, comme c’est souvent le cas aujourd’hui.”94 
More precisely, we should say that this mutual influence between medi-
um virtutis and via media is a particular manifestation of the doctrine of the 
convertibility of the transcendentals. Precisely because “verum et bonum con-
vertuntur,”95 we can follow the via media also as the way of virtus and of ius, 
indeed, to be more specific, also as the way of that virtus iustitiae which, to-
gether with prudence, presides over the determination of the ius. 
Indeed, the via media is not so much suited to determining the medi-
um virtutis generally, as it seems particularly suited to the object of this re-
search, the determination of the medium iustitiae. Even in the case of the 
via media, in fact, the medium found is not only the medium rationis, it is 
also the medium rei. Thanks to the model of the via media, therefore, we 
can better understand what it means on the epistemological level that the 
medium rei which is the object of justice does not refer only to claims of 
the parties, but more radically to what is just in them: how to individuate 
                                                 
92 Cf., supra, n. 67. 
93The reference is of course to the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” violating “Hume's law.” In 
this regard, however, see D’Agostino 1996, 75-87.  
94 Rosemann 1994, 109. 
95 Cf. Super I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 3; ivi, d. 46, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 1; Summa Theol., I, q. 59, 
a. 2, ad 3; ivi, I-II, q. 29, a. 5, arg. 1, and ad 1; ivi, II-II, q. 109, a. 2, arg. 1 and ad 1; De vir-
tutibus, q. 1, a. 7, s.c. 2; Super Heb. [rep. Vulgate], c. 11, l. 1. See also, Aertsen 1996, especial-
ly 284-289. 
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the via media is equivalent to detecting what there is of truth in the theses 
of the disputants, similarly finding the medium iustitiae coincides with as-
certaining what is just in the claims of the parties. “[…] iudex inter accu-
satorem et eum qui constituitur medius constituitur ad examen iustitiae,” we 
read in the treatise de iustitia of the Summa.96 The determination of what 
is just in the claims of the parties then connotes, under a qualitative 
measure, the geometric proportionality, according to which one deter-
mines prudentially the right of each one. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There are now a couple of problems that can help us to verify the 
consistency of the results achieved. We have to ask ourselves: how can 
prudence recognize the medium iustitiae, and thus what is just in the 
claims of the parties? And how can one find the medium iustitiae when 
in the claims of the parties there is no justice?  
To answer we must not do anything but recall two important meth-
odological implications of the Thomistic discourse. As far as it corre-
sponds to the medium iustitiae, what is just in the claims of the parties is 
dialectically recognized as such in relation to common legal principles 
and rules. But even if what is just is not found by any means in the 
claims of the parties, or it only can be found in the requests of one of the 
parties alone, we must still refer to them in order to pick out – in these 
principles and rules – the common measure, which makes it possible to 
                                                 
96 Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 68, a. 2. While there are no explicit statements about it, one 
can assume that this is the sense of the passages in which Thomas conditions the activity 
of judging by the hearing of the parties: “[…] in his quae pertinent ad iustitiam requiritur ul-
terius iudicium alicuius superioris, qui utrumque valeat arguere, et ponere manum suam in am-
bobus” (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3); “[…] in iudiciis nullus potest iudicare nisi audiat 
rationes utriusque partis” (In Metaphysic., III, l. 1, n. 5); “[…] cum enim duo homines ad 
invicem contendunt, iudicem possunt habere qui utriusque dicta examinet… oportet quod in iu-
dice sit altior sapientia quae sit quasi regula ad quam examinentur dicta utriusque partis” (Su-
per Iob, c. 9).  
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establish the juridical outlook and the entitlements of each, the medium 
iustitiae, that is.97 
The critical confrontation with the claims of the parties thus proves 
decisive in determining the ius, which will not therefore be only the ap-
plication of the lex, being also commensurate to the specific circum-
stances of the case. 
But if in this respect the philosophical reflection of Aquinas on ius 
simply seems to anticipate the most sophisticated acquisitions of con-
temporary doctrine, in the reference to justice we can seize the indica-
tion of an alternative foundation, which is moreover able to correspond 
to the deepest needs of today's debate on the criterion of judgment.  
Based on this foundation, the determination of the ius which takes 
place in judgment appears steered by a qualitative factor, which operates 
both through the directives of the lex, both natural as well as positive, 
and through comparisons between the juridical positions of the parties. 
This foundation, moreover, also imprints upon the determination of the 
ius an important realistic connotation, since the medium iustitiae identi-
fies with the medium rei and so the ius becomes the ipsa res iusta. Justice 
therefore plays in this perspective a decisive discriminatory role, as ap-
propriate as it is unfortunately unknown, apart from rare exceptions, to 
the jurists and legal theorists of our time.98 
The realistic connotation of the Thomistic discourse on justice and 
ius, however, emerges also on the methodological level: the Dominican 
master in fact shows us the way by which to “prudentially” proceed to 
the determination of the ius according to the distributive measure of jus-
tice. It is the way of dialectics:99 dialectics is the way that leads to the dis-
covery of rules and principles that are common to the parties, and dialec-
                                                 
97 I refer, for a discussion of these issues, to Ancona 2008-9 and Ancona 2012, 41-56.  
98See, in particular, among the latest doctrines: Hofmann 2000; Gentile 2008; D’Agostino 
2011; Castellano 2011. There cannot, vice versa, be grouped with these doctrines the con-
stitutionalist theories, which, when they speak of justice, normally link it to values that are 
widely shared and constitutionalized, rather than to the entitlements of human nature. Cf., 
in this sense, Zagrebelsky 1992, especially 123 ff. 
99On the dialectical forms of judicial reasoning according to the Thomistic reflection, cf. 
especially Villey 1987, 71, 164. 
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tics is also the way that, starting from these principles and rules, leads to 
the identification and confirmation of the medium iustitiae. But above all 
dialectics is the via media, which, when used in the field of the ius, de-
termines the medium iustitiae as medium rei, that is as a solution that as-
certains what is just in the claims of the parties. It is particularly suita-
ble, especially in complex and pluralistic societies like ours, for judging 
according to an objective criterion of justice in attributing to each his 
own right. 
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Reason, Morality, and Skill1 
 
John Stopford 
 
 
In this paper I discuss the relationship between reason, morality, and 
skill in a well-ordered liberal democracy.2 I argue that while skill played 
an important role in the ethical life of the ancient world, the 
marginalization of skill and craftsmanship has blinded us to the 
importance of a public culture of skill in the modern world. This applies, 
in particular, to the public role of skill as one of the “cultural conditions 
of autonomy” (and a fortiori of political autonomy) in a liberal political 
regime (Stopford 2009, 39-45). Not only do citizens need certain basic 
kinds of skill to express their autonomy. Such skills may also contribute 
to the capacity for “flourishing within limits” that some ecological 
economists regard as a key factor in the development of sustainable 
human societies.3 
Skillful work shaped the cultural life of the archaic Greek world. The 
craft worker was an established figure in the community, honored for 
their contributions to a commodious life. The public craftsman or 
demioergos (δημιουργός - Homer’s word) was “a bringer of civilization,” 
distinguished by competence and know-how, the member of a 
community of skilled producers whose focus was on quality and doing 
good work (Sennett 2008, 25). Craft workers acquired their know-how in 
                                                 
1 An early version of this paper was read at the workshop on “Moral realism and political 
decisions: a new framework of practical rationality for contemporary multicultural Europe" 
organized by members of the Universities of Bamberg and Trieste in Bamberg, Germany, 
on 19 - 22 December 2013. I would like to thank the organizers, Professor Gabriele De 
Anna of the University of Bamberg, and Professor Riccardo Martinelli of the University of 
Trieste, for the opportunity to participate in the workshop. The methodological framework 
of my discussion is “political not metaphysical” in the sense of Rawls (1985; 1996, 10). For 
this reason I focus mainly on questions of practical rationality, leaving all but the most 
important metaphysical and epistemological issues to one side. 
2 I use “well-ordered” in the sense of Rawls (1971, 4-5) to refer to a society that is effectively 
regulated by a public conception of justice. 
3 See Jackson (2009), Chapter 9.  
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long and painstaking apprenticeships, developing and modifying their 
skills throughout their lives (25-26). 
The work of the demioergos was more than a job. Someone who does 
a job does not produce a work. But what was the work of the public 
producer in Greece? Philosophical phrases such as ‘form-giving activity,’ 
which we associate with the production of works, are not informative if 
we are interested in understanding how a work comes into existence (in 
German: wie es entsteht). How can we study form-giving activity? 
Producing things involves a number of related but distinct skills that 
even the producer may not always be aware of using. Sculpting, 
molding, weaving, embossing, and whittling engage maker and material 
in ways that are often inscrutable. 
Skillful activity tends to be “transparent” (durchsichtig) in the sense of 
Heidegger (Heidegger 1927, 146; 1962, 187). The more competent we 
become in exercising a skill, the less we may notice ourselves as we 
exercise it. Skill may be all but invisible to an onlooker. Everyday 
language lacks words to describe the subtleties of skillful activity. The 
Latinized expressions ‘form,’ ‘creation,’ or ‘product’ shed little light on 
the engaged material consciousness of the demioergos. Evocative 
expressions such as the necessary poetry of things (MacGregor 2010) 
work at the level of metaphor but may miss something that is important 
about crafting with one’s hands.  
Although the public status of the demioergoi was in decline by the 4th 
century BCE, craftsmanship and skill still exercised a decisive influence 
on the philosophers of classical Greece: “[t]he craftsman lets kosmos 
appear through the artifact” (McEwen 1993, 73). Plato's hierarchy of 
Reality pairs the various levels of being with different kinds and qualities 
of craftsmanship. “That which truly is” is the work of the World 
Craftsman (demioergos) of the Timaeus who endows the world with 
motion, order and beauty in order that it should thus participate in His 
goodness (Lavecchia 2012, 13). Plato, his criticisms of the poets 
notwithstanding, characterizes the true craftsman as someone who 
seeks the perfection of that which he creates.  
In the early dialogues Plato often identifies craft with knowledge 
(Parry 1996, 15). In the Republic, it can be argued (though it is not a 
matter of consensus) that Plato holds justice in its most developed form 
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to be a craft (101), perhaps a “second-order craft” or “supercraft”.4 
Surveying antiquity from a post-Cartesian perspective we sometimes 
suppose that representations and what they represent belong to discrete 
ontological orders. But for Plato, craftsmanship is the source of a 
seamless continuity between intellectual objects and the visible cosmos.  
Aristotle's distinction between technê as poïesis (ποίησις) and praxis 
(πρᾶξις) seems to preclude the identification of virtue with craftsman-
ship. Craftsmanship involves the production of things --- bringing some-
thing forth --- rather than acting, far less acting rightly. And virtue pro-
duces not things but actions. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues 
that virtue is not a craft. Scholars have inferred from this that it is a mis-
take to focus on the role of craft in Aristotle’s ethical theory.5 This does 
not imply that Aristotle’s view of ethics and practical reasoning is not 
influenced by a craft model, however (Angier 2010, 36), or that his views 
on craft are without significance for ethical and political theory. This 
holds, in particular, of any approach that is not committed to a rigid di-
chotomization of production and action. Thus Murphy asks if it is “really 
plausible that there is no moral dimension to production or that there 
are no techniques of action?” (Murphy 1993, 92).  
A craft and its products may be used for morally good or bad ends, 
and such ends are normally considered to be external to the craft. We do 
not charge a knife with a crime just because it is sharp. Skill and crafts-
manship may be ethically significant in other ways, however. Murphy 
cites Rawls’s Aristotelian Principle (Rawls 1971, 426) to illustrate the im-
portance of skill to human flourishing (εὐδαιμονία): “we are willing to 
undergo the stress of practice and learning [… because …] we anticipate 
the rewards of mastering complex new skills” (Murphy 1993, 6). The 
                                                 
4 Plato uses both demioergos and various cognate forms of technê (variously translated as 
‘craft,’ ‘skill,’ ‘expertise’ or ‘know-how’) in the Republic and elsewhere. On the translation of 
technê and the relation between technê and epistêmê see Parry (2014). Here I follow Parry 
(1996) in rejecting the view that craft is only instrumental in the Republic, and hence that vir-
tue, which is desired for itself and not merely instrumentally, cannot be a craft. Angier, while 
concluding that Plato fails to develop the case for a “genuine virtue-techne,” thinks that Aristo-
tle’s ethical views are nevertheless influenced by the craft model (Angier 2010, 1, 32). 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between craft (technê) and virtue (aretê) in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, see Parry 2014.  
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ability to exercise skills, and in particular complex skills, is an important 
feature of a good life, even if attaining and maintaining them requires 
considerable effort. 
At another level, skill might be said to play a structural role in the 
ability to produce things autonomously. In this respect, a morally auton-
omous person can be compared to the skilled craft worker who both 
conceives and executes a plan. In such cases we can speak of the unity of 
conception and production (νόησις and ποίησις) (Aristotle, Metaphysics 
1032b15; Murphy, 8). The dignity of skilled work depends on the ability 
of the worker to execute a plan they have themselves conceived (8). The 
unskilled worker, by contrast, merely executes a plan that has been con-
ceived by someone else.  
Once immersed in the productive dialectic of conception and execu-
tion, the skilled worker draws on the principles of their craft to solve 
problems of execution while reciprocally deepening their grasp of those 
principles on the basis of their experiences with a particular material (8). 
Producing things according to a plan that is one’s own not only leads to 
the development of more complex skills (8). When they work according 
to their own plan people learn to produce autonomously. “Through this 
dialectic of conception and execution we become autonomous subjects, 
rather than mere instruments, of labour” (8).  
Perhaps we can draw on this image of the craft worker to model the 
role of cultural skills in liberal democracy (Stopford 2009, 39-45). The 
cultural conditions of autonomy are the practices, traditions and ways of 
doing things that constitute a cultural context within which autonomous 
choice is possible. Such practices and traditions are not simply given: 
they have a history, vary from culture to culture, and must be learned. 
The subjective cultural conditions of autonomy are the competences and 
skills that are implicit in an understanding of its objective conditions 
(40-41). When we act autonomously and make choices about how to live 
we do not reflect theoretically on the practices and traditions that form 
the cultural context of our choices: we simply engage that context skill-
fully, making use of the tools and materials that our culture provides. 
One of the consequences of the marginalization of skill is that public 
recognition of skill is reduced as the functions of conception and execu-
tion are distributed between different individuals and classes. Aristotle 
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writes at a time when the publicly recognized skill of the demioergos was 
beginning to be marginalized, and the “hand” separated from the “head” 
(Sennett 2008, 23; Stopford 2011, 29). Aristotle sometimes replaces the 
traditional word for a craft worker, demioergos, with cheirotechnon 
(χειροτεχνῶν) – ‘handworker’ – arguing in the Metaphysics that “the ar-
chitects (architektonikon) in every profession are more estimable and 
know more and are wiser than the artisans because they know the rea-
sons of the things which are done” (Metaphysics, 981a30-b2; Sennett 
23).6 Such linguistic shifts not only confirm the division of intellectual 
and manual labour, but also the diminished public standing of the arti-
san: 
 
[…] while the work of the artisan was admired, he was neglected or 
down-graded as a person […]. And what is more important, there 
never was, except in the constructions of some theorists, like the 
town-planner and philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus, any such 
thing as a category of artisans (Vidal-Naquet 1977, 12). 
 
By the early 20th Century, proponents of scientific management 
recommended shifting all planning activities from workers to 
management (Taylor 1917, 38; Murphy, 8). For Taylor it is “clear that in 
most cases one type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely 
different type to execute the work” (Taylor, 38). Taylor may have believed 
that there are inherent differences between people that make some more 
suited for conceptual work than others, a view that Adam Smith might 
well have rejected. Smith acknowledges in The Wealth of Nations that the 
repetitive performance of a small number of simple tasks rather than 
innate deficiency is to blame for the mental and moral torpor of the 
“labouring poor,” arguing that government should provide education to 
counteract these effects.7  
Here, as in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith accepts the human 
costs of the division of labour and commercial society as the price of 
                                                 
6 As quoted by Sennett 2008, 23.  ἀρχιτέκτονας is translated by Tredennick (1933, 7)  as 
“master craftsmen” rather than “architects”. 
7 See Smith (1909), Book 5, especially Article II, “Of the Expense of the Institution for the 
Education of Youth” (485ff). 
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economic growth and opulence, at least in its early stages. More recently, 
Rainer Marten has argued that the capacity for sympathetic 
identification married to the moral perspective of the “impartial 
spectator,” to which Smith appeals, is an unequal match for the 
disfiguring extremes of Schumpeterian capitalism.8 Disruptive 
entrepreneurism cannot be tamed by feelings of sympathy. When such 
feelings do perform a moral function it can only be from within a social 
scheme that has already been humanized in other ways (Marten 2009, 
69).9 
To understand the characteristics of such a scheme it is necessary to 
look deeper into our ideas about the relationship between skill and 
wealth. Both Xenophon and Aristotle view the wealth acquired and used 
by households as an instrument or tool (Booth 1993, 41).10 In The 
Economist, Xenophon’s Socrates refers to wealth as an “instrument” 
(ὄργανα χρήματα) that he has never possessed (Xenophon 1971, 13).11 In 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Schumpeter 1994,  83:  “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact 
about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got 
to live in.” 
9 But see Schumpeter 1954.  The question of the “coherence” of Smith’s economic and 
moral theories is too complex to present in the space available here. For a recent informa-
tive discussion of these issues, see the introduction to Haakonssen 2006.  
10 The fact that Aristotle sometimes treats money as conventional, and sometimes as a 
commodity like other commodities does not seem to detract from his underlying view that 
true wealth is “the knowledge how to use things rightly.” See Barker 1959, 380-381.  
11 On this interpretation of organa chremata see Booth (1993, 41). Booth notes that chrema-
ta is related to chreia suggesting “need” rather than demand, and cites Aristotle, Ni-
comachean Ethics 1097a28 and Politics1253b31-32 in support of this reading. Aristotle dis-
tinguishes oikonomia from chrematistics. Oikonomia, in the words of Daly and Cobb (1994, 
138-139) deals with “the management of the household so as to increase its use value to all 
members of the household over the long run;” chrematistics concerns the “manipulation 
of property and wealth so as to maximize short-term monetary exchange value to the own-
er.” See also Anielski (2007, 23). Aristotle distinguishes at least two kinds of chrematistics, 
one of which uses money as a means of exchange for the sake of the goals of the house-
hold, while the other makes the acquisition of money an end in itself: “[t]hat is why it ap-
pears on the one hand that all wealth must have a limit and yet why on the other hand we 
see the opposite happening in fact. For all those engaged in business increase money 
without limit. The reason is the closeness between them. For the two uses of business, 
being of the same thing, overlap, since property has the same use in both cases but not in 
the same respect: while of the one use, something else is the end; of the other, the end is 
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the same passage he compares the art of using wealth to that of 
performing on a musical instrument. To own a flute is to be able to play 
it. Without being able to play it one cannot own it. There is also a second 
sense in which one may use a flute without being able to play it, for the 
purpose of exchange. “So it is clear to us that a flute in the hands of a 
man who does not know how to use it, is not property to him, unless he 
sell it” (4). Wealth, we might likewise say, is useful in its primary sense 
when we know how to “play” it. 
While this may seem to involve a “high redefinition” of ‘wealth,’ it is 
a view that flows directly into Aristotle’s autarkic theory of the household 
(Booth, 41). The needs of the household for wealth are intrinsically self-
limiting since “[n]o tool of any art is without limit in either quantity or 
size, and wealth is a multitude of tools for the arts of ruling household 
and city” (Aristotle 1997, 1256b26).12 The soul has its proper objects, 
with which recognizable limits are associated. Food, for example, is the 
proper object of the nutritive soul. Its acquisition and use are governed 
by ethical requirements involving balance, proportion and the avoidance 
of excess (Stopford 2011, 30). The modern “food system,” by contrast, 
decontextualizes food: as a vehicle for the delivery of nutrients to the 
body, on the one hand, and as a commodity with an exchange value on 
the other.13 Here there is no room for skillful activity. The activities of 
                                                                                                       
increase. As a result, it seems to some that increase is the work of the science of household 
management, and they end up thinking they must either preserve or increase their sub-
stance of money without limit.” People confuse the two kinds of business “because they 
are more serious about life than about good life (…). And if they cannot get what they want 
through business itself, they pervert everything else into business instead.” (Aristotle, 1997 
1257b-1258a). 
12 See Aristotle (1997, 1256b26): “So, one kind of the science of property is naturally part of 
the science of household management, and this property must either be present or the 
science must provide it so that it is present. It consists in a store of things necessary for life 
and useful to the community of city or household. And true wealth at any rate would seem 
to be made up of these things. For self-sufficiency in this sort of property with a view to 
good life is not unlimited, contrary to what Solon says in the line: ‘to wealth no limit has 
been laid down for human beings.’ For such a limit has been laid down, just as it has in 
the case of the other arts. No tool of any art is without limit in either quantity or size, and 
wealth is a multitude of tools for the arts of ruling household and city.” On the relation 
between Aristotle’s theory of the “natural limit” and his ethical views see Finley (1970). 
13 On the sociology of food, the “food system,” and “the world ‘behind’ our food” see Caro-
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production, storage and preparation, which were the focus of the 
traditional household economy, are not essentially connected with 
consumption, which has become an abstract function without ethical 
constraints. Consumption and convenience, which formerly signified 
“fittedness” to the natural order, come to signify the kind of ethically 
neutral ease of use and access which makes skill disappear altogether 
(Stopford 2011, 30).  
Marx writes in his remarks on Xenophon (1843-45) that useful is 
“everything which one knows how to use” (Marx 1971, 391).14 Usefulness 
is not a natural or “real” property of things, but a relational property that 
holds of persons and things. A complete analysis of the commodity in 
terms of use and exchange values would have to take into account the 
skills and abilities involved in both types of value. Smith had originally 
discussed exchange value in the context of his theory of growth, tracing it 
back to a human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” (Smith 1909, 
19). His account inaugurates what Graeber calls the “founding myth of 
economics” according to which money is introduced to replace barter. A 
successful barter system presupposes a “double coincidence of wants” 
between parties.15 This occurs rarely enough to make the use of money, 
which does not depend on such coincidences, an improvement. The 
“founding myth” thus provides a plausible explanation of how money and 
subsequently credit arise out of an original human propensity to barter 
and exchange (Graeber 2011, 22-24). 
Graeber questions the historical accuracy of this account, since the 
balance of anthropological evidence suggests that barter-based 
economies of this kind have never existed. Our familiarity with the 
distinction between exchange value and use value makes it easy to forget 
that to say something has a “use value” is also to say that someone 
knows how to use it. Here it is ‘knowing how to use’ that is primary and 
‘use value’ that is secondary. Just as Smith’s idea of a “propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange” may be more retrospective reconstruction 
than anthropological fact, so also our ideas about use value. To 
                                                                                                       
lan 2013, especially Introduction and Chapter 3. 
14 The translation of Marx is from Booth 1993, 250. 
15 A “double coincidence of wants” exists if and only if each party happens to be able to 
offer in exchange exactly what the other party wants to acquire. 
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understand the meaning of “use” we need to know more about the 
structure of the skillful activities on which it is based.16  
Even Marx, who may have accepted some version of the founding 
myth of barter, does not offer his followers an account of the 
relationship between use and skill.17 The managers of “real existing 
socialism” followed Western capitalism in regarding a certain 
fragmentation of the labour process as inevitable (Murphy 1993, 10). 
The marginalization of skillful activity thus gains momentum with 
industrialization. Deskilling and the disaggregation of skills became 
pervasive, leading to a loss of synergies between different kinds of 
skillful activity (Stopford 2011, 31). Economic policy divorces labour 
from its foundations in skill when it “fetishizes” macro-economic labour 
productivity as a criterion of economic success (Jackson, 131-132).18  
This encourages the ongoing replacement of human labour by 
machinery and “labour saving devices.” Even in societies that guarantee 
a reasonable social minimum, such arrangements deprive people of a 
key opportunity for the development and exercise of important skills 
(Stopford 2009, 120-123).19 The alternative to fetishizing labour 
productivity may not be inefficiency, however, but the discovery of 
alternative configurations of skill and particular technologies that allow 
people to engage in meaningful forms of work (Jackson 2009, 132; 
Stopford 2009, 129-132).20 As Jackson notes, this does not mean that 
policies to enhance labour productivity must be abandoned under all 
circumstances. But focusing on macroeconomic labour productivity 
without reevaluating the traditional functions of investment is “a recipe 
for undermining work, community and environment” (Jackson 2009, 
132, 138).  
Economic institutions are a cultural force and culture is an economic 
force. If the fetishization of labour productivity undermines the 
                                                 
16 See Stopford 2009, 115-123, 148-60. 
17 On Marx’s view of barter in precapitalist economies see Booth 1993, 189-91. 
18 For further discussion of a “low growth” approach to labour productivity see Jackson 
2011, 101.  
19 On the “skillful self” see Stopford  2009, 45.  
20 On factors affecting the unity of conception and execution, including aptitudes, technol-
ogy, worker expectations, and government policy see Murphy, 227-228. 
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development of skill it also detracts from the cultural conditions of 
autonomy. The “social logic that locks people into materialistic 
consumerism as the basis for participating in the life of society” (180) 
also affects their abilities to grasp and use the tools that their culture 
offers. Wealth is not an end in itself, but a means that we must know 
how to use. It is for this reason that “the art of using” (Booth 1993, 48) 
forms the core of Aristotle’s theory of the household: “knowing how to 
use suggests the art of acquiring and employing with a view to the right 
end” (49). Since true wealth is acquired and used skillfully for a purpose 
it also has a natural limit which derives from that purpose. To acquire 
more than the natural limit prescribes is pointless. The art of using 
wealth thus leads naturally to the idea of a limit to the acquisition of 
wealth and of economic growth. 
Smith’s model of economic growth, centered on the rational self-
interested economic agent, the division of labour, specialization, 
technological development and the extension of markets, is viewed by 
many economists as unsustainable. Smith himself acknowledges that 
economic growth will eventually end in a “stationary state”.21 Both Mill 
(1902, 334-340) and Keynes (1972, 326) believe that a society without 
economic growth is inevitable “in the long run.” Neither author views 
this prospect pessimistically. Such a society need not be dismal and may 
even hold out the prospect of social, cultural, and moral progress.  
Jackson argues, however, that industrial nations face a “dilemma of 
growth” that cannot be left to take care of itself in the long run. On the 
one hand economic expansion at present rates is unsustainable and 
modern industrial economies must learn to live with diminishing 
economic growth (Jackson 2009, 14-15). On the other hand, “de-growth” 
is socially and political unstable. Societies that cannot maintain 
economic growth face the evils of social instability associated “with 
declining consumer demand […] rising unemployment, falling 
competitiveness and a spiral of recession” (65). 
Jackson suggests that the systematic bias towards macro-economic 
labour productivity in mature economies can be addressed by 
encouraging structural shifts in economic organization towards a 
                                                 
21 Smith 1909, 99-100.   
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“Cinderella economy” that is less material intensive and more labour 
intensive than economies that strive for a high labour productivity (130-
132, 154, 194-197). Such shifts to a low- or post-growth economy can be 
politically stable and ecologically sustainable if they are wedded to a 
conception of human prosperity that acknowledges limits. The 
conception of prosperity that Jackson proposes is based on a set of 
central capabilities like that proposed by Martha Nussbaum, with the 
significant limitation that the goal of securing the central capabilities for 
each citizen must be compatible with economic and ecological criteria of 
sustainability (45-47).  
Jackson follows Sen in rejecting theories that interpret the “living 
standard” in terms of commodity command (opulence), utility, and 
blunt proxies such as gross domestic product: “Commodity command is 
a means to the end of well-being, but can scarcely be the end itself [. . .]” 
(Sen 1985, 19).22 Sen argues that well-being is a matter of how well 
someone is able to function rather than of what commodities they 
command. Human functioning with a given commodity bundle 
depends on a person’s ability to convert commodities into functioning, 
and this in turn may depend on a variety of physiological, social, 
biographical, geographical and cultural factors (70-71). Seemingly 
egalitarian distributions of resources may be unjust because they fail to 
capture the injustices that arise out of such conversion inequalities. 
Nutritional policy, for example, should focus not on income or food as a 
commodity, but on the individual’s ability to be well-nourished.  
While Sen goes on to develop this line of argument in a way that 
emphasizes freedom, interpreted as capability to function rather than 
actual functioning, Nussbaum specifies a concrete list of central human 
capabilities owed to each citizen of a constitutional democracy. This list 
emphasizes both the broad range of human capabilities and the material 
                                                 
22 The limitations of GDP as a measure of prosperity seem obvious when it is pointed out 
that a large prison population will increase it, whereas efficient and effective healthcare 
will tend to reduce it. The existence of economically unnecessary malnutrition in Western 
populations is an example of the way in which the affluence of a society tends to under-
mine assumptions on which welfarism is based. For discussion of the logic of abundance, 
the diminishing marginal utility of extra commodities, and the “life satisfaction paradox” 
see Jackson, Chapter 3, 40-41. 
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conditions for their development through legislation and social policy 
(Nussbaum 2000, 78-70; Stopford 2009, 133-134). One reason for 
drawing up such a detailed list may be practical: political theories should 
be concrete enough to make it possible to operationalize the idea of 
development. They must specify important functions in a way that 
facilitates practical applications (Jackson 2009, 44).  
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities belongs to a “political” conception of 
the person that excludes metaphysical pleading and seeks to achieve 
(taking Rawls’s political liberalism as its model) an “overlapping 
consensus” through cross-cultural dialogue and democratic consultation 
(Nussbaum 2000, 74-75).23 The central capabilities embody what she 
calls “a partial ideal” of truly human functioning, inspired by Aristotle 
and Marx, and by the idea that governments should not seek to shape 
citizens but rather put them in a position to shape their own lives (72).24 
An important aim, which Nussbaum shares with Sen, is to overcome 
structural sources of disempowerment such as adaptive preference to 
which welfarist and resourcist views are insensitive (114-115, 136-141).25  
The proposal to focus government and constitutional policy around a 
normative view of political personhood exposes Nussbaum’s view to the 
charges of perfectionism and paternalism (Stopford 2009, 133, 135-
137).26 In addition, her prima facie prioritization of individual 
functioning raises problems of distributive justice that she cannot easily 
address (136, 146-148). In a move that Pogge characterizes as “inverted 
Aristotelianism” Nussbaum claims extra social resources not for the 
                                                 
23 On the idea of an “overlapping consensus” see Rawls 1996, 133-172. 
24 Nussbaum’s list (78-80) embraces a broad range of physical, intellectual, practical, emo-
tional and imaginative capabilities that are central to our relationship to ourselves, to oth-
ers, to animals, and to the natural world. 
25 For further discussions of resourcism and welfarism, and the sense in which Rawls is a 
resourcist, see Pogge 2002, 176 f. and Stopford 2009, 21-2, 140-142. 
26 Nussbaum responds to such criticisms by arguing that the list of central capabilities 
specifies a “partial” rather than a full conception of the good for persons, and that func-
tioning need be supported only up to a threshold below which truly human functioning is 
not available (2000, 75, 211-212).  But the level of functioning is not at what is at stake. It is 
the legitimacy of the use of state resources to impose or enable human functioning at any 
level that is in question. In The Skillful Self I take the view that the role of the central capa-
bilities in questions of distributive justice can only be heuristic (Stopford 2009, 141-142).  
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better but for the worse endowed, since the worse endowed will be 
entitled to an increased share of resources as part of the adjustment for 
conversion inequality. The limits of this redistributive project are 
unclear, since neither Nussbaum nor Sen proposes a metric for 
balancing claims across the entire social scheme. This in turn raises 
questions of feasibility and social stability (Pogge 2002, 206-209; 
Stopford 2009, 137-138). Such concerns are likely to be aggravated if the 
ecological and economic constraints of a low growth economy have to be 
taken into account.  
As we have seen, Aristotle’s theory of the household implies that the 
acquisition of wealth is circumscribed by a natural limit. Household 
wealth is not an end in itself but a means to a certain kind of life that is 
self-sufficient.27 It provides a model for flourishing within limits that 
distinguishes between life and the “good life,” treating the acquisition of 
household wealth as a means to the latter. Aristotle believes that people 
grow “acquisitive” when they lose sight of their original reasons for ac-
quiring wealth and, having failed to discover the good life, allow the pur-
suit of wealth to become their ruling activity.  
The resourcist’s view of the basis of social expectations echoes the 
view of wealth as an instrument. “Primary goods,” as Rawls calls them, 
are goods (obviously different in kind and scope from Aristotle’s concep-
tion of household wealth) that people know how to make use of in pur-
suing their conceptions of the good (Rawls 1971, 90-95). The capability 
approach, however, goes a step further than Aristotle or Rawls – perhaps 
a step too far – if it makes functioning the basis of social expectations 
(Stopford 2009, 138). This “step too far” diverts attention from a third 
factor relevant to the way human beings function, alongside resources 
and capabilities, namely the nonrepresentable skills (177-179).  
Skills are “representable” if they can be delegated to a third party 
without loss of function (for example when we pay a doctor to look after 
our health). There are, however, other cases in which skillful activity 
cannot be delegated without a loss of function (177). Capabilities can on-
                                                 
27 The word ‘wealth’ here denotes the generic objects of a household economy in the sense 
of Aristotle, not money, riches, or “net worth” in the modern sense.  On the translation 
and interpretation of αὐτάρκης see Meikle 1995, 44-45. 
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ly be said to be “truly human” if they are grounded in skills that are non-
representable in this sense: that each person must acquire and cultivate 
them for themselves.28 It is by conceiving and executing a plan of our 
own making that we take the first and most important step towards act-
ing in a truly human way.  
Because it is skillful, this first step is also already a step towards the 
capacity for rationality that is prefigured in what Kant calls the human 
“technical predisposition” (Kant 1978, 240; Sennett, 150).29 Both Kant 
and Aristotle, from their different perspectives, recognize that the 
human mind is formally flexible with regard to its objects. In the words 
of Aristotle: η ψυχη τα òντα πως ὲστιν (Aristotle 1907 III, 8, 431b20) - 
“Man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities.”30 While for Aristotle this is an 
ontological fact, for Kant it is a state of affairs that can only be conceived 
in conjunction with the historical process by which humankind emerges 
from its roots in the animal world and develops the technical 
predisposition for realizing freely chosen ends (Allison 2012, 239, 250; 
Louden 2011, xxv-xxvi). Culture is not the site of a battle between 
bestializing and humanizing tendencies (Sloterdijk 2009, 15) but a 
gradual process by which a capacity for reason that is already prefigured 
in the manipulative abilities of the human hand unfolds.31 Skill itself is 
                                                 
28 On the semantics of ‘capability’ and ‘skill’ see Stopford 2009, 146. 
29 The technical predisposition of mankind is illustrated by the capacity of the human hand 
to manipulate any object whatsoever. The hand is not confined to holding a particular kind 
of object or grasping a particular type of tool. Its freedom consists in the predisposition by 
which it can adapt to any object whatsoever. In this respect the human hand anticipates 
the flexibility of reason itself. Thus Kant writes in the Anthropology that “the characteriza-
tion of man as a rational animal is found in the form and organization of the human hand, 
its fingers, and fingertips. Nature has made them partly through their construction, and 
partly through their sensitivity, not only for manipulating objects in one particular way, but 
also in an open-ended way. Nature has made them, therefore, fit to be used by reason, and 
thereby Nature has indicated the technological gift, or the gift for skill, of this species as 
that of a rational animal” (Kant 1978, 240). 
30 Quoted with this English translation in Heidegger 1962, 34. 
31 See Sloterdijk 2009, 15-16. Sloterdijk argues that the humanistic “taming of man” has 
failed. But the humanism he describes - one that involves initiation into an “intimate soci-
ety of letters” as the key to the “calming of the inner beast” - is perfectionist. Sloterdijk 
does not consider the possibility of a – to paraphrase Rawls – “political not metaphysical” 
conception of education which, rather than dramatizing the contest of culture and barba-
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not moral, and the cultural, industrial, and scientific achievements that 
it makes possible may embody both progressive and regressive 
elements.32 But a society that undermines the very feature of culture that 
prefigures the human predisposition to reason can never be moral. 
Understanding the relationship between resources, capabilities and 
the nonrepresentable skills can throw light on the transition from a 
growth driven economy focused on consumption to a low growth 
economy which focuses on capability development “within limits.” Such a 
transition calls for a conception of prosperity that is consistent with 
sustainable levels of economic activity and thus presupposes an 
acceptance and understanding of limits. While the list of capabilities 
proposed by Nussbaum might provide a starting point for such a 
conception, Jackson argues that the capability approach must be 
“bounded” – that is to say that only ecological and economic resources 
consistent with a low or no economic growth scenario should be devoted 
to the development of the core capabilities (Jackson 2000, 45). But what 
would it mean to promote human capabilities under such circumstances? 
How can we make sense of the transition to a society that is no longer 
wedded to economic growth and is nevertheless prosperous? 
One clue to such a transition may be sought in the craft worker’s 
approach to resistances and limits. What Sennett calls the “material 
consciousness” of the craftsman involves a kind of “dialogue” through 
which the skilled worker voluntarily submits to the constraints of their 
material (Sennett 2008, 168). Learning and applying a craft involves 
learning to deal with limits. Progress in skillful activity involves dealing 
with obstacles and material resistances that the craftsman must address 
and devise strategies to overcome. “Skill builds by moving irregularly, 
and sometimes by taking detours” (238). Sometimes the least obvious 
course or strategy is the right one, and sometimes the craft worker 
confronts obstacles that they have themselves introduced. (220-222). 
Dealing with resistances requires the craftsman to develop secondary 
skills such as patience and self-discipline (Stopford 2009, 176). 
                                                                                                       
rism, focuses on the cultivation of the raw materials of human nature, recognizing that the 
growth of culture is slow and its progress uneven.  
32 See, for example, Kant’s account of the “shining misery” to which the culture of skill 
leads (Kant 1987, §83). 
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Skills acquired in this way are nonrepresentable because each person 
must acquire and exercise them for themselves and one person cannot 
exercise them on behalf of another. “Thinking as making” and the 
“material consciousness” of the craft worker involve the development of 
nonrepresentable skills in a specific medium.33 To learn to overcome 
such obstacles through these and other strategies may involve a slow and 
continuous process of development over many years. “Thinking as 
making,” as Aristotle would agree, is not the same as “thinking as 
doing.” To succeed the craft worker must learn to flourish within the 
limits of the available.  
The craft worker’s encounter with obstacles and resistances has par-
allels in other kinds of skillful activity that do not yield products and arti-
facts but are nevertheless skillful (175-84). Health, bodily integrity, the 
capacity for affiliation, and many other capabilities depend on forms of 
skillful activity that are liable to run into obstacles and resistances in 
much the way craft work does (148-60). Skills do not exist in isolation 
from one other but form networks. Skills acquired in one area of a net-
work may be transferred and adopted in others. Each type of skillful ac-
tivity may break down, whether occasionally or systematically. When a 
skill breaks down, the entire network of mutually supporting skills con-
nected with it is likely to be affected. We can think of each human being 
as the custodian of such a network of nonrepresentable skills that is 
theirs and theirs alone (177).  
What we discern here are the outlines of a culture of skill in which 
the craftsman’s slow, sometimes awkward, unpredictable and 
painstaking encounters with obstacles, resistances, and limits provide a 
pattern for human flourishing within limits. Cultural progress is neither 
fast nor instinctive. Were it so, we would not enjoy the flexibility that 
allows us to interact with the world in an “open-ended” way. Instead, 
human culture depends on a slow process of “trial, practice and 
                                                 
33 Sennett’s account of “material consciousness” might be seen as an elaboration of 
Heidegger’s (1927, §15) account of Zuhandensein , though Sennett’s method is not phe-
nomenological. Sennett uses the term “material consciousness” to signify not a “thematic” 
consciousness of an object, but rather a “productive awareness” that is disclosed by dealing 
with a material and expressed through phrases such as “thinking with one’s hands” (Sen-
nett 2008, 149-155). 
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instruction” (Kant 1991, 42). The skillful self does not respond to a 
problem by giving up, but by trying a different approach or looking at a 
difficulty in a different light. Rather than abandoning its goals, it seeks 
new ways and means to achieve them. “Skillpower is not willpower, and 
in craft as in art it often takes a long time to get from A to B.”34  
In a culture of skill people are concerned not with what they have but 
with what they have to do or what needs to be done. Such a culture is less 
susceptible than consumer culture to positional or “status goods” and 
unproductive status competition (Jackson 2009, 154-156) that adds “little or 
nothing to the levels of well-being” (53) and acts as a “material ‘ratchet’ that 
drives resources through the economy” (181).35 When the skillful self is 
engaged with the task at hand it may not even notice other selves, far less 
compare itself with them. To understand others as skillful selves is itself a 
form of skillful activity (Stopford 2009, 155). The others are encountered not 
as isolated individuals but in the context of activities in which we notice 
them because they too are engaged in doing something skillfully. 
The other is not someone who occupies the median position in a 
distribution or a consumer whose choices are mapped using demand 
curves, but a person who, like ourselves, has a task to do and does it 
more or less well. Rather than seeing others as economic agents whose 
material status we compare with our own, we see them in terms of what 
they can do and be. When citizens develop a skillful understanding of 
their own activities and have understood that others are also skillful 
selves who, like themselves, have their problems and obstacles to deal 
with, they are less likely to base their choices about how to live on the 
symbolic status of material commodities to which they lack a skillful 
relationship. Status syndrome and status anxiety are signs that the 
skillful self has lost touch with the essential context of everyday skillful 
activity.36 The less dependent we are on status goods and unproductive 
status competition the more our participation in society can focus on 
needs that are “truly human.” 
                                                 
34 Stopford 2011, 37 (author’s translation). The German text reads: „Die Kraft der 
Fähigkeiten ist keine Willenskraft, und im Handwerk wie in der Kunst braucht es oft eine 
lange Zeit, um von A nach B zu kommen.“ 
35 On consumer culture and the “iron cage” of consumerism see Jackson 2009, 87-102. 
36 On the essential role of contexts of purposes in use see Stopford 2009, 116-117.  
John Stopford 
 
256 
A culture of skill thus furnishes a framework of less “materialistic” 
ways for people to participate in the life of society, reducing our 
dependency on material growth and preparing the way for a 
readjustment of the balance between investment, labour productivity 
and consumption (Jackson, 133-136). The restoration of a public culture 
of skill cannot by itself resolve questions of distributive justice and basic 
entitlements. Such issues remain on the day to day political agenda. But 
such a culture is necessary to sustain the kind of framework within 
which fairness is possible, holding bargaining and agreement about 
distributive shares and entitlements to within a manageable range, and 
laying the foundation for the reasonable management of social 
expectations.  
Political communities that wish to encourage the development of a 
culture of skill must thus seek ways to resist the marginalization of skill 
that has become a systematic feature of modern civilization. This does 
not require us to oppose the “chief dimensions of globalization,” but it 
does involve the search for configurations of economic and technological 
development that are consistent with a culture of skill and grounded in a 
democratic critique of technological rationality (Stopford 2009, 7-8, 123-
132). 37 This may, in turn, lead to a political conception of prosperity that 
reflects a skillful understanding of what it means to flourish within 
limits, and from this position begin to address the dilemma of growth 
with which ecologically challenged societies are faced. 
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